Context-Aware Hierarchical Online Learning for Performance Maximization in Mobile Crowdsourcing

In mobile crowdsourcing (MCS), mobile users accomplish outsourced human intelligence tasks. MCS requires an appropriate task assignment strategy, since different workers may have different performance in terms of acceptance rate and quality. Task assignment is challenging, since a worker's performance (i) may fluctuate, depending on both the worker's current personal context and the task context, (ii) is not known a priori, but has to be learned over time. Moreover, learning context-specific worker performance requires access to context information, which may not be available at a central entity due to communication overhead or privacy concerns. Additionally, evaluating worker performance might require costly quality assessments. In this paper, we propose a context-aware hierarchical online learning algorithm addressing the problem of performance maximization in MCS. In our algorithm, a local controller (LC) in the mobile device of a worker regularly observes the worker's context, her/his decisions to accept or decline tasks and the quality in completing tasks. Based on these observations, the LC regularly estimates the worker's context-specific performance. The mobile crowdsourcing platform (MCSP) then selects workers based on performance estimates received from the LCs. This hierarchical approach enables the LCs to learn context-specific worker performance and it enables the MCSP to select suitable workers. In addition, our algorithm preserves worker context locally, and it keeps the number of required quality assessments low. We prove that our algorithm converges to the optimal task assignment strategy. Moreover, the algorithm outperforms simpler task assignment strategies in experiments based on synthetic and real data.Comment: 18 pages, 10 figure

The Cognitive Compressive Sensing Problem

In the Cognitive Compressive Sensing (CCS) problem, a Cognitive Receiver (CR) seeks to optimize the reward obtained by sensing an underlying $N$ dimensional random vector, by collecting at most $K$ arbitrary projections of it. The $N$ components of the latent vector represent sub-channels states, that change dynamically from "busy" to "idle" and vice versa, as a Markov chain that is biased towards producing sparse vectors. To identify the optimal strategy we formulate the Multi-Armed Bandit Compressive Sensing (MAB-CS) problem, generalizing the popular Cognitive Spectrum Sensing model, in which the CR can sense $K$ out of the $N$ sub-channels, as well as the typical static setting of Compressive Sensing, in which the CR observes $K$ linear combinations of the $N$ dimensional sparse vector. The CR opportunistic choice of the sensing matrix should balance the desire of revealing the state of as many dimensions of the latent vector as possible, while not exceeding the limits beyond which the vector support is no longer uniquely identifiable.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figure

Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items

In this paper we consider online auction mechanisms for the allocation of M items that are identical to each other except for the fact that they have different expiration times, and each item must be allocated before it expires. Players arrive at different times, and wish to buy one item before their deadline. The main difficulty is that players act "selfishly" and may mis-report their values, deadlines, or arrival times. We begin by showing that the usual notion of truthfulness (where players follow a single dominant strategy) cannot be used in this case, since any (deterministic) truthful auction cannot obtain better than an M-approximation of the social welfare. Therefore, instead of designing auctions in which players should follow a single strategy, we design two auctions that perform well under a wide class of selfish, "semi-myopic", strategies. For every combination of such strategies, the auction is associated with a different algorithm, and so we have a family of "semi-myopic" algorithms. We show that any algorithm in this family obtains a 3-approximation, and by this conclude that our auctions will perform well under any choice of such semi-myopic behaviors. We next turn to provide a game-theoretic justification for acting in such a semi-myopic way. We suggest a new notion of "Set-Nash" equilibrium, where we cannot pin-point a single best-response strategy, but rather only a set of possible best-response strategies. We show that our auctions have a Set-Nash equilibrium which is all semi-myopic, hence guarantees a 3-approximation. We believe that this notion is of independent interest

The Satisfiability Threshold of Random 3-SAT Is at Least 3.52

We prove that a random 3-SAT instance with clause-to-variable density less than 3.52 is satisfiable with high probability. The proof comes through an algorithm which selects (and sets) a variable depending on its degree and that of its complement

Optimal Monetary Policy When Agents Are Learning

Most studies of optimal monetary policy under learning rely on optimality conditions derived for the case when agents have rational expectations. In this paper, we derive optimal monetary policy in an economy where the Central Bank knows, and makes active use of, the learning algorithm agents follow in forming their expectations. In this setup, monetary policy can influence future expectations through its e ect on learning dynamics, introducing an additional tradeo between inflation and output gap stabilization. Specifically, the optimal interest rate rule reacts more aggressively to out-of-equilibrium inflation expectations and noisy cost-push shocks than would be optimal under rational expectations: the Central Bank exploits its ability to "drive" future expectations closer to equilibrium. This optimal policy closely resembles optimal policy when the Central Bank can commit and agents have rational expectations. Monetary policy should be more aggressive in containing inflationary expectations when private agents pay more attention to recent data. In particular, when beliefs are updated according to recursive least squares, the optimal policy is time-varying: after a structural break the Central Bank should be more aggressive and relax the degree of aggressiveness in subsequent periods. The policy recommendation is robust: under our policy the welfare loss if the private sector actually has rational expectations is much smaller than if the Central Bank mistakenly assumes rational expectations whereas in fact agents are learning.Optimal Monetary Policy, Learning, Rational Expectations