The Effects of Market Liberalization on the Relative Earnings of Chinese Women

In this paper we first explore the effects of differences in labor market institutions and the degree of market liberalization on the size and composition of gender wages gaps in China's urban labor markets. We use enterprise-ownership type, enterprise age, and workers' methods of finding employment as proxies for the extent of market liberalization. We find both the size of the wage gaps and the proportion of the gap left unexplained by differences in productive characteristics largest in the most liberalized (joint venture) sector, and smallest in the least liberalized (state) sector. We next investigate the effects of differences in wage structure on the gender wage gaps. We find that differences in wage structure, in general, and the degree of wage dispersion, in particular, are extremely important in accounting for the larger wage gaps in the joint venture and collective sectors relative to the state-owned sector.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39844/3/wp460.pd

Regional monopoly and interregional and intraregional competition: the parallel trade in Coca-Cola between Shanghai and Hangzhou in China

This article uses a “principal-agent-subagent” analytical framework and data that were collected from field surveys in China to (1) investigate the nature and causes of the parallel trade in Coca-Cola between Shanghai and Hangzhou and (2) assess the geographic and theoretical implications for the regional monopolies that have been artificially created by Coca-Cola in China. The parallel trade in Coca-Cola is sustained by its intraregional rivalry with Pepsi-Cola in Shanghai, where Coca-Cola (China) (the principal) seeks to maximize its share of the Shanghai soft-drinks market. This goal effectively supersedes the market-division strategy of Coca-Cola (China), since the gap in wholesale prices between the Shanghai and Hangzhou markets is higher than the transaction costs of engaging in parallel trade. The exclusive distributor of Coca-Cola in the Shanghai market (the subagent) makes opportunistic use of a situation in which it does not have to bear the financial consequences of the major residual claimants (the principal and other agents) and has an incentive to enter the nondesignated Coca-Cola market of Hangzhou by crossing the geographic boundary between the two regional monopolies devised by Coca-Cola. The existence of parallel trade in Coca-Cola promotes interregional competition between the Shanghai and Hangzhou bottlers (the agents). This article enhances an understanding of the economic geography of spatial equilibrium, disequilibrium, and quasi-equilibrium of a transnational corporation's distribution system and its artificially created market boundary in China

Measuring the impact of the investment climate on total factor productivity : the cases of China and Brazil

This study measures the impact of investment climate factors on total factor productivity (TFP) of firms in Brazil and China. The analysis is conducted in two steps: first an econometric production function is estimated to produce a measure of TFP at the firm level. In the second step, variation in TFP across firms is statistically related to a indicators of the investment climate as well as firm characteristics. The results yield a number of insights about the factors underlying productivity. In both countries, and in a variety of industry groups, indicators of poor investment climate, especially delays in customs clearance and interruptions in utility services, have significant negative effects on TFP. Reducing customs clearance time by one day in China could increase TFP by 2-6 percent. Indicators such as email usage have positive effects on TFP. In the case of China, state-owned firms and firms located in the interior are shown to be much less productive than privately owned firms and firms located in the east. In Brazil, the results present an interesting contrast between the apparel industry and the electronics industry. In the apparel industry, older firms in competitive markets are more productive, while in the case of electronics, newer firms with higher market shares are more productive.Economic Theory&Research,Technology Industry,Water and Industry,ICT Policy and Strategies,Economic Growth

The Global Positioning System: Global Developments and Opportunities

International Relations/Trade,

The Effects of Market Liberalization on the Relative Earnings of Chinese Women

In this paper we first explore the effects of differences in labor market institutions and the degree of market liberalization on the size and composition of gender wages gaps in China's urban labor markets. We use enterprise-ownership type, enterprise age, and workers' methods of finding employment as proxies for the extent of market liberalization. We find both the size of the wage gaps and the proportion of the gap left unexplained by differences in productive characteristics largest in the most liberalized (joint venture) sector, and smallest in the least liberalized (state) sector. We next investigate the effects of differences in wage structure on the gender wage gaps. We find that differences in wage structure, in general, and the degree of wage dispersion, in particular, are extremely important in accounting for the larger wage gaps in the joint venture and collective sectors relative to the state-owned sector.China, gender wage gap, labor, market liberalization, earnings

Chinese Overseas M&A Performance and the go Global Policy

This paper investigates whether stock markets view Chinese OMAs as increasing shareholder wealth. The subject is of interest given the influential role that the government plays in Chinese firms’ overseas activities, and the fact that the government may have objectives other than maximization of shareholder wealth. We examine 145 OMAs by Chinese acquiring firms over the year 1994-2008. We find some evidence that markets positively responded to news of Chinese OMAs. However, we also find that markets responded less favorably after China implemented its Go Global policy encouraging overseas investment. We hypothesize two reasons for this: First, the expansion of OMAs under Go Global resulted in Chinese firms pursuing less attractive targets, on average. Second, Go Global re-directed investment towards industries having national strategic value but diminished profit value. Using a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition procedure, we find no evidence to support this latter hypothesis. Thus, to whatever extent strategic interests may motivate China’s Go Global policy, it does not appear that their pursuit has come at the expense of shareholder wealth.Economic Development; China Economy; Overseas Mergers and Acquisitions; Event Study; Go Global

China's Embrace of Globalization

As China has become an increasingly important part of the global trading system over the past two decades, interest in the country and its international economic policies has increased among international economists who are not China specialists. This paper represents an attempt to provide the international economics community with a succinct summary of the major steps in the evolution of Chinese policy toward international trade and foreign direct investment and their consequences since the late 1970s. In doing so, we draw upon and update a number of more comprehensive book-length treatments of the subject. It is our hope that this paper will prove to be a useful resource for the growing numbers of international economists who are exploring China-related issues, either in the classroom or in their own research.

Foreign direct investment in the People’s Republic of China : preferences, policies and performance

In establishing an investment policy in post-Mao China, policy was designed to gain the benefits of foreign direct investment (capital inflow, job creation, export growth, and the upgrading of technology and skills) without suffering any of the perceived negative consequences. As a result policy makers have attempted to segregate the investment regime, restricting or prohibiting investment where domestic Chinese producers might be vulnerable to international competition, whilst encouraging investment to produce exports and where there is little or no domestic capacity. In the process, considerable autonomy over investment policy has been devolved to local governments, which in turn have been heavily influenced by the interests of foreign investors in shaping local investment strategies. From the mid-1990s, the policy of shielding domestic producers from competition was challenged from both external actors seeking the creation of a level playing field, and internal actors who questioned the logic of the status quo. But whilst there has been considerable liberalisation, including the extension of forms of investment and ownership not least as a result of Chinas WTO entry criteria conceptions of social stability, the potential impact of investment on such social stability, still remain crucial determinants of investment policy