What is Leadership? (Chapter Two of Leadership Alive: Changing Leadership Practices within the Emerging 21st Century Culture)

Excerpt: This newly emerging culture is upon us. This change in Western culture requires a new breed of leader to emerge. There are many usable definitions concerning leadership. Leadership may appear in many forms, come from many theories, and be derived from many sources, but all are likely to guide through actions, influence, or service. 80 The new emerging leader of the 21st century will understand the relationship between the four principle leadership models: (1) Servant Leadership, (2) Situational Leadership, (3) Leadership and the New Science, and ( 4) Christian Leadership. In Chapter Three, I will introduce and explore the cultural shift that is surfacing within the United States and for that matter, Western Society abroad. I\u27ll discuss its effect upon leadership perceptions and development and will introduce three major themes of cultural change. We\u27re in need of a leadership with perspective and that perspective is colored by the prismatic tapestry of our evolving culture. So let\u27s turn the page to explore and collect some new colors of understanding as we venture into the future of the 21st century

Reflective Artificial Intelligence

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology advances, we increasingly delegate mental tasks to machines. However, today's AI systems usually do these tasks with an unusual imbalance of insight and understanding: new, deeper insights are present, yet many important qualities that a human mind would have previously brought to the activity are utterly absent. Therefore, it is crucial to ask which features of minds have we replicated, which are missing, and if that matters. One core feature that humans bring to tasks, when dealing with the ambiguity, emergent knowledge, and social context presented by the world, is reflection. Yet this capability is completely missing from current mainstream AI. In this paper we ask what reflective AI might look like. Then, drawing on notions of reflection in complex systems, cognitive science, and agents, we sketch an architecture for reflective AI agents, and highlight ways forward

Dance of the bulrushes: building conversations between social creatures

The interactive installation is in vogue. Interaction design and physical installations are accepted fixtures of modern life, and with these technology-driven installations beginning to exert influence on modes of mass communication and general expectations for user experiences, it seems appropriate to explore the variety of interactions that exist. This paper surveys a number of successful projects with a critical eye toward assessing the type of communication and/or conversation generated between interactive installations and human participants. Moreover, this exploration seeks to identify whether specific tactics and/or technologies are particularly suited to engendering layers of dialogue or ‘conversations’ within interactive physical computing installations. It is asserted that thoughtful designs incorporating self-organizational abilities can foster rich dialogues in which participants and the installation collaboratively generate value in the interaction. To test this hypothesis an interactive installation was designed and deployed in locations in and around London. Details of the physical objects and employed technologies are discussed, and results of the installation sessions are shown to corroborate the key tenets of this argument in addition to highlighting other concerns that are specifically relevant to the broad topic of interactive design

Subjects-of-a-Life, Entelechy, and Intrinsic Teleology

Abstract This article explores the question of what is a “subject-of-a-life,” Tom Regan’s celebrated term for a living entity to whom, he argued, we humans owe ethical duty. I return to ancient concepts of entelechy and teleological organization, arguing that, stripped of theological implications, they provide a usable basis for modern theorizing about organism and an ethical foundation for condemning such practices as transgenic engineering. Every creature, it is argued, has its own inherited formal identity, which it strives to sustain. This reality is ethically pertinent knowledge which humans are obliged to respect and honor

Action! Fun! Let's Learn English Language

Recent research reveals that students' attitudes and academic achievement improve when learning experiences revolve around their interests, talents and needs. In order to facilitate learning, teachers or language educators have to provide highly engaging learning experiences, which are both motivating and challenging to learners. Language acquisition and teaching strategies are key terms that are significant in language learning and teaching. Success in learning English is due to many factors such as motivation, classroom management, methodology, teachers' efforts and skills, students' interests, teaching materials, lesson plans and so on. Students become very excited when lesson games and drama activities are included in their lessons. They learn English naturally and enjoyably. Keywords: learning English, achievement, motivation, interest, teaching materia

Animals, Machines, and Moral Responsibility in a Built Environment

Nature has ended. Acid rain and global warming leave no place untouched by human hands. We can no longer think of \u27the environment\u27 as synonymous with \u27nature\u27. Instead, Steven Vogel argues that the environment is more like a mall: it is built. And because we build the environment, we are responsible for it. Yet, other things build, too. Animals build and use tools. Machines and algorithms build everything from skyscrapers to cell phones. Are they responsible for what they build? While animals and robots are normally considered in distinct philosophical fields, Vogel’s rejection of the natural-artificial split prompts us to question the distinction between natural and artificial agents. I argue, under consistent reasons, that neither animals nor robots are morally responsible for what they do. When machines act in morally consequential ways, then, we cannot blame the robot. However, we usually think to blame those who built the robot. I present a theory of how a builder may be responsible for what they build. Then, I argue that there are cases where neither the robot nor the engineer can be blamed for the robot\u27s actions. Drawing on Vogel, Karl Marx, and Martin Heidegger, I explore moral and environmental responsibility through meditations on animals and machines

Engaging the Religiously Committed Other: Anthropologists and Theologians in Dialogue

Anthropology has two tasks: the scientific task of studying human beings and the instrumental task of promoting human flourishing. To date, the scientific task has been constrained by secularism, and the instrumental task by the philosophy and values of liberalism. These constraints have caused religiously based scholarship to be excluded from anthropology’s discourse, to the detriment of both tasks. The call for papers for the 2009 meetings of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) recognized the need to “push the field’s epistemological and presentational conventions” in order to reach anthropology’s various publics. Religious thought has much to say about the human condition. It can expand the discourse in ways that provide explanatory value as well as moral purpose and hope.We propose an epistemology of witness for dialogue between anthropologists and theologians, and we demonstrate the value added with an example: the problem of violence

Doctor of Philosophy

dissertationIt is often assumed that rational agents are unified agents. As a normative feature of agency, the idea that fully rational creatures are, in a certain sense, unified, suggests that understanding ourselves as rational creatures requires understanding our reasons for acting as reasons that can be represented with a single account of agency. In this dissertation, I argue against such a view by showing that features of our own agency preclude constructing such a representation. To be the type of creatures we are, we have to act in ways that cannot be represented with a single, unified theory of rational agency. Instead, making sense of ourselves as rational creatures requires a number of different models that cannot be nicely fitted together. The upshot is that a unified account of rational agency may not be possible