Multi-Stage Decision Rules for Power Generation & Storage Investments with Performance Guarantees

We develop multi-stage linear decision rules (LDRs) for dynamic power system generation and energy storage investment planning under uncertainty and propose their chance-constrained optimization with performance guarantees. First, the optimized LDRs guarantee operational and carbon policy feasibility of the resulting dynamic investment plan even when the planning uncertainty distribution is ambiguous. Second, the optimized LDRs internalize the tolerance of the system planner towards the stochasticity (variance) of uncertain investment outcomes. They can eventually produce a quasi-deterministic investment plan, which is insensitive to uncertainty (as in deterministic planning) but robust to its realizations (as in stochastic planning). Last, we certify the performance of the optimized LDRs with the bound on their sub-optimality due to their linear functional form. Using this bound, we guarantee that the preference of LDRs over less restrictive -- yet poorly scalable -- scenario-based optimization does not lead to financial losses exceeding this bound. We use a testbed of the U.S. Southeast power system to reveal the trade-offs between the cost, stochasticity, and feasibility of LDR-based investments. We also conclude that the LDR sub-optimality depends on the amount of uncertainty and the tightness of chance constraints on operational, investment and policy variables

THOUGHTS ON PRODUCTIVITY, EFFICIENCY AND CAPACITY UTILIZATION MEASUREMENT FOR FISHERIES

Productivity Analysis, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

A market-based transmission planning for HVDC grid—case study of the North Sea

There is significant interest in building HVDC transmission to carry out transnational power exchange and deliver cheaper electricity from renewable energy sources which are located far from the load centers. This paper presents a market-based approach to solve a long-term TEP for meshed VSC-HVDC grids that connect regional markets. This is in general a nonlinear, non-convex large-scale optimization problem with high computational burden, partly due to the many combinations of wind and load that become possible. We developed a two-step iterative algorithm that first selects a subset of operating hours using a clustering technique, and then seeks to maximize the social welfare of all regions and minimize the investment capital of transmission infrastructure subject to technical and economic constraints. The outcome of the optimization is an optimal grid design with a topology and transmission capacities that results in congestion revenue paying off investment by the end the project's economic lifetime. Approximations are made to allow an analytical solution to the problem and demonstrate that an HVDC pricing mechanism can be consistent with an AC counterpart. The model is used to investigate development of the offshore grid in the North Sea. Simulation results are interpreted in economic terms and show the effectiveness of our proposed two-step approach

Endogenous Entry and Antitrust Policy

This article derives antitrust implications for markets where entry can be regarded as endogenous (contrary to most analysis within the post-Chicago tradition). Many applications concern issues of abuse of dominance. Endogenous entry requires a wide revision of our understanding of the role of incumbents in pricing, producing in the presence of network externalities and multi-sided markets, bundling products, price discriminating and delegating to retailers through vertical restraints: when entry is endogenous, leaders adopt aggressive strategies without exclusionary purposes and without affecting welfare negatively. Endogenous entry has also implications for the analysis of mergers (that take place only if create enough cost efficiencies and do not harm consumers), the evaluation of collusive cartels (that are unfeasible in markets where entry is endogenous) and state aids for exporting firms (which are always unilaterally optimal for international markets with free entry). The spirit of the policy recommendations of the Chicago school is broadly supported by our analysis in a solid game-theoretic framework.Antitrust, Endogenous entry, Leadership, Chicago school