4,731 research outputs found
Queueing Game For Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks
In this paper, we investigate the problem of spectrum access decision-making
for the Secondary Users (SUs) in the cognitive radio networks. When the Primary
Users (PUs) are absent on certain frequency bandwidth, SUs can formulate a
queue and wait for the Base Station (BS) to serve. The queue of the SUs will be
dismissed if the PU is emerging in the system. Leveraging the queueing game
approaches, the decision-making process of the SUs that whether to queue or not
is studied. Both individual equilibrium and social optimization strategies are
derived analytically. Moreover, the optimal pricing strategy of the service
provider is investigated as well. Our proposed algorithms and corresponding
analysis are validated through simulation studies
Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks
This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio
networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to
delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two
paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we
examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary
markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic
shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium
behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents
the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF
channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing
delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU
traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players
employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition
and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators,
two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization
and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator
exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated
separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the
equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal
pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market,
we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and
exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a
backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for
this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac
Optimal Pricing Strategies in Cognitive Radio Networks with Heterogeneous Secondary Users and Retrials
In a cognitive radio (CR) system, excessive access services for secondary users (SUs) lead to a substantial increase in congestion and the retrial phenomenon, both of which degrade the performance of CR networks, especially in overload conditions. This paper investigates the price-based spectrum access control policy that characterizes the network operator\u27s provision to heterogeneous and delay-sensitive SUs through pricing strategies. Based on shared-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), the SUs can occupy the dedicated spectrum without degrading the operations of primary users (PUs). The service to transmission of SUs can be interrupted by an arriving PU, while the interrupted SUs join a retrial pool called an orbit, later trying to use the spectrum to complete the service. In the retrial orbit, the interrupted SU competes fairly with other SUs in the orbit. Such a DSA mechanism is formulated as a retrial queue with service interruptions and general service times. Regarding the heterogeneity of delay-sensitive SUs, we consider two cases: the delay-sensitive parameter follows a discrete distribution and a continuous distribution, respectively. In equilibrium, we find that the revenue-optimal price is unique, while there may exist a continuum of equilibria for the socially optimal price. In addition, the socially optimal price is always not greater than the revenue-optimal price, and thus the socially optimal arrival rate is not less than the revenue-optimal one, which is contrary with the conclusion, i.e., the socially optimal and revenue-optimal arrival rates are consistent, drawn in the literature for homogeneous SUs. Finally, we present numerical examples to show the effect of various parameters on the operator\u27s pricing strategies and SUs\u27 behavior
Network Neutrality and the Evolution of the Internet
In order to create incentives for Internet traffic providers not to discriminate with respect to certain applications on the basis of network capacity requirements, the concept of market driven network neutrality is introduced. Its basic characteristics are that all applications are bearing the opportunity costs of the required traffic capacities. An economic framework for market driven network neutrality in broadband Internet is provided, consisting of congestion pricing and quality of service differentiation. However, network neutrality regulation with its reference point of the traditional TCP would result in regulatory micromanagement of traffic network management. --Broadband Internet,network neutrality,quality of service differentiation,congestion pricing,interclass externality pricing,interconnection agreements
Network neutrality and the evolution of the internet
In order to create incentives for Internet traffic providers not to discriminate with respect to certain applications on the basis of network capacity require-ments, the concept of market driven network neutrality is introduced. Its basic characteristics are that all applications are bearing the opportunity costs of the required traffic capacities. An economic framework for market driven network neutrality in broadband Internet is provided, consisting of congestion pricing and quality of service differentiation. However, network neutrality regulation with its reference point of the traditional TCP would result in regulatory micro-management of traffic network management. --
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