2,143 research outputs found
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We analyze the allocation of priority in queues via simple bidding mechanisms. In our model, the stochastically arriving customers are privately informed about their own processing time. They make bids upon arrival at a queue whose length is unobservable. We consider two bidding schemes that differ in the definition of bids (these may reflect either total payments or payments per unit of time) and in the timing of payments (before, or after service). In both schemes, a customer obtains priority over all customers (waiting in the queue or arriving while he is waiting) who make lower bids. Our main results show how the convexity/concavity of the function expressing the costs of delay determines the queue-discipline (i.e., SPT, LPT) arising in a bidding equilibrium
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We analyze the allocation of priority in queues via simple bidding mechanisms. In our model, the stochastically arriving customers are privately informed about their own processing time. They make bids upon arrival at a queue whose length is unobservable. We consider two bidding schemes that differ in the definition of bids (these may reflect either total payments or payments per unit of time) and in the timing of payments (before, or after service). In both schemes, a customer obtains priority over all customers (waiting in the queue or arriving while he is waiting) who make lower bids. Our main results show how the convexity/concavity of the function expressing the costs of delay determines the queue-discipline (i.e., SPT, LPT) arising in a bidding equilibrium.
When queueing is better than push and shove
We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved efficiently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is service anarchy (ie. a random queue), every existing queue can be transformed into an efficient order
Dynamic Policies for Cooperative Networked Systems
A set of economic entities embedded in a network graph collaborate by
opportunistically exchanging their resources to satisfy their dynamically
generated needs. Under what conditions their collaboration leads to a
sustainable economy? Which online policy can ensure a feasible resource
exchange point will be attained, and what information is needed to implement
it? Furthermore, assuming there are different resources and the entities have
diverse production capabilities, which production policy each entity should
employ in order to maximize the economy's sustainability? Importantly, can we
design such policies that are also incentive compatible even when there is no a
priori information about the entities' needs? We introduce a dynamic production
scheduling and resource exchange model to capture this fundamental problem and
provide answers to the above questions. Applications range from infrastructure
sharing, trade and organisation management, to social networks and sharing
economy services.Comment: 6-page version appeared at ACM NetEcon' 1
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