Time, action and psychosis: using subjective time to investigate the effects of ketamine on sense of agency

Sense of agency refers to the experience of initiating and controlling actions in order to influence events in the outside world. A disturbed sense of agency is found in certain psychiatric and neurological disorders, most notably schizophrenia. Sense of agency is associated with a subjective compression of time: actions and their outcomes are perceived as bound together in time. This is known as ‘intentional binding’ and, in healthy adults, depends partly on advance prediction of action outcomes. Notably, this predictive contribution is disrupted in patients with schizophrenia. In the present study we aimed to characterise the psychotomimetic effect of ketamine, a drug model for psychosis, on the predictive contribution to intentional binding. It was shown that ketamine produced a disruption that closely resembled previous data from patients in the early, prodromal, stage of schizophrenic illness. These results are discussed in terms of established models of delusion formation in schizophrenia. The link between time and agency, more generally, is also considered

Model selection and prediction of outcomes in recent onset schizophrenia patients who undergo cognitive training.

Predicting treatment outcomes in psychiatric populations remains a challenge, but is increasingly important in the pursuit of personalized medicine. Patients with schizophrenia have deficits in cognition, and targeted cognitive training (TCT) of auditory processing and working memory has been shown to improve some of these impairments; but little is known about the baseline patient characteristics predictive of cognitive improvement. Here we use a model selection and regression approach called least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) to examine predictors of cognitive improvement in response to TCT for patients with recent onset schizophrenia. Forty-three individuals with recent onset schizophrenia randomized to undergo TCT were assessed at baseline on measures of cognition, symptoms, functioning, illness duration, and demographic variables. We carried out 10-fold cross-validation of LASSO for model selection and regression. We followed up on these results using linear models for statistical inference. No individual variable was found to correlate with improvement in global cognition using a Pearson correlation approach, and a linear model including all variables was also found not to be significant. However, the LASSO model identified baseline global cognition, education, and gender in a model predictive of improvement on global cognition following TCT. These findings offer guidelines for personalized approaches to cognitive training for patients with schizophrenia

Psychic embedding — vision and delusion

The paper introduces the idea that the human brain may apply complex mathematical modules in order to process and understand the world. We speculate that the substrate of what appears outwardly as intuition, or prophetic power, may be a mathematical apparatus such as time-delay embedding. In this context, predictive accuracy may be the reflection of an appropriate choice of the embedding parameters. We further put this in the perspective of mental illness, and search for the possible differences between good intuition and delusive ideation. We speculate that the task at which delusional schizophrenic patients falter is not necessarily of perception, but rather of model selection. Failure of the psychotic patient to correctly choose the embedding parameters may readily lead to misinterpretation of an accurate perception through an altered reconstructed of the object perceived

Altered brainstem responses to modafinil in schizophrenia: implications for adjunctive treatment of cognition.

Candidate pro-cognitive drugs for schizophrenia targeting several neurochemical systems have consistently failed to demonstrate robust efficacy. It remains untested whether concurrent antipsychotic medications exert pharmacodynamic interactions that mitigate pro-cognitive action in patients. We used functional MRI (fMRI) in a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled within-subject crossover test of single-dose modafinil effects in 27 medicated schizophrenia patients, interrogating brainstem regions where catecholamine systems arise to innervate the cortex, to link cellular and systems-level models of cognitive control. Modafinil effects were evaluated both within this patient group and compared to a healthy subject group. Modafinil modulated activity in the locus coeruleus (LC) and ventral tegmental area (VTA) in the patient group. However, compared to the healthy comparison group, these effects were altered as a function of task demands: the control-independent drug effect on deactivation was relatively attenuated (shallower) in the LC and exaggerated (deeper) in the VTA; in contrast, again compared to the comparison group, the control-related drug effects on positive activation were attenuated in LC, VTA and the cortical cognitive control network. These altered effects in the LC and VTA were significantly and specifically associated with the degree of antagonism of alpha-2 adrenergic and dopamine-2 receptors, respectively, by concurrently prescribed antipsychotics. These sources of evidence suggest interacting effects on catecholamine neurons of chronic antipsychotic treatment, which respectively increase and decrease sustained neuronal activity in LC and VTA. This is the first direct evidence in a clinical population to suggest that antipsychotic medications alter catecholamine neuronal activity to mitigate pro-cognitive drug action on cortical circuits

Comment on Noll and Krier, "Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation"

We have known about systematic violations of the expected utility (EU) theory of choice for almost forty years, since Maurice Allais got Jimmie Savage to violate his own "sure-thing principle" (or "independence axiom") while making hypothetical choices over lunch in Paris. Savage was victimized by some combination of wine and intuition. The wine's effect is gone, but the intuition is not: devotion to EU sometimes produces unappealing choices

Human Computation and Convergence

Humans are the most effective integrators and producers of information, directly and through the use of information-processing inventions. As these inventions become increasingly sophisticated, the substantive role of humans in processing information will tend toward capabilities that derive from our most complex cognitive processes, e.g., abstraction, creativity, and applied world knowledge. Through the advancement of human computation - methods that leverage the respective strengths of humans and machines in distributed information-processing systems - formerly discrete processes will combine synergistically into increasingly integrated and complex information processing systems. These new, collective systems will exhibit an unprecedented degree of predictive accuracy in modeling physical and techno-social processes, and may ultimately coalesce into a single unified predictive organism, with the capacity to address societies most wicked problems and achieve planetary homeostasis.Comment: Pre-publication draft of chapter. 24 pages, 3 figures; added references to page 1 and 3, and corrected typ

Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self

The concept of the brain as a prediction machine has enjoyed a resurgence in the context of the Bayesian brain and predictive coding approaches within cognitive science. To date, this perspective has been applied primarily to exteroceptive perception (e.g., vision, audition), and action. Here, I describe a predictive, inferential perspective on interoception: ‘interoceptive inference’ conceives of subjective feeling states (emotions) as arising from actively-inferred generative (predictive) models of the causes of interoceptive afferents. The model generalizes ‘appraisal’ theories that view emotions as emerging from cognitive evaluations of physiological changes, and it sheds new light on the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie the experience of body ownership and conscious selfhood in health and in neuropsychiatric illness

Vanilla PP for Philosophers: A Primer on Predictive Processing

The goal of this short chapter, aimed at philosophers, is to provide an overview and brief explanation of some central concepts involved in predictive processing (PP). Even those who consider themselves experts on the topic may find it helpful to see how the central terms are used in this collection. To keep things simple, we will first informally define a set of features important to predictive processing, supplemented by some short explanations and an alphabetic glossary. The features described here are not shared in all PP accounts. Some may not be necessary for an individual model; others may be contested. Indeed, not even all authors of this collection will accept all of them. To make this transparent, we have encouraged contributors to indicate briefly which of the features are necessary to support the arguments they provide, and which (if any) are incompatible with their account. For the sake of clarity, we provide the complete list here, very roughly ordered by how central we take them to be for “Vanilla PP” (i.e., a formulation of predictive processing that will probably be accepted by most researchers working on this topic). More detailed explanations will be given below. Note that these features do not specify individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the concept of “predictive processing”. All we currently have is a semantic cluster, with perhaps some overlapping sets of jointly sufficient criteria. The framework is still developing, and it is difficult, maybe impossible, to provide theory-neutral explanations of all PP ideas without already introducing strong background assumptions