Globalisation and the mix of wage and profit taxes

This paper analyses the development of the ratio of corporate taxes to wage taxes using a simple political economy model with internationally mobile and immobile firms. Among other results, our model predicts that countries reduce their corporate tax rate, relative to the wage tax, either when preferences for public goods increase or when a rising share of capital is employed in multinational firms. The predicted relationships are tested using panel data for 23 OECD countries for the period 1980 through 2001. The results of the empirical analysis support our central hypotheses

Political and institutional determinants of the tax mix : an empirical investigation for OECD countries

Modern tax systems show a mix of direct and indirect taxes. However, it is difficult if not impossible to explain actual tax systems on the ba-sis of optimality conditions. Political and institutional factors are some-times argued to explain the presence of very complex tax structures. Wepropose various hypotheses that relate the tax structure to some political and institutional explanatory variables. The hypotheses are tested by ap-plying panel data analysis on a large sample of OECD countries for the period 1965 to 1995. We conclude that political and institutional vari-ables do not substantially influence the actual shape of the tax structure.

The Welfare Gains of Age Related Optimal Income Taxation

Using a calibrated overlapping generations model we quantify the welfare gains of an age dependent income tax. Agents face uncertainty regarding future abilities and can by saving transfer consumption across periods. The welfare gain of switching from an age-independent to an age-dependent nonlinear tax amounts in our benchmark model to around three percent of GDP. The gains are particularly high when there are restrictions on debt policy. The gains of using a nonlinear- as opposed to a linear tax are even larger. Surprisingly, it is of secondary importance to optimally choose the tax on interest income.labor income taxation, capital income taxation, age-dependent taxes, OLG model

Taxes and Pensions

Pension benefit rules depend on individual history far more than taxes do, and age plays a much larger role in pension determination than in tax determination. Apart from some simulation studies, theoretical studies of optimal tax design typically contain neither a mandatory pension system nor the behavioral dimensions that lie behind justifications commonly offered for mandatory pensions. Conversely, optimizing models of pension design typically do not include annual taxation of labor and capital incomes. After spelling out this contrast and reviewing (and rejecting) zero taxation of capital income based on the Atkinson-Stiglitz and Chamley-Judd results, this article raises the issue of tax-favored retirement savings, a topic where the two subjects come together.pension, income tax, social security

The financing and taxation of U.S. direct investment abroad

Developing Countries;Foreign Investment

Analyzing a Flat Income Tax in the Netherlands

A flat tax rate on income has gained popularity in European countries. This paper assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the least cost to labour market performance. We do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands. The model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked, labour force participation, skill formation, wage bargaining between unions and firms, matching frictions, and a wide variety of institutional details. The simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the Netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained. This finding bolsters the notion that a linear tax is less efficient than a non-linear tax to obtain redistributive goals.flat tax, labour market, general equilibrium, equity, optimal taxation

The financing and taxation of U.S. direct investment abroad

The author examines the financing of U.S. direct investment abroad. Using a theoretical model, he first examines how home country investors can use debt finance to reduce their host country tax liability and to reduce the capital investment distortion attributable to foreign taxes. Empirically, U.S. affiliates are shown to use leverage in high tax environments and in situations where the affiliates face high foreign wage bills relative to assets. This confirms the notion that leverage can be used to ward off host country tax and wage pressures on the firm. The author examines what characteristics of foreign direct investment determine the average host country tax rate paid. Generally, the taxation of foreign direct investment is positively related to the size of the wage bill. Host countries appear to charge lower taxes in cases where U.S. direct investor abroad pay high wage bills to labor within the host country. Certain trends emerge from the data: there is a relative shift of U.S. direct investment abroad toward the industrial countries; debt finance of direct investment is becoming more important in industrial countries and less important in developing countries; and the tax benefits that industrialand developing countries get from U.S. affiliates, as measured by average income and payroll taxes, are waning. The downward trend in tax rates suggests an increased international competition to attract foreign direct investment. The reduction in average tax rates on U.S. investment abroad and the relative shift toward investment in industrial countries suggests a tougher climate ahead for developing countries that wish to attract foreign direct investment. One strategy for attracting foreign investment would be to deepen the domestic financial market so a multinational can attract additional lending capital in the host country itself. Another approach is local equity participation in foreign direct investment to lessen the incentives for host countries to tax foreign investments highly.Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research

