The Future of Retail Operations

Retailing consists of all the activities associated with the selling of goods to the final consumer. In this article, we review the research on retail operations published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Research (M&SOM) since 1999. We then discuss the current retail landscape and the new research directions it offers, in which M&SOM can play a prominent role

Inefficiencies in Digital Advertising Markets

Digital advertising markets are growing and attracting increased scrutiny. This article explores four market inefficiencies that remain poorly understood: ad effect measurement, frictions between and within advertising channel members, ad blocking, and ad fraud. Although these topics are not unique to digital advertising, each manifests in unique ways in markets for digital ads. The authors identify relevant findings in the academic literature, recent developments in practice, and promising topics for future research

A Survey of the Economic Role of Software Platforms in Computer-Based Industries

Software platforms are a critical component of the computer systems underpinning leading– edge products ranging from third– generation mobile phones to video games. After describing some key economic features of computer systems and software platforms, the paper presents case studies of personal computers, video games, personal digital assistants, smart mobile phones, and digital content devices. It then compares several economic aspects of these businesses including their industry evolution, pricing structures, and degrees of integration.software platforms, hardware platforms, network effects, bundling, multi-sided markets

STRATEGIC PRODUCT DESIGN DECISIONS FOR UNCERTAIN, CONVERGING AND SERVICE ORIENTED MARKETS

Market driven product design decisions are receiving increasing attention in the engineering design research literature. Econometric models and marketing research techniques are being integrated into engineering design in order to assist with profit maximizing product design decisions. This stream of research is referred to as "Design for Market Systems" (DMS). The existing DMS approaches fall short when the market environment is complex. The complexity can be incurred by the uncertain action-reactions of market players which impose unexpected market responses to a new design. The complexity can originate from the emergence of a niche product which creates a new product market by integrating the features of two or more existing products categories. The complexity can also arise when the designer is challenged to handle the couplings of outsourced subsystems from suppliers and explore the integration of the product with service providers. The objective of the thesis is to overcome such limitations and facilitate design decisions by modeling and interpreting the complex market environment. The research objective is achieved by three research thrusts. Thrust 1 examines the impact of action-reactions of market players on the long and short term design decisions for single category products using an agent based simulation approach. Thrust 2 concerns the design decisions for "convergence products". A convergence product physically integrates two or more existing product categories into a common product form. Convergence products make the consumer choice behavior and profit implications of design alternatives differ significantly from the situation where only a single product market is involved. Thrust 3 explores product design decisions while considering the connection to the upstream suppliers and downstream service providers. The connection is achieved by a quantitative understanding of interoperability of physical product modules as well as between a physical product and a service provider

The Political Economy of Cable - "Open Access."

Advocates of "open access" claim that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should be able to use a cable TV system's bandwidth on the same terms offered to ISPs owned by the cable system. On that view, "open access" mitigates a monopoly bottleneck and encourages the growth of broadband. This paper shows that cable operators do enjoy market power, and do seek to leverage a dominant position in video into the broadband access market by allocating too little bandwidth for Internet access. Yet, rather than protect cable operators from cannibalizing their cable TV revenue, this strategy defends against imposition of common carrier regulation, which would allow system capacity to be appropriated by regulators and rival broadband networks. Ironically, the push for "open access" limits Internet access by encouraging this under-allocation of broadband spectrum, and by introducing coordination problems slowing technology deployment. These effects are empirically evident in the competitive superiority of cable's "closed" platform vis-a-vis "open" DSL networks, and in financial market reactions to key regulatory events and mergers in broadband.

The Economics of Interchange Fees and Their Regulation: An Overview

This essay surveys the economic literature on interchange fees and the debate over whether interchange should be regulated and, if so, how. We consider, first, the operation of unitary payment systems, like American Express, in the context of the recent economic literature on two-sided markets, in which businesses cater to two interdependent groups of customers. The main focus is on the determination of price structure. We then discuss the basic economics of multi-party payment systems and the role of interchange in the operation of such systems under some standard, though unrealistic, simplifying assumptions. The key point of this discussion is that the interchange fee is not an ordinary price; its most direct effect is on price structure, not price level. We then examine the implications for privately determined interchange fees of some of the relevant market imperfections that have been discussed in the economic literature. While some studies suggest that privately determined interchange fees are inefficiently high, others point to fees being inefficiently low. Moreover, there is a consensus among economists that, as a matter of theory, it is not possible to arrive, except by happenstance, at the socially optimal interchange fee through any regulatory system that considers only costs. This distinguishes the market imperfections at issue here for multi-party systems from the more familiar area of public utility regulation, where setting price equal to marginal cost is theoretically ideal. Next, we consider the issues facing policy makers. Since there is so much uncertainty about the relation between privately and socially optimal interchange fees, the outcome of a policy debate can depend critically on who bears the burden of proof under whatever set of institutions and laws the deliberation takes place. There is no apparent basis in today's economics - at a theoretical or empirical level - for concluding that it is generally possible to improve social welfare by a noticeable reduction in privately set interchange fees. Thus, if antitrust or other regulators had to show that such intervention would improve welfare, they could not do so. This, again, is quite unlike public utility regulation or many areas of antitrust including, in particular, ordinary cartels. By the same token, there is no basis in economics for concluding that the privately set interchange fee is just right. Thus, if card associations had to bear the burden of proof - for example, to obtain a comfort or clearance letter from authorities for engaging in presumptively illegal coordinated behavior - it would be difficult for them to demonstrate that they set socially optimal fees. We take a pragmatic approach by suggesting two fact-based inquiries that we believe policymakers should undertake before intervening to affect interchange. First, policymakers should establish that there is a significant market failure that needs to be addressed. Second, policymakers should establish that it is possible to correct a serious market imperfection, assuming one exists, by whatever intervention they are considering (such as cost-based regulation of interchange fee levels) and thereby to increase social welfare significantly after taking into account other distortions that the intervention may create. We illustrate both of these points by examining the recent Australian experience.Technology and Industry, Regulatory Reform

The economics of interchange fees and their regulation : an overview

Debit cards ; Credit cards

Digital Platform Strategy - A Systematic Critical Review

While the transformative effect of digital platforms is broadly recognized, digital platform-related research evolved in largely disconnected streams focusing on technical platform architecture, network effects, and specific tactical decisions, without offering a holistic view of digital platform strategy. With the goal of advancing digital platform strategy research, we conduct a systematic critical review of research published in the leading Information Systems journals through a pragmatic business strategy lens that argues that markets, partnerships, differentiators, staging, and profit logic form the core elements of a holistic business strategy. We outline the core insights in extant research and we identify a number of promising opportunities for expanding the scope of digital platform strategy research in Information Systems

Innovation in the Wireless Ecosystem: A Customer-Centric Framework

The Federal Communications Commission’s Notice of Inquiry in GN 09-157 Fostering Innovation and Investment in the Wireless Communications Market is a significant event at an opportune moment. Wireless communications has already radically changed the way not only Americans but people the world over communicate with each other and access and share information, and there appears no end in sight to this fundamental shift in communication markets. Although the wireless communications phenomenon is global, the US has played and will continue to play a major role in the shaping of this market. At the start of a new US Administration and important changes in the FCC, it is most appropriate that this proceeding be launched.