Automated Negotiation for Complex Multi-Agent Resource Allocation

The problem of constructing and analyzing systems of intelligent, autonomous agents is becoming more and more important. These agents may include people, physical robots, virtual humans, software programs acting on behalf of human beings, or sensors. In a large class of multi-agent scenarios, agents may have different capabilities, preferences, objectives, and constraints. Therefore, efficient allocation of resources among multiple agents is often difficult to achieve. Automated negotiation (bargaining) is the most widely used approach for multi-agent resource allocation and it has received increasing attention in the recent years. However, information uncertainty, existence of multiple contracting partners and competitors, agents\u27 incentive to maximize individual utilities, and market dynamics make it difficult to calculate agents\u27 rational equilibrium negotiation strategies and develop successful negotiation agents behaving well in practice. To this end, this thesis is concerned with analyzing agents\u27 rational behavior and developing negotiation strategies for a range of complex negotiation contexts. First, we consider the problem of finding agents\u27 rational strategies in bargaining with incomplete information. We focus on the principal alternating-offers finite horizon bargaining protocol with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents\u27 reserve prices. We provide an algorithm based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents\u27 equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist. Our approach is sound, complete and, in principle, can be applied to other uncertainty settings. Simulation results show that there is at least one pure strategy sequential equilibrium in 99.7% of various scenarios. In addition, agents with equilibrium strategies achieved higher utilities than agents with heuristic strategies. Next, we extend the alternating-offers protocol to handle concurrent negotiations in which each agent has multiple trading opportunities and faces market competition. We provide an algorithm based on backward induction to compute the subgame perfect equilibrium of concurrent negotiation. We observe that agents\u27 bargaining power are affected by the proposing ordering and market competition and for a large subset of the space of the parameters, agents\u27 equilibrium strategies depend on the values of a small number of parameters. We also extend our algorithm to find a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in concurrent negotiations where there is one-sided uncertainty regarding the reserve price of one agent. Third, we present the design and implementation of agents that concurrently negotiate with other entities for acquiring multiple resources. Negotiation agents are designed to adjust 1) the number of tentative agreements and 2) the amount of concession they are willing to make in response to changing market conditions and negotiation situations. In our approach, agents utilize a time-dependent negotiation strategy in which the reserve price of each resource is dynamically determined by 1) the likelihood that negotiation will not be successfully completed, 2) the expected agreement price of the resource, and 3) the expected number of final agreements. The negotiation deadline of each resource is determined by its relative scarcity. Since agents are permitted to decommit from agreements, a buyer may make more than one tentative agreement for each resource and the maximum number of tentative agreements is constrained by the market situation. Experimental results show that our negotiation strategy achieved significantly higher utilities than simpler strategies. Finally, we consider the problem of allocating networked resources in dynamic environment, such as cloud computing platforms, where providers strategically price resources to maximize their utility. While numerous auction-based approaches have been proposed in the literature, our work explores an alternative approach where providers and consumers negotiate resource leasing contracts. We propose a distributed negotiation mechanism where agents negotiate over both a contract price and a decommitment penalty, which allows agents to decommit from contracts at a cost. We compare our approach experimentally, using representative scenarios and workloads, to both combinatorial auctions and the fixed-price model, and show that the negotiation model achieves a higher social welfare

Engineering coordination : eine Methodologie für die Koordination von Planungssystemen

