Anticommons and optimal patent policy in a model of sequential innovation

When innovation is sequential, the development of new products depends on the access to previous discoveries. As a consequence the patent system affects both the revenues and the cost of the innovator. We construct a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs in R&D to invent a new product. We ask three questions: (i) what is the net effect of patents on innovation as technologies become more complex (n increases)? (ii) are patent pools welfare enhancing? (iii) what is the optimal response of patent policy as technological complexity increases? We find that the answers to these questions depend on the degree of complementarity and substitutability between the inputs used in research

MARKETING MECHANISMS IN GM GRAINS AND OILSEEDS

A number of challenges exist for genetically modified (GM) crop development at the production level. Contract strategies can resolve these challenges. Contracts can be designed to induce legal adoption of GM wheat by varying technology fees, violation detection, and penalties. The primary objective of this research is to analyze contracting strategies to determine terms to minimize technology agreement violation and to induce legal adoption of GM wheat. A simulation model of a crop budget for Hard Red Spring wheat was developed. Results illustrate that contracts can be designed to induce desired behavior. Technology fee, probability of detection, and the level of non-GM premium were the most notable factors influencing adoption decisions.Producer Decisions, Risk, Genetically Modified, Contract Terms, Wheat, Crop Production/Industries,

Review of the literature on reference pricing

This paper reviews the literature on reference pricing (RP) in pharmaceutical markets. The RP strategy for cost containment of expenditure on drugs is analyzed as part of the procurement mechanism. We review the existing literature and the state-of-the-art regarding RP by focusing on its economic effects. In particular, we consider: (1) the institutional context and problem-related factors which appear to underline the need to implement an RP strategy; i.e., its nature, characteristics and the sort of health care problems commonly addressed; (2) how RP operates in practice; that is, how third party-payers (the insurers/buyers) have established the RP systems existing on the international scene (i.e., information methods, monitoring procedures and legislative provisions); (3) the range of effects resulting from particular RP strategies (including effects on choice of appropriate pharmaceuticals, insurer savings, total drug expenditures, prices of referenced and non-referenced products and dynamic efficiency; (4) the market failures which an RP policy is supposed to address and the main advantages and drawbacks which emerge from an analysis of its effects. Results suggest that RP systems achieve better their postulated goals (1) if cost inflation in pharmaceuticals is due to high prices rather than to the excess of prescription rates, (2) when the larger is the existing difference in prices among equivalent drugs, and (3) more important is the actual market for generics.Reference pricing, pharmaceutical expenditure, generic drugs, drug patents

Licensing radical product innovations to speed up the diffusion

Inventors can commercialize innovative products by themselves and simultaneously license the technology to other firms. The licensee may cannibalize sales of the licensor, but this can be compensated by gains from royalties. We show in this paper how licenses can be used strategically to speed up the new product diffusion process in two instances of markets: (i) a market with strong Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), and (ii) a market with weak IPR holder and pirate rivals. The main findings suggest that licensing is a beneficial strategy for a licensor in the context of strong IPR, because licensor benefits from the royalties, the advertising investment and positive word-of-mouth effects by licensees. We compare this result with a weak IPR context, where piracy speeds up the product diffusion but this does not compensate IPR holder for the sales loss effect who is willing to license to get some royalties. However, pirates do not generally find interesting the licensing agreement. We present a comparative statics analysis based on numerical simulation.Product diffusion models, Licensing, Optimal control and differential games

Economics of Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Materials

This paper presents an economic perspective on intellectual property in plant materials, including its value, and summary information on the U.S. seed industry. It first considers intellectual property rights--types, economic incentives that they bestow, and uses across developed and developing countries. Second, it considers the U.S. seed industry--characteristics for major crops, optimal pricing of a superior variety, and relative size of public and private research expenditures. Some conclusions and implications are presented in the final section.Intellectual property rights; value of innovations; plants; seed industry