Fairness Emergence in Reputation Systems

Reputation systems have been used to support users in making decisions under uncertainty or risk that is due to the autonomous behavior of others. Research results support the conclusion that reputation systems can protect against exploitation by unfair users, and that they have an impact on the prices and income of users. This observation leads to another question: can reputation systems be used to assure or increase the fairness of resource distribution? This question has a high relevance in social situations where, due to the absence of established authorities or institutions, agents need to rely on mutual trust relations in order to increase fairness of distribution. This question can be formulated as a hypothesis: in reputation (or trust management) systems, fairness should be an emergent property. The notion of fairness can be precisely defined and investigated based on the theory of equity. In this paper, we investigate the Fairness Emergence hypothesis in reputation systems and prove that , under certain conditions, the hypothesis is valid for open and closed systems, even in unstable system states and in the presence of adversaries. Moreover, we investigate the sensitivity of Fairness Emergence and show that an improvement of the reputation system strengthens the emergence of fairness. Our results are confirmed using a trace-driven simulation from a large Internet auction site.Trust, Simulation, Fairness, Equity, Emergence, Reputation System

A Normative Framework of Justice in Climate Change

The more the various dimensions of climate change are just, the more an international agreement is in principle attainable. That is the reason why justice plays a major role in favouring collective action against global warming. In this article I spell out the dominant notions of justice and the consequent criteria of equity for the main domains of global warming negotiations, in order to identify a normative ethical framework. As far as mitigation is concerned, for the definition of a just initial allocation of endowments the reference point should be a per capita distribution corrected by a factor which takes into account all undeserved inequalities, as suggested by Rawls’ theory of justice. With regard to the subsequent exchange of endowments, I consider the Pareto principle supplemented by the envy-freeness one as the most viable option. Turning to adaptation, my point is that the criterion of responsibility based on historical accountability is inevitable. The related underpinning of justice can be found in principle I of Rawls’ theory of justice. Finally, for the issues raised by the just allocation of compensations for climate related damages I consider Sen’s capability approach the soundest option.adaptation, climate change, equity, justice, international climate agreements, mitigation

Le critère d’absence d’envie dans les théories contemporaines de la justice

Le critère d’absence d’envie, introduit par J. Tinbergen et utilisé par certaines théories de la justice distributive, ne permet pas, dans tous les cas, d’identifier des allocations de biens respectant l’exigence de pareto-optimalité. Pour cette raison il a été, durant un temps, délaissé. Néanmoins, ce critère demeure utile dans certains contextes dont nous voudrions préciser les caractéristiques. En effet, plusieurs travaux récents d’économie normative ont montré que, sous certaines conditions et même dans un contexte de production, l’absence d’envie offre une solution à la recherche d’allocations équitables. Ainsi, nous voudrions examiner, à partir de ces résultats, sous quelles conditions le champ d’application du critère d’absence d’envie peut être étendu, en vue d’identifier des allocations équitables, dans un contexte économique d’échange comme de production.The non envy criterium, introduced by Tinbergen and convoqued by some theories of justice, cannot always be used to identify allocations which also satisfy the requirement of Pareto-optimality. This is the reason why it had been neglected for a while. Nevertheless, it is still useful in some contexts we would like to describe. In fact, recent conclusions of normative economy demonstrated that, in some conditions and even in the framework of production, this criterium provide a solution for fair allocations. Precisely, we would like, on the basis of these results, to determine which extent has the implementation of non envy criterium in order to identify fair distributive allocations in a context of exchange and production as well

