The theory of international business: the role of economic models

This paper reviews the scope for economic modelling in international business studies. It argues for multi-level theory based on classic internalisation theory. It present a systems approach that encompasses both firm-level and industry-level analysis

Smart Pricing: Linking Pricing Decisions with Operational Insights

The past decade has seen a virtual explosion of information about customers and their preferences. This information potentially allows companies to increase their revenues, in particular since modern technology enables price changes to be effected at minimal cost. At the same time, companies have taken major strides in understanding and managing the dynamics of the supply chain, both their internal operations and their relationships with supply chain partners. These two developments are narrowly intertwined. Pricing decisions have a direct effect on operations and visa versa. Yet, the systematic integration of operational and marketing insights is in an emerging stage, both in academia and in business practice. This article reviews a number of key linkages between pricing and operations. In particular, it highlights different drivers for dynamic pricing strategies. Through the discussion of key references and related software developments we aim to provide a snapshot into a rich and evolving field.supply chain management;inventory;capacity;dynamic pricing;operations-marketing interface

Coordinating Channels for Durable Goods: The Impact of Competing Secondary Markets

A large literature in economics and marketing studies the problem of manufacturer's designing contracts that give a retailer appropriate incentives to make decisions that are optimal from the manufacturer's point of view (see, for example, Spengler 1950, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin 1983, Lal 1990, Rao and Srinivasan 1995, Desai 1997, among others). An important result from this literature is that the manufacturer can coordinate retail price decisions by choosing a two-part tariff in which the wholesale price equals the manufacturer's marginal cost and the fixed fee extracts all the rents from the retailer. In other words, the manufacturer sells the firm to the retailer for the fixed fee and, thus, eliminates the double-marginalization problem. Although this result is well established for non-durables, researchers have not analyzed the coordination issue for durable goods manufacturers who have the added complexity of competition from used goods in secondary markets. In this paper, we show how the coordination problem for a durable goods manufacturer is fundamentally different from the traditional coordination problem of a non-durables manufacturer. In particular, the durable goods manufacturer has to solve not only the coordination problem but also the time-consistency problem (see, for example, Coase 1972, Bulow 1982, Purohit 1995). Our objectives in this paper are to investigate whether or not the insights from the channel coordination literature, that has developed principally with non-durable goods in mind, are also applicable to durable goods. In order to do this, we develop a dynamic, two-period model in which a manufacturer sells its products to a retailer who sells the product to consumers. Products sold in the first period become used goods in the second period and compete with sales of new units. Starting from consumer utilities, we derive inverse demand functions for new and used goods and consider a number of different contracts between the manufacturer and the retailer. We start with a simple contract in which the manufacturer offers a wholesale price for a period at the beginning of that period. As one would expect, this contract does not solve either the channel coordination problem or the time-consistency problem. We then consider a number of two-part tariff contracts. Given the well-established results from the existing channel coordination literature, we begin with a contract in which the manufacturer offers per-period two-part tariffs in which all wholesale prices are set at marginal cost. We find that not only does this contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double marginalization problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. We then allow the wholesale prices to be different from marginal costs. We show that using this more general two-part tariff contract, the manufacturer can achieve channel coordination. That is, the total channel profit is the same as the profit of an integrated seller. However, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the marginal cost. Next, we consider a contract in which the manufacturer uses a single fixed fee, announced at the beginning of the first period. The per-period wholesale prices are still at the marginal cost level in this contract. This contract is identical to "selling the firm to the retailer" at the price of the fixed fee. Here we find that the contract can achieve channel coordination. However, the contract is not an equilibrium solution. In particular, the manufacturer increases wholesale prices to above marginal cost levels. Although some of the contracts above solve the double marginalization problem, none of them mitigates the time consistency problem. In order to solve both these problems, the contract must yield total channel profit equal to an integrated renter's profit. Because the renter does not have a problem with time consistency, an integrated renter earns the highest profits in a durable goods channel. We derive a contract that solves both of these problems. In this contract, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and two per-period wholesale prices, both of which turn out to be strictly above the marginal cost. Interestingly, with this contract, the manufacturer makes more money by selling through the retailer rather than selling directly to consumers. We contribute to the coordination literature by examining coordination issues in a dynamic, durable goods context and identifying a new coordination problemunlike the traditional coordination models, a durable goods manufacturer may have to provide the retailer incentives to sell less rather than to sell more. Clearly, the traditional "selling the firm to the retailer," approach does not solve this new problem. We also contribute to the durable goods literature by showing how a durable goods manufacturer can sell its product and solve its time consistency problem. Effectively, this allows the manufacturer to earn the same profits as it would get if it could commit to prices or if it could rent its product. When committing to individual consumers or renting can only be achieved through additional costs, our solution is the optimal strategy for a durable goods manufacturer.

