Analysis of Several Productive Development Policies in Uruguay

This paper reviews and assesses some of the Productive Development Policies currently being implemented in Uruguay. Three horizontal and three vertical policies are considered in light of the market and public failures they attempt to address and minimize. Horizontal policies comprise Innovation, Industrial Promotion and Directives for Industrial and Technological Development. Vertical policies include the analysis of Forestry Law, Meat Traceability and the Sustainable Production Project in the agricultural sector.Public economics, Regulation and industrial policy, Industrial policy

The Myth of 'Rebalancing' Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice

It is generally assumed that trade retaliation under the WTO performs some kind of ‘rebalancing’ by allowing the injured Member to suspend ‘concessions and obligations’ vis-à-vis the violating Member of a level equivalent to the level of ‘nullification and impairment’ suffered by the injured Member. This article argues that this perception is misguided. The article first questions if a sensible comparator exists with which equivalence for purposes of ‘rebalancing’ could be evaluated. It then argues that WTO arbitration decisions do not even succeed in their limited goal of providing for retaliation that will affect trade in the same amount as the WTO-inconsistent measure at issue. One reason is the use of an asymmetric and underspecified trade effects comparator. The other reason is very significant miscalculation of the trade effects of the violation, as shown by detailed legal-economic analysis of all relevant arbitration decisions. The decisions concerning countermeasures against prohibited export subsidies do not make any attempt at ‘rebalancing’ in the first place. The article considers political explanations of arbitration decisions. It concludes with some suggestions for improvement

Flexible versus simple trade-in strategy for remanufacturing

Some enterprises recently start to offer the flexible trade-in option to attract customers from competitors, in contrast to the simple one that only allows them to return used products to the same manufacturers for new. Based on analytical and numerical analyses, this study compares the environmental impacts of two trade-in strategies (simple versus flexible) in combination with different carbon tax policies. From the perspective of consumer switching behaviour, a Hotelling model with two market segments is established. Under the flexible trade-in strategy, the carbon emission of enterprises turns out to be significantly higher than that under the simple trade-in strategy. An appropriate carbon tax policy, especially with preferential tax rates on green products, is capable of guiding enterprises to choose a more environment-friendly trade-in strategy included in the model. The findings fill the research gap in comparing the pros and cons of simple and flexible trade-in strategies in terms of sustainable development, and provide managers and policy-makers the insights on how to promote the healthy development of the remanufacturing industry with trade-in strategizing and carbon taxation

Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico

Although liberal trade and development scholars disagree about the merits of the World Trade Organization (WTO), they both assume that WTO legal obligations restrict states’ regulatory autonomy. This article argues for relaxing this shared assumption by showing that, despite the restrictions imposed by international economic law obligations, states retain considerable flexibility to carve out policy autonomy. The article makes three distinct contributions. First, it analyzes how active WTO members can, through litigation and lawyering, influence rule interpretation to advance their interests. Second, the article redefines the concept of “legal capacity” in the WTO context and introduces the term “developmental legal capacity,” which describes how states can use legal tools and institutions not only as a sword to open new markets but also as a shield for heterodox economic policies. Third, the article offers a comparative analysis of two case studies, Brazil and Mexico, and shows that they have pursued different trade and litigation strategies. While subject to the same WTO obligations, these countries have made different use of their policy space according to their own economic objectives. The article concludes that, despite the apparent rigidity of the WTO, countries following a deliberate strategy can expand their regulatory space to advance their own interests

A Cost-Benefit Framework for the Assessment of Non-Tariff Measures in Agro-Food Trade

This report develops a conceptual framework for the assessment of costs and benefits associated with non-tariff measures that allows an evidence-based comparative assessment of alternative regulatory approaches. It was prepared by Frank van Tongeren (OECD Secretariat), John Beghin (Iowa State University), and St?phan Marette (INRA).

