On Team Decision Problems with Nonclassical Information Structures

In this paper, we consider sequential dynamic team decision problems with nonclassical information structures. First, we address the problem from the point of view of a "manager" who seeks to derive the optimal strategy of the team in a centralized process. We derive structural results that yield an information state for the team which does not depend on the control strategy, and thus it can lead to a dynamic programming decomposition where the optimization problem is over the space of the team's decisions. We, then, derive structural results for each team member that yield an information state which does not depend on their control strategy, and thus it can lead to a dynamic programming decomposition where the optimization problem for each team member is over the space of their decisions. Finally, we show that the control strategy of each team member is the same as the one derived by the manager. We present an illustrative example of a dynamic team with a delayed sharing information structure.Comment: 16 page

Value of Information in Feedback Control

In this article, we investigate the impact of information on networked control systems, and illustrate how to quantify a fundamental property of stochastic processes that can enrich our understanding about such systems. To that end, we develop a theoretical framework for the joint design of an event trigger and a controller in optimal event-triggered control. We cover two distinct information patterns: perfect information and imperfect information. In both cases, observations are available at the event trigger instantly, but are transmitted to the controller sporadically with one-step delay. For each information pattern, we characterize the optimal triggering policy and optimal control policy such that the corresponding policy profile represents a Nash equilibrium. Accordingly, we quantify the value of information $\operatorname{VoI}_k$ as the variation in the cost-to-go of the system given an observation at time $k$. Finally, we provide an algorithm for approximation of the value of information, and synthesize a closed-form suboptimal triggering policy with a performance guarantee that can readily be implemented

Unified Approach to Convex Robust Distributed Control given Arbitrary Information Structures

We consider the problem of computing optimal linear control policies for linear systems in finite-horizon. The states and the inputs are required to remain inside pre-specified safety sets at all times despite unknown disturbances. In this technical note, we focus on the requirement that the control policy is distributed, in the sense that it can only be based on partial information about the history of the outputs. It is well-known that when a condition denoted as Quadratic Invariance (QI) holds, the optimal distributed control policy can be computed in a tractable way. Our goal is to unify and generalize the class of information structures over which quadratic invariance is equivalent to a test over finitely many binary matrices. The test we propose certifies convexity of the output-feedback distributed control problem in finite-horizon given any arbitrarily defined information structure, including the case of time varying communication networks and forgetting mechanisms. Furthermore, the framework we consider allows for including polytopic constraints on the states and the inputs in a natural way, without affecting convexity

Quadratic Multi-Dimensional Signaling Games and Affine Equilibria

This paper studies the decentralized quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems when an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. The main contributions of this study are the extension of Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk formulation to multi-dimensional sources and to noisy channel setups. We consider both (simultaneous) Nash equilibria and (sequential) Stackelberg equilibria. We show that for arbitrary scalar sources, in the presence of misalignment, the quantized nature of all equilibrium policies holds for Nash equilibria in the sense that all Nash equilibria are equivalent to those achieved by quantized encoder policies. On the other hand, all Stackelberg equilibria policies are fully informative. For multi-dimensional setups, unlike the scalar case, Nash equilibrium policies may be of non-quantized nature, and even linear. In the noisy setup, a Gaussian source is to be transmitted over an additive Gaussian channel. The goals of the encoder and the decoder are misaligned by a bias term and encoder's cost also includes a penalty term on signal power. Conditions for the existence of affine Nash equilibria as well as general informative equilibria are presented. For the noisy setup, the only Stackelberg equilibrium is the linear equilibrium when the variables are scalar. Our findings provide further conditions on when affine policies may be optimal in decentralized multi-criteria control problems and lead to conditions for the presence of active information transmission in strategic environments.Comment: 15 pages, 4 figure