Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments

We study online mechanisms for preemptive scheduling with deadlines, with the goal of maximizing the total value of completed jobs. This problem is fundamental to deadline-aware cloud scheduling, but there are strong lower bounds even for the algorithmic problem without incentive constraints. However, these lower bounds can be circumvented under the natural assumption of deadline slackness, i.e., that there is a guaranteed lower bound $s > 1$ on the ratio between a job's size and the time window in which it can be executed. In this paper, we construct a truthful scheduling mechanism with a constant competitive ratio, given slackness $s > 1$. Furthermore, we show that if $s$ is large enough then we can construct a mechanism that also satisfies a commitment property: it can be determined whether or not a job will finish, and the requisite payment if so, well in advance of each job's deadline. This is notable because, in practice, users with strict deadlines may find it unacceptable to discover only very close to their deadline that their job has been rejected

A Market-based Approach to Multi-factory Scheduling

In this paper, we report on the design of a novel market-based approach for decentralised scheduling across multiple factories. Specifically, because of the limitations of scheduling in a centralised manner -- which requires a center to have complete and perfect information for optimality and the truthful revelation of potentially commercially private preferences to that center -- we advocate an informationally decentralised approach that is both agile and dynamic. In particular, this work adopts a market-based approach for decentralised scheduling by considering the different stakeholders representing different factories as self-interested, profit-motivated economic agents that trade resources for the scheduling of jobs. The overall schedule of these jobs is then an emergent behaviour of the strategic interaction of these trading agents bidding for resources in a market based on limited information and their own preferences. Using a simple (zero-intelligence) bidding strategy, we empirically demonstrate that our market-based approach achieves a lower bound efficiency of 84%. This represents a trade-off between a reasonable level of efficiency (compared to a centralised approach) and the desirable benefits of a decentralised solution

Space communications scheduler: A rule-based approach to adaptive deadline scheduling

Job scheduling is a deceptively complex subfield of computer science. The highly combinatorial nature of the problem, which is NP-complete in nearly all cases, requires a scheduling program to intelligently transverse an immense search tree to create the best possible schedule in a minimal amount of time. In addition, the program must continually make adjustments to the initial schedule when faced with last-minute user requests, cancellations, unexpected device failures, quests, cancellations, unexpected device failures, etc. A good scheduler must be quick, flexible, and efficient, even at the expense of generating slightly less-than-optimal schedules. The Space Communication Scheduler (SCS) is an intelligent rule-based scheduling system. SCS is an adaptive deadline scheduler which allocates modular communications resources to meet an ordered set of user-specified job requests on board the NASA Space Station. SCS uses pattern matching techniques to detect potential conflicts through algorithmic and heuristic means. As a result, the system generates and maintains high density schedules without relying heavily on backtracking or blind search techniques. SCS is suitable for many common real-world applications