A Possibilistic and Probabilistic Approach to Precautionary Saving

This paper proposes two mixed models to study a consumer's optimal saving in the presence of two types of risk.Comment: Panoeconomicus, 201

Editor’s Note

The research works presented in this issue are based on various topics of interest, among which are included: Mobile services, mpeg, agent-based Simulation, complexity, management accounting systems, animal-drawn vehicles, traffic and transport, possibility theory, precautionary saving, MAS, ambient intelligence, gamification, sustainable environments, disaster recovery, DSS, constraint programming and ICT

Fuzzy Mathematics

This book provides a timely overview of topics in fuzzy mathematics. It lays the foundation for further research and applications in a broad range of areas. It contains break-through analysis on how results from the many variations and extensions of fuzzy set theory can be obtained from known results of traditional fuzzy set theory. The book contains not only theoretical results, but a wide range of applications in areas such as decision analysis, optimal allocation in possibilistics and mixed models, pattern classification, credibility measures, algorithms for modeling uncertain data, and numerical methods for solving fuzzy linear systems. The book offers an excellent reference for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in applied and theoretical fuzzy mathematics. Researchers and referees in fuzzy set theory will find the book to be of extreme value

Moral Luck in Medical Ethics and Practical Politics

Typically we maintain two incompatible standards towards right action and good character, and the tension between these polarities creates the paradox of moral luck. In practice we regard actions as right or wrong, and character as good or bad, partly according to what happens as a result of the agent's decision. Yet we also think that people should not be held responsible for matters beyond their control. This split underpins Kant's assertion that only the good will is securely good, that its goodness is impervious to outcome ill-luck. Some commentators, such as Martha Nussbaum and to some extent Bernard Williams, think that this simply writes off the paradox. Williams asserts that the paradox is insoluble, and that its inescapability threatens the notion of agent responsibility. In contrast Thomas Nagel argues that agents' most cherished projects may be indeed be subject to luck, but that does not mean that their deepest motivations are moral. This, I suggest, is one of several means whereby we might limit the effect of the paradox without denying that the tension exists. But I also argue that it is wrong to accuse Kant of ignoring the paradox. Ethical consequentialists, on the other hand, appear to have no problem with moral luck, because the paradox depends on a dichotomy between the outside world and the locus of moral worth in the individual agent. But this turns out not to be true. The problem of moral luck is not some strange Kantian fixation, but a general dilemma: a variant on what Nagel terms "the problem of excess objectivity" which cuts across all of ethics and metaphysics. Retaining a broadly Kantian notion of agent-responsibility, but limiting what agents are responsible for, requires us to delineate the realm of ethics more narrowly than has been done by those who believe that the rational and/or prudential are coterminous with the ethical. This strategy for minimising the paradox's impact is explored in two areas from medical ethics, the allocation of scarce medical resources and informed consent, and two from public policy, secrecy and nuclear deterrence. Throughout, the analysis seeks to test Nagel's maxim that the best we can hope for is to act in such a manner that we would not have to revise our opinion of how we should have acted once the consequences of our actions become apparent