Supply chain management in industrial production. A retrospective view

The article presents a retrospective review on key-issues about how the management discipline evolved up to the current view about supply-chain management (SCM) in industrial production. Specifically, the article resumes: a) the reasons that led to the transition from the traditional procurement policies to the SCM approach, b) the variables involved in the process of defining SCM relations and c) the key managerial principles underlying SCM policies and strategies. In the manufacturing industry the problem of organizing and managing firm’s relationships with supplier has recently become of an unprecedented complexity. The evolution of production systems started around the ‘80s, with the shift from the “flexible” paradigm to the “lean” one, has increased dramatically the intricacy of product and process architecture.. At the same time, the opportunities brought by the technological hybridization of products (that is: opportunities deriving from incorporating complementary technologies within products so to enhance its features and performance) gained a critical role as a competitive advantage. In our view supply chain management, as well as others managerial areas, has undergone a profound change; indeed, in the last 30 years the evolution of the industrial competitive environment has deeply modified the reference framework of supply-chain relationships even in common procurement and/or routine contracts. In the attempt to give an adequate response to changes in the competitive environment, supply policies evolve to become articulate relational strategies based on the strategic assessments of the role and the relevance of the various suppliers. The traditional approach to procurement management is combined with a perspective of value creation, a perspective that goes beyond the traditional “make-or-buy” criteria, since it introduces principles for the assessment of the strategic capability of the suppliers to create value for customer rather than to be able to fulfill its task for the firm. In such a view, firms operating in the same value-chain coordinate their strategies with a view to increase the overall value rather than compete for the allocation of the existing one. Firms’ network of suppliers and the relational capabilities assume a critical role in order to coordinate the value creation processes within the chain.Supply chain management, industrial management

The Future of Retail Operations

Retailing consists of all the activities associated with the selling of goods to the final consumer. In this article, we review the research on retail operations published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Research (M&SOM) since 1999. We then discuss the current retail landscape and the new research directions it offers, in which M&SOM can play a prominent role

Leader-follower Game in VMI System with Limited Production Capacity Considering Wholesale and Retail Prices

VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) is a widely used cooperative inventory policy in supply chains in which each enterprise has its autonomy in pricing. This paper discusses a leader-follower Stackelberg game in a VMI supply chain where the manufacturer, as a leader, produces a single product with a limited production capacity and delivers it at a wholesale price to multiple different retailers, as the followers, who then sell the product in dispersed and independent markets at retail prices. An algorithm is then developed to determine the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Finally, a numerical study is conducted to understand the influence of the Stackelberg equilibrium and market related parameters on the profits of the manufacturer and its retailers. Through the numerical example, our research demonstrates that: (a) the market related parameters have significant influence on the manufacturer’ and its retailers’ profits; (b) a retailer’s profit may not be necessarily lowered when it is charged with a higher inventory cost by the manufacturer; (c) the equilibrium of the Stackelberg equilibrium benefits the manufacturer.Stackelberg Game;Supply Chain;Vendor Managed Inventory

Response of Fresh Food Suppliers to Sustainable Supply Chain Management of Large European Retailers

This article analyses new supply chain management (SCM) strategies of the largest retail distribution chains in Europe within the context of differing sustainability concepts and approaches. An analysis is carried out of the strategic plans of such retailers, as well as recent developments in the sector. We begin by identifying the priority actions of retailers and then evaluating, by means of a survey, how small horticultural marketing firms (mainly cooperatives) in southeast Spain respond to the needs of these retailers. Subsequently, an analysis is carried out on these small marketing firm exporters to identify the relative weight which they assign to the variables assessed, while also considering the existing relationships between said weighted variables and business profits. Our results show that retailers tend to establish more simplified supply chains (that is, shorter and more vertical), essentially demonstrating their interpretation of a sustainable supply chain. In contrast, horticultural marketing firms have concentrated more on tactical and operational issues, thereby neglecting environmental, social and logistics management. Thus, their success rate in meeting the sustainability demands of their customers can be considered medium-low, requiring a more proactive attitude. Improved and collaborative relations, and the integration of sustainability concepts between suppliers (marketing firms) and their clients could contribute to successfully meeting sustainability demands. From the point of view of the consumer, close supplier–retail relationships have solved food safety issues, but the implementation of sustainability in other supply chain activities and processes is a pending issue. We propose strategic approximation and collaboration to bridge the gap between the varying sustainability demands in the supplier–retail relationship within perishable supply chains. Although this article specifically addresses fresh vegetable supply chains, the results may be extrapolated to other agri-food chains with a similar structure

Multiobjective optimization as a decision aid for managing build-to-order supply chains

This paper provides an overview of multiobjective optimization (MOO) as a decision aid in build-to-order supply chains (BTO-SC). The main features of BTO-SCs are discussed along with capabilities of MOO to enhance decision making at different points along the chain. Key decision points across a typical BTO-SC are identified and potential applications of MOO are discussed. A sample application is presented and future avenues for further research highlighted