WTO 금지보조금 분쟁이행제도에 대한 법경제학적 연구

학위논문 (박사)-- 서울대학교 국제대학원 : 국제학과 국제통상 전공, 2013. 8. 안덕근.WTO 분쟁해결제도는 다른 국제법 분야와는 다른 독특한 이행체제를 갖추고 있어 국제통상법 학자들의 많은 주목을 받아왔다. 특히, WTO 금지 보조금 규정은 다른 WTO 협정분야에 비해 가장 엄격한 반면, 실제 금지 보조금의 분쟁이행 실적은 상대적으로 저조한 편이다. 이에 따라 현 WTO 금지보조금 분쟁판결의 이행을 촉진시키기 위한 구제제도의 효과성에 대한 의문이 생기지 않을 수 없다. 더욱 특이한 점은 법학자들과는 달리 국제경제학자들은 금지보조금으로 규정되어 있는 수출보조금에 대한 현 WTO 규정을 보다 유연하게 하여 각 국이 전략적 경제정책 차원에서 보조금을 사용할 수 있도록 해야 한다는 입장이다. 이에 따라 본 연구에서는 WTO 금지보조금 구제제도에 대한 법•경제학적 분석을 바탕으로 WTO 금지보조금 구제제도의 나아갈 방향을 경제적 근거에 입각하여 제시하고자 한다. 특히, 본 연구는 기존의 경제모형을 활용한 연구 결과와는 달리, 최근에 제시된 경제모형을 활용하여 WTO 금지 보조금 구제제도에 대한 새로운 이해를 도출해내고자 하였다. 그 결과, WTO 금지보조금에 대한 현 규정의 수준은 WTO 보조금 협정이 추구하는 목적과 취지에 맞게 보다 강화되어야 하며, 보다 효과적인 구제제도의 마련을 위하여 기존의 미래지향적(prospective) 피해 구제가 아닌 소급적인(retrospective) 구제가 가능해야 함을 주장하고 있다. 특히 금지보조금 규정상 적용 가능한 기존의신속절차(fast track)규정이 제 효과를 발휘할 수 있도록 WTO 이행패널의 관할권 및 DSU 제21.5조와 제22.6간의 적용순서(sequencing) 관련 규정의 올바른 해석과 적용이 요구될 것이다. 또한 WTO 보조금 협정의 보호대상 및 목적에 따라 금전적 보상은 적합한 구제방안이 될 수 없으며, 특히 이행 촉진을 위한 보복조치의 수준은 보조금의 다자적(multilateral) 성격을 고려하여 보조금의 무역효과에 근거하여 결정되어야 한다고 주장하고 있다. 결국 WTO 규정의 올바른 의미와 효과를 제고하기 위해서는 WTO 재판관과 회원국들의 합리적이고 현실적인 판단을 통하여 해당 규정의 목적과 취지가 충분히 존중될 수 있도록 해야 할 것이다.The remedy system in the WTO for prompt dispute settlement has attracted a lot of attention by international trade scholars due to its unique enforcement mechanism which is not available in other areas of international law. In particular, the remedy system for prohibited subsidies deserves more focused attention due to a contradiction: Despite the tight regulations and rules to ensure compliance with WTO subsidy rules, the actual implementation rate of the WTO DSB rulings to remove violating prohibited subsidy measures fares the poorest. This leads to the question of whether the current remedy system for prohibited subsidies is indeed effective, or at least desirable from the perspective of WTO Members. During the process of this study, several proposals have been made to remedy the current inefficiency in the remedy system for prohibited subsidies by examining the following issues: (1) Whether retrospective remedies should be allowed for the effective withdrawal of subsidies(2) What the appropriate level of retaliation for prohibited subsidies should be(3) Whether monetary compensation could be allowed as an alternative remedy for inducing compliance in prohibited subsidy disputesand (4) How the current mechanism for inducing compliance through the fast track procedure for prohibited subsidies could be strengthened. In order to address these questions, this research has relied on both legal and economic analyses to provide an economic justification for the legal arguments that are made in this study. In particular, existing research using economic models have been applied to this work in order to provide interesting perspectives that help to suggest a renewed approach for the remedy system, at least for the case of prohibited subsidies. In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that when it comes to the remedy rules on prohibited subsidies, a stronger incentive for prompt compliance is needed through the retrospective application of the retaliation remedy, especially for dealing with non-recurring prohibited subsidies. This study further suggests that the possibility of using monetary compensation as an alternative remedy for prohibited subsidies is not viable, mainly due to the purpose of remedies in prohibited subsidy rules that is served by the property rule. For determining the level of retrospective retaliation, proportionality and the multilateral nature of remedies should be considered, under which the trade effects of the subsidy measure on individual WTO Members should be the basis for calculation. The problem of delayed implementation involving recurring prohibited subsidies may be a more intricate matter that mainly derives from the fundamental nature of subsidies as a strategic national policy. However, the loophole that is created, which undermines the stability and predictability of the WTO remedy system should not go unaddressed. In this regard, the existing fast track procedures that are in place as the remedy system for prohibited subsidies may be made more effective by addressing the problems that incur from the narrow jurisdiction of WTO compliance panels and the arbitrary sequencing arrangements in compliance and authorization proceedings. Ultimately, it will be the role of the WTO adjudicating bodies and the Members to apply the rules in a sensible and practical manner that gives meaning and effectiveness to the WTO rules in accordance with the purpose and objectives of the respective WTO Agreements.CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 The Implementation Problem in Prohibited Subsidy Disputes 1 1.2 Purpose and Scope of Study 3 1.3 Research Methods and Sources 6 CHAPTER II LEGAL REMEDIES IN GENERAL 10 2.1 Rules on Remedies 10 2.1.1 Remedies in Domestic Contract Law 11 2.1.1.1 Damages 12 2.1.1.2 Restitution 13 2.1.1.3 Specific Performance 14 2.1.2 Remedies in Public International Law 15 2.1.2.1 Cessation 18 2.1.2.2 Reparation 19 2.1.3 Remedies in International Investment Treaties 22 2.1.3.1 Dispute Settlement Methods in Investment Arbitrations 23 2.1.3.2 Primary Remedy of Compensation 25 2.1.4 Remedies in Intellectual Property Law 28 2.1.4.1 Interim and Final Injunctions 31 2.1.4.2 Delivery-up 32 2.1.4.3 Damages 32 2.1.4.4 Account for Profits 33 2.1.4.5 Criminal Remedies 33 2.2 Purpose of Remedies 36 2.3 The Principle of Proportionality 42 2.4 Summary 45 CHAPTER III THE REMEDY SYSTEM FOR PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO 46 3.1 Overview of the Remedy System in the WTO 46 3.1.1 Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 47 3.1.2 Purpose of Remedies in the WTO 51 3.1.3 Limitations of the WTO Remedy System 56 3.2 Current Status of Remedies for Prohibited Subsidies in the WTO 61 3.2.1 The Compliance Problem in WTO Prohibited Subsidy Disputes 61 3.2.2 The Remedy System in Action for Prohibited Subsidies in the WTO 67 3.2.2.1 Type of Remedies for Prohibited Subsidies 68 3.2.2.2 Application of Remedies in Prohibited Subsidy Disputes 71 A. Application of the primary remedy of withdrawal 72 B. Application of the retaliation remedy 74 C. The compensation remedy 80 3.3 The Distinctive Treatment of Prohibited Subsidies in the WTO 80 3.3.1 Evolution of Rules on Prohibited Subsidies 81 3.3.1.1 Rules on Subsidies in the Draft ITO Charter 81 3.3.1.2 Subsidy Rules in GATT 1947 and 1955 Amendments 84 3.3.1.3 Subsidy Rules in the 1979 Subsidy Code 86 3.3.1.4 Subsidy Rules in the SCM Agreement 89 3.3.2 Interpretation and Application of the Remedy Rules on Prohibited Subsidies 92 3.3.2.1 Interpretation and Application of appropriate countermeasures 94 3.3.2.2 Interpretation and Application of withdraw the subsidy 100 3.3.2.3 Interpretation and Application of withdraw without delay 104 3.3.3 Issues in WTO Jurisprudence regarding Prohibited Subsidies 106 3.3.3.1 Level of Retaliation: appropriate countermeasures 106 3.3.3.2 Remedies for Past Injury: withdraw the subsidy 114 3.3.3.3 Prolonged Dispute Proceedings: withdraw without delay 120 3.4 Summary 123 CHAPTER IV ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE WTO REMEDY SYSTEM 124 4.1 Economic Perspectives on the Retaliation Remedy in General 124 4.2 Economic Perspectives on the Remedy System for Prohibited Subsidies 128 4.3 Summary 139 CHAPTER V REMEDYING THE REMEDY SYSTEM FOR PROHIBITED SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO 142 5.1 Introduction of the Retrospective Retaliation Remedy for Non-Recurring Prohibited Subsidies 143 5.2 Monetary Compensation as a Retrospective Remedy for Prohibited Subsidies 154 5.3 Improving the Fast Track Procedure for Prohibited Subsidy Disputes 163 5.4 Summary 173 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION 176 BIBLIOGRAPHY 181Docto

