Central Bank Haircut Policy

We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral. Setting a haircut therefore involves balancing the trade-off between relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents on one hand, and increasing potential inflation risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents on the other. We argue that the optimal haircut is higher when the central bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity. Finally, for an unexpected drop in the haircut, the central bank can be more aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut.Payment, clearing, and settlement systems; Central bank research; Monetary policy implementation; Financial system regulation and policies; Financial services

Rediscounting Under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature, these policies are indistinguishable. However, Freeman's argument that the central bank should absorb losses associated with default to provide risk-sharing stands in stark contrast to the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses and Freeman's argument breaks down. However, we show that policies resembling discount window lending and open market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy is for the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. By making them compete with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the economy.Payment, clearing, and settlement systems; Financial markets; Central bank research

Optimal monetary policy under financial sector risk

We consider whether or not a central bank should respond directly to financial market conditions when setting monetary policy. Specifically, should a central bank put weight on interbank lending spreads in its Taylor rule policy function? ; Using a model with risk and balance sheet effects in both the real and financial sectors (Davis, "The Adverse Feedback Loop and the Effects of Risk in the both the Real and Financial Sectors" Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper No. 66, November 2010) we find that when the conventional parameters in the Taylor rule (the coefficients on the lagged interest rate, inflation, and the output gap) are optimally chosen, the central bank should not put any weight on endogenous fluctuations in the interbank lending spread. ; However, the central bank should adjust the risk free rate in response to fluctuations in the spread that occur because of exogenous financial shocks, but we find that the central bank should not be too aggressive in its easing policy. Optimal policy calls for a two-thirds of a percentage point cut in the risk free rate in response to a financial shock that causes a one percentage point increase in interbank lending spreads.Business cycles ; Financial markets ; Monetary policy

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. This paper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. We consider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications for optimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held among banks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregate liquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Two different instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required to cope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs.Bank liquidity, interbank markets, central bank policy, financial fragility, bank runs.

Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets, and Monetary Policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. This paper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. We consider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to di¤erent implications for optimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distribu- tional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held among banks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and mon- etary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregate liquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Two di¤erent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required to cope with the two di¤erent types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs.bank liquidity;interbank markets;central bank policy;financial fragility;bank runs

Channel Systems: Why is there a Positive Spread?

An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via two standing facilities: a lending facility and a deposit facility. In this paper we show that it is socially optimal to implement a non-zero interest rate spread. We prove this result in a dynamic general equilibrium model where market participants have heterogeneous liquidity needs and where the central bank requires government bonds as collateral. We also calibrate the model and discuss the behavior of the money market rate and the volumes traded at the ECB’s deposit and lending facilities in response to the recent financial crisis.monetary policy, open market, operations, standing facilities

Lend out IOU: A Model of Money Creation by Banks and Central Banking

This paper considers the efficiency of money creation by banks and the principles of the central bank issuance to improve over it. The ability to issue deposit liability as a means of payment enlarges banks lending capacities and subjects them to fiercer competition. In curcumstances where banks issue too much money, interest-rate policy may help. In circumstances of a credit crunch, quantitative- easing policy helps, under which the central bank lends its issues to all banks. These issues are unbacked by taxation and purely nominal. The optimal quantity of the central bank's lending is unique and implements the first-best allocation

Financial fragility and the exchange rate regime

We study financial fragility, exchange rate crises, and monetary policy in an open economy version of a Diamond-Dybvig model. The banking system, the exchange rate regime, and central bank credit policy are seen as parts of a mechanism intended to maximize social welfare; if the mechanism fails, banking crises and speculative attacks become possible. We compare currency boards, fixed rates, and flexible rates with and without a lender of last resort. A currency board cannot implement a socially optimal allocation; in addition, bank runs are possible under a currency board. A fixed exchange rate system may implement the social optimum but is more prone to bank runs and exchange rate crises than a currency board. A flexible rate system implements the social optimum and eliminates runs, provided the exchange rate and central bank lending policies are appropriately designed.Banks and banking, Central ; Financial crises ; Financial institutions ; Foreign exchange rates

Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Matter for Monetary Policy?

Central bankers and financial supervisors often have different goals. While monetary policymakers want to ensure that there are always sufficient lending activities to maintain high and stable economic growth, supervisors work to limit banks. lending capacities in order to prevent excessive risk-taking. To avoid working at cross-purposes, central bankers need to adopt a policy strategy that accounts for the impact of capital adequacy requirements. In this paper we derive an optimal monetary policy that reinforces prudential capital requirements at the same time that it stabilizes aggregate economic activity. We go on to show that policymakers at the Federal Reserve adjust interest rate policy in a way that would neutralize the procyclical impact of bank capital requirements. By contrast, central bankers in Germany and Japan clearly do not act as the theory suggests they should.