Planning problems, like real-world planning and scheduling problems, are complex tasks. As an efficient strategy for handing such problems is the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy has been identified. Each sub problem is then solved independently. Typically the sub problems are solved in a linear way. This approach enables the generation of sub-optimal plans for a number of real world problems. Today, this approach is widely accepted and has been established e.g. in the organizational structure of companies. But existing interdependencies between the sub problems are not sufficiently regarded, as each problem are solved sequentially and no feedback information is given. The field of coordination has been covered by a number of academic fields, like the distributed artificial intelligence, economics or game theory. An important result is, that there exist no method that leads to optimal results in any given coordination problem. Consequently, a suitable coordination mechanism has to be identified for each single coordination problem. Up to now, there exists no process for the selection of a coordination mechanism, neither in the engineering of distributed systems nor in agent oriented software engineering. Within the scope of this work the ECo process is presented, that address exactly this selection problem. The Eco process contains the following five steps. • Modeling of the coordination problem • Defining the coordination requirements • Selection / Design of the coordination mechanism • Implementation • Evaluation Each of these steps is detailed in the thesis. The modeling has to be done to enable a systemic analysis of the coordination problem. Coordination mechanisms have to respect the given situation and the context in which the coordination has to be done. The requirements imposed by the context of the coordination problem are formalized in the coordination requirements. The selection process is driven by these coordination requirements. Using the requirements as a distinction for the selection of a coordination mechanism is a central aspect of this thesis. Additionally these requirements can be used for documentation of design decisions. Therefore, it is reasonable to annotate the coordination mechanisms with the coordination requirements they fulfill and fail to ease the selection process, for a given situation. For that reason we present a new classification scheme for coordination methods within this thesis that classifies existing coordination methods according to a set of criteria that has been identified as important for the distinction between different coordination methods. The implementation phase of the ECo process is supported by the CoPS process and CoPS framework that has been developed within this thesis, as well. The CoPS process structures the design making that has to be done during the implementation phase. The CoPS framework provides a set of basic features software agents need for realizing the selected coordination method. Within the CoPS process techniques are presented for the design and implementation of conversations between agents that can be applied not only within the context of the coordination of planning systems, but for multiagent systems in general. The ECo-CoPS approach has been successfully validated in two case studies from the logistic domain.Reale Planungsprobleme, wie etwa die Produktionsplanung in einer Supply Chain, sind komplex Planungsprobleme. Eine übliche Strategie derart komplexen Problemen zu lösen, ist es diese Probleme in einfachere Teilprobleme zu zerlegen und diese dann separat, meist sequentiell, zu lösen (divide-and-conquer Strategie). Dieser Ansatz erlaubt die Erstellung von (suboptimalen) Plänen für eine Reihe von realen Anwendungen, und ist heute in den Organisationsstrukturen von größeren Unternehmen institutionalisiert worden. Allerdings werden Abhängigkeiten zwischen den Teilproblemen nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt, da die Partialprobleme sequentiell ohne Feedback gelöst werden. Die erstellten Teillösungen müssen deswegen oft nachträglich koordiniert werden. Das Gebiet der Koordination wird in verschiedenen Forschungsgebieten, wie etwa der verteilten Künstlichen Intelligenz, den Wirtschaftswissenschaften oder der Spieltheorie untersucht. Ein zentrales Ergebnis dieser Forschung ist, dass es keinen für alle Situationen geeigneten Koordinationsmechanismus gibt. Es stellt sich also die Aufgabe aus den zahlreichen vorgeschlagenen Koordinationsmechanismen eine Auswahl zu treffen, die für die aktuelle Situation den geeigneten Mechanismus identifiziert. Für die Auswahl eines solchen Mechanismus existiert bisher jedoch kein strukturiertes Verfahren für die Entwicklung von verteilten Systems und insbesondere im Bereich der Agenten orientierter Softwareentwicklung. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird genau hierfür ein Verfahren vorgestellt, der ECo-Prozess. Mit Hilfe dieses Prozesses wird der Auswahlprozess in die folgenden Schritte eingeteilt: • Modellierung der Problemstellung und des relevante Kontextes • Formulierung von Anforderungen an einen Koordinationsmechanismus (coordination requirements) • Auswahl/Entwurf eines Koordinationsmechanismuses • Implementierung des Koordinationsverfahrens • Evaluation des Koordinationsverfahrens Diese Schritte werden im Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit detailliert beschrieben. Die Modellierung der Problemstellung stellt dabei den ersten Schritt dar, um die Problemstellung analytisch zugänglich zu machen. Koordinationsverfahren müssen die Gegebenheiten, den Kontext und die Domäne, in der sie angewendet werden sollen hinreichend berücksichtigen um anwendbar zu sein. Dieses kann über Anforderungen an den Koordinationsprozess formalisiert werden. Der von den Anforderungen getrieben Auswahlprozess ist ein Kernstück der hier vorgestellten Arbeit. Durch die Formulierung der Anforderungen und der Annotation eines Koordinationsmechanismus bezüglich der erfüllten und nicht erfüllten Anforderungen werden die Motive für Designentscheidungen dieses Verfahren expliziert. Wenn Koordinationsverfahren anhand dieser Anforderungen klassifiziert werden können, ist es weiterhin möglich den Auswahlprozess (unabhängig vom ECo-Ansatz) zu vereinfachen und zu beschleunigen. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird eine Klassifikation von Koordinationsansätzen anhand von allgemeinen Kriterien vorgestellt, die die Identifikation von geeigneten Kandidaten erleichtern. Diese Kandidaten können dann detaillierter untersucht werden. Dies wurde in den vorgestellten Fallstudien erfolgreich demonstriert. Für die Unterstützung der Implementierung eines Koordinationsansatzes wird in dieser Arbeit zusätzlich der CoPS Prozess vorgeschlagen. Der CoPS Prozess erlaubt einen ganzheitlichen systematischen Ansatz für den Entwurf und die Implementierung eines Koordinationsverfahrens. Unterstürzt wird der CoPS Prozess durch das CoPS Framework, das die Implementierung erleichtert, indem es als eine Plattform mit Basisfunktionalität eines Agenten bereitstellt, der für die Koordination von Planungssystemen verantwortlich ist. Im Rahmen des CoPS Verfahrens werden Techniken für den Entwurf und die Implementierung von Konversation im Kontext des agenten-orientiertem Software Engineerings ausführlich behandelt. Der Entwurf von Konversationen geht dabei weit über Fragestellung der Formatierung von Nachrichten hinaus, wie dies etwa in den FIPA Standards geregelt ist, und ist für die Implementierung von agentenbasierten Systemen im Allgemeinen von Bedeutung. Die Funktionsweise des ECo-CoPS Ansatzes wird anhand von zweierfolgreich durchgeführten Fallstudien aus dem betriebswirtschaftlichen Kontext vorgestellt

Coordination in Service Value Networks - A Mechanism Design Approach

The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value networks (SVN) implies new economic and organizational challenges. This work provides an auction-based coordination mechanism that enables the allocation and pricing of service compositions in SVNs. The mechanism is multidimensional incentive compatible and implements an ex-post service level enforcement. Further extensions of the mechanism are evaluated following analytical and numerical research methods