Le critère d’absence d’envie dans les théories contemporaines de la justice

Le critère d’absence d’envie, introduit par J. Tinbergen et utilisé par certaines théories de la justice distributive, ne permet pas, dans tous les cas, d’identifier des allocations de biens respectant l’exigence de pareto-optimalité. Pour cette raison il a été, durant un temps, délaissé. Néanmoins, ce critère demeure utile dans certains contextes dont nous voudrions préciser les caractéristiques. En effet, plusieurs travaux récents d’économie normative ont montré que, sous certaines conditions et même dans un contexte de production, l’absence d’envie offre une solution à la recherche d’allocations équitables. Ainsi, nous voudrions examiner, à partir de ces résultats, sous quelles conditions le champ d’application du critère d’absence d’envie peut être étendu, en vue d’identifier des allocations équitables, dans un contexte économique d’échange comme de production.The non envy criterium, introduced by Tinbergen and convoqued by some theories of justice, cannot always be used to identify allocations which also satisfy the requirement of Pareto-optimality. This is the reason why it had been neglected for a while. Nevertheless, it is still useful in some contexts we would like to describe. In fact, recent conclusions of normative economy demonstrated that, in some conditions and even in the framework of production, this criterium provide a solution for fair allocations. Precisely, we would like, on the basis of these results, to determine which extent has the implementation of non envy criterium in order to identify fair distributive allocations in a context of exchange and production as well

Pro-poor water service strategies in developing countries: promoting justice in Uganda’s urban project

Water service to the urban poor presents challenges to political leaders, regulators and managers. We identify technology mixes of yard taps, public water points (with and without pre-paid meters) to meet alternative constraints, and reflecting populations served and investment requirements. Three investment scenarios have different implications for improving water access to over 400,000 citizens in Kampala. One component, pre-paid water meters, can promote social equity and institutional sustainability. If procedural justice is given as much weight as distributive justice in the selection of pro-poor programs, pre-paid meters (the ultimate cost recovery tool) can have a place in the investment plan. The study examines how public stand pipes (and a combination of other options) can meet both financial constraints and social objectives. Financial considerations cannot be wished away when seeking effective strategies for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.Water utility optimization; pro-poor connections; pre-paid meters; cost recovery; Africa; Uganda

SYNALLAGMA AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT - The Concept of Reciprocity and Fairness in Contracts from the Historical and Law and Economics Perspective

The problem of commutative justice has been widely analysed by the contemporary doctrine of civil law. Simultaneously there is a profound debate about the meaning of commutative justice and equivalence in exchange within the sphere of moral philosophy. All these issues seem to concern the problem of interdependence between parties. Such interdependence is called synallagma or the principle of synallagma. In this paper I would like to present the concept of synallagma in civil law and in philosophy of law. Since the dispute in both disciplines seems to be unresolved and inconclusive, I would like to present the two economic theories concerning synallagma as the strategic interaction between agents. The most appropriate tool to be implemented seems to be the game theory. In conclusion I would like to address the question whether substantial and objective equivalence in contracts is possible or under which conditions it is meaningful.

Could homo oeconomicus become a revolutionary ? On the need to teach and practice a different economics

This paper investigates the standard economic paradigm as to the possibility for the agents to become revolutionaries, i.e., to develop the desire and effective action to overturn the prevailing social order. We take our cue from Amartya Sen’s remark that the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics might be part of ‘a revolutionary’s handbook’. In analyzing the meaning of Sen’s assertion, we uncover the deep-lying difficulties which the standard paradigm, characterized by a vision of individuals as self-enclosed ‘monads’ and of social order as monadological coordiantion, has in even making sense of the notion of revolution. We are thus led to the intermediary conclusion that the neoclassical paradigm is structurally unable to see the agents as (even only potential) revolutionaries. In the course of our demonstration, we show that economics needs to be conceived not primarily as a ‘teaching about’, the economic system and the agents ’actions, but as a ‘resource for’ the agents within the model itself to reflect on the directions they want to give to social change. We endow the economic agents themselves (and not just the theorist who looks at them ‘from above’) with a significant capacity to educate themselves in order to form a judgment about what kind of economy they want to act in. In other words, asking whether the economic agents might in some cases become revolutionaries leads us to militate for the need to fully endogenize economics as a component of the economic model itself.Revolution;agency;economic models;epistemology of economics;critical theory