227 research outputs found

    Optimal detection of two counterfeit coins with two-arms balance

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    AbstractWe consider the following coin-weighing problem: suppose among the given n coins there are two counterfeit coins, which are either heavier or lighter than other n−2 good coins, this is not known beforehand. The weighing device is a two-arms balance. Let NA(k) be the number of coins from which k weighings suffice to identify the two counterfeit coins by algorithm A and U(k)=max{n|n(n−1)⩽3k} be the information-theoretic upper bound of the number of coins then NA(k)⩽U(k). We establish a new method of reducing the above original problem to another identity problem of more simple configurations. It is proved that the information-theoretic upper bound U(k) are always achievable for all even integer k⩾1. For odd integer k⩾1, our general results can be used to approximate arbitrarily the information-theoretic upper bound. The ideas and techniques of this paper can be easily employed to settle other models of two counterfeit coins

    Minimum average-case queries of q + 1 -ary search game with small sets

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    Given a search space S={1,2,...,n}, an unknown element x*∈S and fixed integers ℓ≥1 and q≥1, a q+1-ary ℓ-restricted query is of the following form: which one of the set {A 0,A 1,...,A q} is the x* in?, where (A 0,A 1,...,A q) is a partition of S and | Ai|≤ℓ for i=1,2,...,q. The problem of finding x* from S with q+1-ary size-restricted queries is called as a q+1-ary search game with small sets. In this paper, we consider sequential algorithms for the above problem, and establish the minimum number of average-case sequential queries when x* satisfies the uniform distribution on S. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

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    Financial Warfare: Money as an Instrument of Conflict and Tension in the International Arena

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    This project employs a historical, institutionalist, and legal approach to analyzing financial warfare, specifically utilizing a chartal-spatialist theory of money. Utilizing these theories in conjunction with historical case studies, a theory of financial warfare is developed through understanding money as a product of social stratification and hierarchy, and therefore that the creation of money itself is a process of power. The spatiality of a powerful money expands beyond its national borders, and hence there is a hierarchy within money itself in the international arena. To build the theory, this project includes three case studies of implementations of financial warfare, each of which add a piece to the overall story: counterfeiting, financial sanctions policy, and counterterrorism through the dismantling of terrorist organizations’ financial networks. As such, through focusing on money as an instrument of conflict and tension, the theory of financial warfare developed in this project focuses on the strength of a country’s currency, as well as its position in the international financial system. Given the fact that hegemony is relative, the theory outlines preconditions for successfully implementing financial warfare, which include having higher financial power relative to the target country, having macroeconomic flexibility through issuing a strong sovereign currency, and having an elastic access to the law as defined in Katherina Pistor’s legal theory of finance. This project further concludes that given its position as the issuer of the global reserve currency and the central authority in the international financial system, the United States is in the highest position of power to implement financial warfare

    News – European Union

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    Institutional Report 2020

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    Anti Money Laundering Mechanism: An Application of Principal-Agent Model for Pakistan

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    In this paper anti money laundering policy of the international financial regime is analyzed in principal agent model perspective. The strategy of the principal for formal agents is deliberated for global financial stability. This strategy encompasses incentive and dis-incentive for cooperation of formal agent. Formal agent by cooperating with principal may induce dis-incentive for informal agent. All the integrating stake holders make decision on the basis of comparison of present value of marginal cost of non-cooperation and present value of returns from cooperation. As the desired objective of the principal is to minimize transaction of money through informal channels therefore it has to include informal agents and clients in the strategy. The successful anti money laundering strategy can only be evolved by the cooperation of all the stakeholders.International Financial Regime, Principal Agent model and Money Laundering
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