Coordinating Channels for Durable Goods: The Impact of Competing Secondary Markets

A large literature in economics and marketing studies the problem of manufacturer's designing contracts that give a retailer appropriate incentives to make decisions that are optimal from the manufacturer's point of view (see, for example, Spengler 1950, Jeuland and Shugan 1983, McGuire and Staelin 1983, Lal 1990, Rao and Srinivasan 1995, Desai 1997, among others). An important result from this literature is that the manufacturer can coordinate retail price decisions by choosing a two-part tariff in which the wholesale price equals the manufacturer's marginal cost and the fixed fee extracts all the rents from the retailer. In other words, the manufacturer sells the firm to the retailer for the fixed fee and, thus, eliminates the double-marginalization problem. Although this result is well established for non-durables, researchers have not analyzed the coordination issue for durable goods manufacturers who have the added complexity of competition from used goods in secondary markets. In this paper, we show how the coordination problem for a durable goods manufacturer is fundamentally different from the traditional coordination problem of a non-durables manufacturer. In particular, the durable goods manufacturer has to solve not only the coordination problem but also the time-consistency problem (see, for example, Coase 1972, Bulow 1982, Purohit 1995). Our objectives in this paper are to investigate whether or not the insights from the channel coordination literature, that has developed principally with non-durable goods in mind, are also applicable to durable goods. In order to do this, we develop a dynamic, two-period model in which a manufacturer sells its products to a retailer who sells the product to consumers. Products sold in the first period become used goods in the second period and compete with sales of new units. Starting from consumer utilities, we derive inverse demand functions for new and used goods and consider a number of different contracts between the manufacturer and the retailer. We start with a simple contract in which the manufacturer offers a wholesale price for a period at the beginning of that period. As one would expect, this contract does not solve either the channel coordination problem or the time-consistency problem. We then consider a number of two-part tariff contracts. Given the well-established results from the existing channel coordination literature, we begin with a contract in which the manufacturer offers per-period two-part tariffs in which all wholesale prices are set at marginal cost. We find that not only does this contract fail to achieve channel coordination, but the retailer sells a higher quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. This is in contrast to the traditional double marginalization problem in which the retailer sells a lower quantity than an integrated manufacturer would sell. We then allow the wholesale prices to be different from marginal costs. We show that using this more general two-part tariff contract, the manufacturer can achieve channel coordination. That is, the total channel profit is the same as the profit of an integrated seller. However, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the marginal cost. Next, we consider a contract in which the manufacturer uses a single fixed fee, announced at the beginning of the first period. The per-period wholesale prices are still at the marginal cost level in this contract. This contract is identical to "selling the firm to the retailer" at the price of the fixed fee. Here we find that the contract can achieve channel coordination. However, the contract is not an equilibrium solution. In particular, the manufacturer increases wholesale prices to above marginal cost levels. Although some of the contracts above solve the double marginalization problem, none of them mitigates the time consistency problem. In order to solve both these problems, the contract must yield total channel profit equal to an integrated renter's profit. Because the renter does not have a problem with time consistency, an integrated renter earns the highest profits in a durable goods channel. We derive a contract that solves both of these problems. In this contract, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and two per-period wholesale prices, both of which turn out to be strictly above the marginal cost. Interestingly, with this contract, the manufacturer makes more money by selling through the retailer rather than selling directly to consumers. We contribute to the coordination literature by examining coordination issues in a dynamic, durable goods context and identifying a new coordination problemunlike the traditional coordination models, a durable goods manufacturer may have to provide the retailer incentives to sell less rather than to sell more. Clearly, the traditional "selling the firm to the retailer," approach does not solve this new problem. We also contribute to the durable goods literature by showing how a durable goods manufacturer can sell its product and solve its time consistency problem. Effectively, this allows the manufacturer to earn the same profits as it would get if it could commit to prices or if it could rent its product. When committing to individual consumers or renting can only be achieved through additional costs, our solution is the optimal strategy for a durable goods manufacturer.

Consumer-driven innovation networks and e-business management systems

This paper examines the use of consumer-driven innovation networks within the UK food-retailing industry using qualitative interview-based research analysed within an economic framework. This perspective revealed that, by exploiting information gathered directly from their customers at point-of-sale and data mining, supermarkets are able to identify consumer preferences and co-ordinate new product development via innovation networks. This has been made possible through their information control of the supply-chain established through the use of transparent inventory management systems. As a result, supermarkets’ e-business systems have established new competitive processes in the UK food-processing and retailing industry and are an example of consumer-driven innovation networks. The informant-based qualitative approach also revealed that trust-based transacting relationships operated differently from those previously described in the literature

New Product Development and Product Supply Within a Network Setting: The Case of the Chilled Ready-Meal Industry in the UK