Optimal size of government and economic growth in EU-27

Using time-series techniques and panels data, the paper analyses for the EU countries in the period 1970-2009 the existence and shape of the “BARS curve” (Barro, Armey, Rahn, and Scully), connecting the size of Government (measured by the share of public expenditure on GDP) to the rate of economic growth. Individual countries research has been conducted for 12 countries for whom enough time series were available, while panel analysis has been performed both for EU-27 and for subgroups, distinguished by their different socio-economic and monetary structures, and per capita GDP. BARS curves were generally found, and the shares of actual public expenditures generally exceed substantially those related to the maximization of GDP growth. However, great differences do emerge. For the 12 countries examined by time-series techniques, the difference between the actual level and the peak of the BARS curve ranges from 5.7 points for Germany and 18.1 points for Belgium. Panel data analysis for EU-27 shows a peak of the BARS curve at 37%, while the actual level is about 47%. While, panel data disaggregation shows a similar situation for the Western Continental Countries, with a smaller gap for Anglo-Saxon countries. For low per capita GDP countries the peak is higher than for the mature economies. So, further research may prove useful to show light on the disparities emerging in the empirical analysis of individual countries and of the panel sub-groups. However, the present research provides enough evidence that high GDP countries of EU have overcome the level of government size compatible with GDP growth rate maximization.Government size; economic growth; BARS curve; public expenditure; EU-27.

OPTIMAL SIZE OF GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN EU-27

Using time-series techniques and panels data, the paper analyses for the EU countries in the period 1970-2009 the existence and shape of the "BARS curve" (Barro, Armey, Rahn, and Scully), connecting the size of Government (measured by the share of public expenditure on GDP) to the rate of economic growth. Individual countries research has been conducted for 12 countries for whom enough time series were available, while panel analysis has been performed both for EU-27 and for subgroups, distinguished by their different socio-economic and monetary structures, and per capita GDP. BARS curves were generally found, and the shares of actual public expenditures generally exceed substantially those related to the maximization of GDP growth. However, great differences do emerge. For the 12 countries examined by timeseries techniques, the difference between the actual level and the peak of the BARS curve ranges from 5.7 points for Germany and 18.1 points for Belgium. Panel data analysis for EU-27 shows a peak of the BARS curve at 37%, while the actual level is about 47%. While, panel data disaggregation shows a similar situation for the Western Continental Countries, with a smaller gap for Anglo-Saxon countries. For low per capita GDP countries the peak is higher than for the mature economies. So, further research may prove useful to show light on the disparities emerging in the empirical analysis of individual countries and of the panel sub-groups. However, the present research provides enough evidence that high GDP countries of EU have overcome the level of government size compatible with GDP growth rate maximization.Government size; economic growth; BARS curve; public expenditure; EU-27

Taxation if Capital is not Perfectly Mobile: Tax Competition versus Tax Exportation.

This paper analyzes the tax competition and tax exporting effect of financial integration. On the one hand, financial integration increases capital mobility and thus the incentive for countries to compete for capital. On the other hand, financial integration increases foreign ownership of firms and capital and allows for exportation of source taxes. Both effects have contrary implications for capital taxes. Allowing for imperfectly mobile capital, our analysis suggests that currently the tax exportation effect is dominating, which implies excessive capital taxation. From studying the benchmark of full financial integration we find that capital taxes are likely to increase from current levels. We further examine the tax exportation effect empirically and find that is significant as well as quantitatively important for the U.S.