Mechanism Choice

This chapter reviews the literature on the selection of regulatory policy instruments, from both normative and positive perspectives. It first reviews the mechanism design literature to identify normative objectives in selecting among the menu or toolbox of policy instruments. The chapter then discusses the public choice and positive political theory literatures and the variety of models developed to attempt to predict the actual selection of alternative policy instruments. It begins with simpler early models focusing on interest group politics and proceeds to more complicated models that incorporate both supply and demand for policy, the role of policy entrepreneurs, behavioral and cognitive choice, and public perceptions and mass politics. It compares these theories to empirical experience. The chapter examines literature in law, economics, political science, and related fields, and it draws examples from US, European, and international regulation. It concludes with suggestions for future research. Document is the author\u27s manuscrip

Mechanism Choice

Mechanism choice can generally be described as the selection of some way to structure rules for social behavior. Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin recently described a mechanism as “an institution, procedure, or game for determining outcomes” (Maskin 2008: 568). In the realm of public law, mechanism choice is synonymous with “instrument choice” or policy design. The selection of the policy instrument can be as important to success or failure as the intended policy outcome. Good intentions or objectives are not enough: the choice of tools matters. A large and growing literature in instrument choice and mechanism design examines both the normative criteria for correcting market failures, matching optimal instruments to different types of problems, minimizing costs, and overcoming incomplete information; and also the positive political factors that may influence the actual selection of instruments, and the pattern of such choices across issue areas, governance systems, and time. Public policy instruments are selected and designed by public bodies –legislatures, executive agencies, and courts – that are comprised of individuals with their own policy preferences, and that are subject to pressures from private interests through lobbying, campaign contributions, and elections. Thus, it is no surprise to the student of public law that the mechanisms actually selected to implement public policy are not necessarily the ones that best pursue the public interest. This chapter begins with a brief summary of normative mechanism choice, including the legal literature on instrument choice and the economics literature on mechanism design. It then moves to a more detailed discussion of positive mechanism choice, also called public choice, political economy, or positive politics. This positive literature explores how political institutions and pressures shape the selection of mechanisms to implement policy, notably when the selected instrument departs from the normative ideal. The positive study of mechanism choice not only informs how political processes shape policy outcomes, but also sheds useful insights into those processes themselves.

Introduction & Coda, Multi-Party Dispute Resolution, Democracy and Decision Making: Vol. II of Complex Dispute Resolution

The Complex Dispute Resolution series collects essays on the development of foundational dispute resolution theory and practice and its application to increasingly more complex settings of conflicts in the world, including multi-party and multi-issue decision making, negotiations in political policy formation and governance, and international conflict resolution. Each volume contains an original introduction by the editor, which explores the key issues in the field. All three volumes feature essays which span an interdisciplinary range of fields, law, political science, game theory, decision science, economics, social and cognitive psychology, sociology and anthropology and consider issues in the uses of informal and private processes, as well as more formal and public processes. The essays question whether the development of universal theoretical insights about conflict resolution is possible with variable numbers of parties and issues and in multi-cultural and multi-jural settings. Each volume also presents a coda, summarizing key issues in the field and suggesting further avenues for research. The second volume (and the introductory essay here) applies the theoretical foundations and practices of primary processes in dispute resolution–negotiation, mediation, arbitration and some hybrid processes in both public and private, informal and formal settings to more complex multi-party and multi issue settings, and asks whether foundational theories must be altered when there are more parties and issues. What difference do larger numbers make in theory and practice of dispute resolution and decision making? Other theoretical and empirical observations of the role of third party neutrals and facilitators in multi-party settings are explored, and applied disciplines such as game theory and decision sciences are applied to complex dispute resolution settings. Illustrations of uses of these processes in different substantive areas, e.g. legal disputes, public policy decision making, politics and governance, environmental matters, institutional relations, and high conflict settings are provided. The volume collects classic articles in multi-party, multi-issue theory and practice while interrogating the issues of how the numbers of parties and issues, different contexts and cultures challenges our efforts to create generalizable theory and practice of human conflict resolution. The review essay also discusses recent efforts to seek correspondences and learning from application of conflict resolution theory and practice to the work on deliberative democracy and political decision making. The coda suggests avenues for future research. Some attention is paid to issues of ethics and political theory, as well as evaluation of efficacy, in the use of third party facilitators in public policy and governance disputes

Cheaper and Better: Selecting Good Workers for Crowdsourcing

Crowdsourcing provides a popular paradigm for data collection at scale. We study the problem of selecting subsets of workers from a given worker pool to maximize the accuracy under a budget constraint. One natural question is whether we should hire as many workers as the budget allows, or restrict on a small number of top-quality workers. By theoretically analyzing the error rate of a typical setting in crowdsourcing, we frame the worker selection problem into a combinatorial optimization problem and propose an algorithm to solve it efficiently. Empirical results on both simulated and real-world datasets show that our algorithm is able to select a small number of high-quality workers, and performs as good as, sometimes even better than, the much larger crowds as the budget allows

Bandit-Based Task Assignment for Heterogeneous Crowdsourcing

We consider a task assignment problem in crowdsourcing, which is aimed at collecting as many reliable labels as possible within a limited budget. A challenge in this scenario is how to cope with the diversity of tasks and the task-dependent reliability of workers, e.g., a worker may be good at recognizing the name of sports teams, but not be familiar with cosmetics brands. We refer to this practical setting as heterogeneous crowdsourcing. In this paper, we propose a contextual bandit formulation for task assignment in heterogeneous crowdsourcing, which is able to deal with the exploration-exploitation trade-off in worker selection. We also theoretically investigate the regret bounds for the proposed method, and demonstrate its practical usefulness experimentally

Bylaw Governance

This article argues that Delaware corporate law permits shareholders to use bylaws to circumscribe the managerial authority of the board of directors. While shareholders cannot mandate action by the board, they can enact specific prohibitions on its behavior, so long as the board retains enough discretion to implement—in practice, not merely in theory—its managerial policies by other means. The use of such circumscribing bylaws to discourage shirking (or analogous managerial abuses) by the directors or officers resembles the use of negative covenants in debt contracts that seek to prevent the debtor from squandering assets. Bylaw governance thus subtly but significantly reallocates governance power within the corporation, so as to reduce the agency costs of management. Its legal validity should also prompt courts and scholars alike to focus less on the quantity of power wielded by the shareholders, and more on the ways that power can be configured to produce managerial efficiencies

Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes

The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theory of how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why a) senior members and young members in safe districts are most likely to challenge a committee’s jurisdiction; b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer’s ideal point in order to obtain jurisdiction; c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106th Congress