This paper analyses inter-organizational networks that link together firms operating in the food processing and distribution industry in the UK. In doing so, the paper draws on insights recently developed by Mark Casson that treat inter-firm networks as an institutional response to the changing costs and opportunities of information management. Detailed analysis of product innovation and supply chain management issues within the industry, exemplified by the growth of chilled ready-meals, leads to the identification of two distinct but complementary inter-firm networks: a network of control and a network of innovation. In each case, the study finds that the critical information is derived from the retailers’ interface with consumers and thus that these information-based networks are effectively controlled by the leading supermarket chains. The study’s conclusions are considered in relation to the recent findings of the Competition Commission following its investigation into grocery retailing in the UK

The pricing decision strategy of value-added services in two-stage supply chain with e-commerce platform

The homogenization of products has caused e-commerce platform merchants to provide differentiated services to consumers through value-added services, in order to enhance the competitiveness of the market. Introduce the value-added service level factor in the e-commerce environment, consider the impact of e-commerce platform merchants providing value-added services on supply chain pricing, construct a secondary supply chain for manufacturers and e-commerce platform merchants, and compare and analyze centralized decision-making supply chains and dispersion decision-making supply chain pricing decisions. The simulation analysis shows that the increase of the value-added service level coefficient in a certain range has a positive stimulation effect on the product pricing of the e-commerce platform. Centralized decision-making supply chain and decentralized decision-making supply chain have a critical value for product pricing, and centralized decision-making supply chain is more sensitive to value-added services.The impact of the value-added service level on the overall profit of the centralized decision-making supply chain is less than the overall profit of the decentralized decision-making supply chain

Beyond the Cost of Price Adjustment: Investments in Pricing Capital

The literature on costs of price adjustment has long argued that changing prices is a complex and costly process. In fact, some authors have suggested that we should think of firms’ price-setting activities as “producing” prices, similar to the way firms use production processes to produce goods and services. In this paper we explore one natural extension of this view, that besides observing costs of price adjustment, we should also expect to see firm-level investments in capital expenditures into these “pricing” production processes. We coin the term “pricing capital” for these investments, and suggest that they can improve the efficiency of the “pricing production” activities by both reducing the costs of adjusting prices, and improving the effectiveness of price adjustments in future periods. Using two types of data sources, we find compelling evidence of the existence as well as the importance of pricing capital in firms. The existence of firm-level “pricing capital” has the potential of fundamentally altering the way we think about pricing and price adjustment in many areas of economics. It suggests looking toward the “pricing capital” to decipher the likely degree and causes of price rigidity and its variation across price setters, markets, and industries. Moreover, “pricing capital” introduces a new, higher-level, pricing decision made by individual firms. Decisions to invest in pricing capital compete with traditional capital investment decisions that have long been studied in economics, such as capital investments in plant, equipment, and R&D. Furthermore, since pricing capital is a choice variable, it implies that costs of price adjustment often used in models of price rigidity are endogenous. As such, pricing capital offers new insights into the micro-foundations of the costs of price adjustment. The most provocative implication of the new theory of pricing, however, is that the allocative efficiency of the price system itself may be determined endogenously by individual price setters who choose whether and how much to invest in pricing capital.Cost of Price Adjustment, Menu Cost, Managerial and Customer Costs of Price Adjustment, Pricing Capital, Pricing Production Process (PPP), Price Rigidity, Sticky Prices, Rigid Prices, Microfoundations of the Costs of Price Adjustment, Allocative Efficiency, Price System, Endogenous Price Adjustment Cost

The boomerang returns? Accounting for the impact of uncertainties on the dynamics of remanufacturing systems

Recent years have witnessed companies abandon traditional open-loop supply chain structures in favour of closed-loop variants, in a bid to mitigate environmental impacts and exploit economic opportunities. Central to the closed-loop paradigm is remanufacturing: the restoration of used products to useful life. While this operational model has huge potential to extend product life-cycles, the collection and recovery processes diminish the effectiveness of existing control mechanisms for open-loop systems. We systematically review the literature in the field of closed-loop supply chain dynamics, which explores the time-varying interactions of material and information flows in the different elements of remanufacturing supply chains. We supplement this with further reviews of what we call the three ‘pillars’ of such systems, i.e. forecasting, collection, and inventory and production control. This provides us with an interdisciplinary lens to investigate how a ‘boomerang’ effect (i.e. sale, consumption, and return processes) impacts on the behaviour of the closed-loop system and to understand how it can be controlled. To facilitate this, we contrast closed-loop supply chain dynamics research to the well-developed research in each pillar; explore how different disciplines have accommodated the supply, process, demand, and control uncertainties; and provide insights for future research on the dynamics of remanufacturing systems