3,087 research outputs found
Optimal Contracts for Outsourced Computation
While expensive cryptographically verifiable computation aims at defeating malicious agents, many civil purposes of outsourced computation tolerate a weaker notion of security, i.e., ālazy-but-honestā contractors. Targeting this type of agents, we develop optimal contracts for outsourcing of computational tasks via appropriate use of rewards, punishments, auditing rate, and āredundancyā. Our contracts provably minimize the expense of the outsourcer (principal) while guaranteeing correct computation. Furthermore, we incorporate practical restrictions of the maximum enforceable fine, limited and/or costly auditing, and bounded budget of the outsourcer. By examining the optimal contracts, we provide insights on how resources should be utilized when auditing capacity and enforceability are limited. Finally, we present a light-weight cryptographic implementation of the contracts and discuss a comparison across different implementations of auditing in outsourced computation
Betrayal, Distrust, and Rationality: Smart Counter-Collusion Contracts for Verifiable Cloud Computing
Cloud computing has become an irreversible trend. Together comes the pressing
need for verifiability, to assure the client the correctness of computation
outsourced to the cloud. Existing verifiable computation techniques all have a
high overhead, thus if being deployed in the clouds, would render cloud
computing more expensive than the on-premises counterpart. To achieve
verifiability at a reasonable cost, we leverage game theory and propose a smart
contract based solution. In a nutshell, a client lets two clouds compute the
same task, and uses smart contracts to stimulate tension, betrayal and distrust
between the clouds, so that rational clouds will not collude and cheat. In the
absence of collusion, verification of correctness can be done easily by
crosschecking the results from the two clouds. We provide a formal analysis of
the games induced by the contracts, and prove that the contracts will be
effective under certain reasonable assumptions. By resorting to game theory and
smart contracts, we are able to avoid heavy cryptographic protocols. The client
only needs to pay two clouds to compute in the clear, and a small transaction
fee to use the smart contracts. We also conducted a feasibility study that
involves implementing the contracts in Solidity and running them on the
official Ethereum network.Comment: Published in ACM CCS 2017, this is the full version with all
appendice
Mechanisms for Outsourcing Computation via a Decentralized Market
As the number of personal computing and IoT devices grows rapidly, so does
the amount of computational power that is available at the edge. Since many of
these devices are often idle, there is a vast amount of computational power
that is currently untapped, and which could be used for outsourcing
computation. Existing solutions for harnessing this power, such as volunteer
computing (e.g., BOINC), are centralized platforms in which a single
organization or company can control participation and pricing. By contrast, an
open market of computational resources, where resource owners and resource
users trade directly with each other, could lead to greater participation and
more competitive pricing. To provide an open market, we introduce MODiCuM, a
decentralized system for outsourcing computation. MODiCuM deters participants
from misbehaving-which is a key problem in decentralized systems-by resolving
disputes via dedicated mediators and by imposing enforceable fines. However,
unlike other decentralized outsourcing solutions, MODiCuM minimizes
computational overhead since it does not require global trust in mediation
results. We provide analytical results proving that MODiCuM can deter
misbehavior, and we evaluate the overhead of MODiCuM using experimental results
based on an implementation of our platform
A2THOS: Availability Analysis and Optimisation in SLAs
IT service availability is at the core of customer satisfaction and business success for todayās organisations. Many medium-large size organisations outsource part of their IT services to external providers, with Service Level Agreements describing the agreed availability of outsourced service components. Availability management of partially outsourced IT services is a non trivial task since classic approaches for calculating availability are not applicable, and IT managers can only rely on their expertise to fulfil it. This often leads to the adoption of non optimal solutions. In this paper we present A2THOS, a framework to calculate the availability of partially outsourced IT services in the presence of SLAs and to achieve a cost-optimal choice of availability levels for outsourced IT components while guaranteeing a target availability level for the service
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