Multiplexing regulated traffic streams: design and performance

The main network solutions for supporting QoS rely on traf- fic policing (conditioning, shaping). In particular, for IP networks the IETF has developed Intserv (individual flows regulated) and Diffserv (only ag- gregates regulated). The regulator proposed could be based on the (dual) leaky-bucket mechanism. This explains the interest in network element per- formance (loss, delay) for leaky-bucket regulated traffic. This paper describes a novel approach to the above problem. Explicitly using the correlation structure of the sources’ traffic, we derive approxi- mations for both small and large buffers. Importantly, for small (large) buffers the short-term (long-term) correlations are dominant. The large buffer result decomposes the traffic stream in a stream of constant rate and a periodic impulse stream, allowing direct application of the Brownian bridge approximation. Combining the small and large buffer results by a concave majorization, we propose a simple, fast and accurate technique to statistically multiplex homogeneous regulated sources. To address heterogeneous inputs, we present similarly efficient tech- niques to evaluate the performance of multiple classes of traffic, each with distinct characteristics and QoS requirements. These techniques, applica- ble under more general conditions, are based on optimal resource (band- width and buffer) partitioning. They can also be directly applied to set GPS (Generalized Processor Sharing) weights and buffer thresholds in a shared resource system

Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks

This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac