133 research outputs found
Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom
We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without additivity axiom similarly as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen's one by replacement of the additivity and null-player axioms via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the Owen value suggested by Winter for games with level structure is valid as well
Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value Kamijo (2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses
The Shapley group value
Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a)
as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person iteraction situation,
we propose a group value, which we call the Shapley group value, as a priori evaluation
of the prospects of a group of players in a coalitional game when acting as a unit. We
study its properties and we give an axiomatic characterization. We motivate our
proposal by means of some relevant applications of the Shapley group value, when it is
used as an objective function by a decision maker who is trying to identify an optimal
group of agents in a framework in which agents interact and the attained benefit can be
modeled by means of a transferable utility game. As an illustrative example we analyze
the problem of identifying the set of key agents in a terrorist network.This research has been supported by I+D+i research project MTM2011-27892 from the Government of Spai
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