Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link

In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.conflict, suicide terrorism, weakest link, Colonel Blotto

Adversarial Risk Análysis for Counterterrorism Modelling

Recent large scale terrorist attacks have raised interest in models for resource allocation against terrorist threats. The unifying theme in this area is the need to develop methods for the analysis of allocation decisions when risks stem from the intentional actions of intelligent adversaries. Most approaches to these problems have a game theoretic flavor although there are also several interesting decision analytic based proposals. One of them is the recently introduced framework for adversarial risk analysis, which deals with decision making problems that involve intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. We explore how adversarial risk analysis addresses some standard counterterrorism models: simultaneous defend-attack models, sequential defend-attack-defend models and sequential defend-attack models with private information. For each model, we first assess critically what would be a typical game theoretic approach and then provide the corresponding solution proposed by the adversarial risk analysis framework, emphasizing how to coherently assess a predictive probability model of the adversary’s actions, in a context in which we aim at supporting decisions of a defender versus an attacker. This illustrates the application of adversarial risk analysis to basic counterterrorism models that may be used as basic building blocks for more complex risk analysis of counterterrorism problems

Weakest-Link Attacker-Defender Games With Multiple Attack Technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization\u27s objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology e.g., suicide attacks when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures

The past and future of terrorism research

Este artículo destaca cinco áreas donde el análisis económico del terrorismo ha tenido mayor relevancia en las políticas de los últimos 30 años. Estas áreas son la evaluación de la efectividad de las acciones contra el terrorismo, la identificación de las causas del terrorismo, la medición de las consecuencias económicas del terrorismo, el análisis de la dinámica de las series temporales de actos terroristas y la formulación de representaciones del terrorismo basadas en la teoría de juegos. La principal novedad del artículo es que sintetiza investigaciones anteriores e identifica las cuestiones más importantes en las políticas que requieren un análisis adicional. Estas cuestiones permiten entender cómo operan las redes globales de terrorismo, evaluar los resultados de las estrategias antiterroristas y de formas alternativas de cooperación internacional e investigar los aspectos estratégicos del terrorismo de suicidas. Se ofrece un procedimiento para tratar cada una de estas políticas.terrorismo, contraterrorismo, análisis coste beneficio, teoría de juegos, efectividad de las políticas, consecuencias económicas.

An Epidemiological Approach to Terrorism

There are many types of models for counterterrorism, explaining different problems that the military faces in the fight against terrorism. This thesis proposes that one of the fundamental assumptions underlying existing models of counterterrorism is that the struggle with terrorists can be understood as a war in the traditional sense of the term. We propose to rethink the struggle against terrorism as a fight against an infection. The epidemic of terrorist ideology within part of the world is a result, from this perspective, of the infectiousness of that ideology. Using the insights of the field of the epidemiology of ideas, this research looks into the models and methods used to understand and fight biological epidemics. We work with the SIR model from mathematical epidemiology, which partitions populations into susceptible, infected, and recovered categories, and apply that model with notional starting rates to the epidemic of terrorist ideology. This research allows another set of assumptions for models used in counterterrorism because the insights gained from viewing terrorism as a symptom of an epidemic can expand our understanding of the problem that we fight

Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism

The trends and consequences of terrorist activities are often captured by counting the number of incidents and casualties. More recently, the effects of terrorist acts on various aspects of the economy have been analyzed. These costs are surveyed and put in perspective. As economic consequences are only a part of the overall costs of terrorism, possible approaches for estimating the utility losses of the people affected are discussed. Results using the life satisfaction approach, in which individual utility is approximated by self-reported subjective well-being, suggest that people’s utility losses may far exceed the purely economic consequences.terrorism, subjective well-being, life satisfaction, utility loss

Terrorism- a game theoretic approach

Terrorism which has been on the increase in recent years is of much concern to both Governments and the private sectors .This research aims at reflecting the contemporary trends in international terrorism, and suggesting the possibility of their application for the Ghanaian private sector. Game Theory, which in recent years has been increasingly used in researches and in creating anti-terrorism strategies is the method of presentation of this write-up. Game Theory is rationally used to examine this phenomenon, and with the aid of economic instruments offer new remedies