The WTO and Development Policy Space in India

International trade law scholarship has offered different approaches for assessing how international trade law impacts domestic policy space for developing nations. However, much of this scholarship has failed to address the realities of how domestic policy implementation affects development policy space. This Article argues for a policy implementation-based approach to assessing development policy space by analyzing India’s response to two recent WTO disputes: India-Solar Cells (2013), and India-Export Related Measures (2018). In the India-Solar Cells dispute, the U.S. challenged India’s inclusion of local content requirements in its National Solar Mission program. In India-Export Related Measures, the U.S. challenged India’s export subsidies programs, including its Special Economic Zones (SEZs) policy. The WTO Appellate Body found that India’s local content requirements in India-Solar Cells violated international trade law norms, while the WTO Panel in India-Export Related Measures will adjudicate on the request for consultations in India-Export Related Measures in 2019. In examining how domestic policy implementation impacts policy space, this Article fills an important gap in the existing literature, which has paid insufficient attention to the domestic policy context of industrial policy in relation to international trade disputes. I argue that key dimensions of industrial policy regimes shape how nations respond to WTO decisions by implementing alternative WTO-compliant policies: the policy goals, tradeoffs and viability of policy alternatives; the nature and size of industrial sectors; and the existence of broader policy transitions. The Article analyzes aspects of policy regimes governing India’s solar industrial policy and SEZ policy, and explores the nature of policy implementation and adaption in response to WTO adjudication in order to fully assess policy space in these sectors. The Article concludes by suggesting the need to look beyond international law norms and WTO dispute resolution to the realities of the domestic policy landscape in order to provide a more complete account of how international trade law impacts development policy space

Cost recovery and pricing of payment services

A modern payment system is essential for promoting domestic and international trade and exchange as well as developing financial markets. Payment users will be directed toward the most efficient payment methods when the costs of producing those services are reflected in the prices paid. Resources are being wasted in the United States because consumers see no important difference in transaction prices or bank costs between using a check or using electronic direct debit in paying a bill, even though the social costs of these two instruments are different. Electronic payments cost only a third to half as much as paper-based payments. An estimated $100 billion (or 1.5 percent of GDP) is being lost by the continued use of paper-based checks. When payment instruments are not appropriately priced, the costs must be covered elsewhere. One common solution is to let loan revenues cover part of payment expenses (keeping loan rates higher to compensate). When prices reflect the full cost of producing the service, users demand the services that use the fewest real resources. The authors give examples of payment prices and price schedules and show how underlying cost data are used to"build up"to a price. They outline how payment services may best be structured to: a) Appropriately reflect economies of scale or scope in the production of payment services; b) Adjust cost recovery percentages to accommodate how much demand conditions associated with start-up differ from those associated with mature operation. (During a new system's early years of operation, the transaction volume may be low and some form of underrecovery of costs may be required to encourage use of the system. But any such underrecovery must be built into future pricing arrangements oncethe systems are established and traffic volumes are at a level where full cost recovery is practical. To ensure fairness, the pricing structure must also guarantee that latecomers to the system not get more favorable treatment than the initial user group.); and c) Induce efficient use of scarce resources. They note the economic principles that recommend certain pricing methods over others and apply equally to payment services provided by the private sector or through a government agency. They show why costs should be recovered through user transaction fees.Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Markets and Market Access,Decentralization,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Markets and Market Access

Liberalized Telecommunications Trade in the WTO: Implications for Universal Service Policy

The basic telecommunications commitments associated with the General Agreement on Trade in Services significantly affect market liberalization. Ultimately, a domestic legal framework that incorporates, as a part, some cost sharing for the furtherance of socially beneficial domestic policy would increase universal access benefits for some. Any detriment to those who are bearing the costs of it would be offset by the benefits that are obtained from GATS commitments on telecommunications that reduced trade barriers on services. Thus, this domestic/international arrangement could increase access to basic and enhanced services for some without decreasing universal service to any