The Political Economy of Privatization

International organizations promote privatization as precondition for economic development. But is there really too little privatization? This political economy model asks for the incentives of governments to privatize or restructure a state-owned firm. Different government types are compared to identify the political and institutional determinants of privatization. Under privatization, governments commit not to influence the profit-maximizing employment choice by private investors. With respect to the social optimum, both voter-oriented and egoistic governments can have inefficiently high incentives to privatize. When this is the case, outside pressure to privatize is detrimental. An improving institutional environment reduces these inefficiencies

Реструктуризація ринку електроенергії в контексті трансформаційних процесів і ціноутворення

The study introduces several most significant empirical and analytical findings covering the issue of electricity restructuring. In this regard, it detailes the dataset on electricity framework in order to investigate tendencies and the main challenges in the market structure following the regulation and deregulation processes of the electricity sector, as well as the consequences for pricing. The purpose of the study is to analyze key aspects of the restructuring of electric energy markets in order to determine the main challenges related to justification of the optimal structure of the industry with this framework, as well as to establish the dependence between reforms, structural transformations and price volatility in the energy market. It should be noted that deregulation and restructuring of energy companies have been determined by the transition to competitive relations and made it possible to solve significant problems in different fields of activity, including tariffs, participants’ interests, energy efficiency, etc. Consequently, reforming of the energy market structural components should be comprehensively implemented, in order to avoid fragmentary imbalances and the impact of price distortions on the participants of the electricity market.Дослідження спрямовано на формування ключових практичних і аналітичних висновків, що стосуються проблем реструктуризації електроенергетики. Для цього виявлено найбільш значущі структурні особливості функціонування електроенергетичного ринку, що дозволило висвітлити деякі існуючі тенденції і основні проблеми в структурі енергоринку, пов'язані з процесами регулювання і дерегулювання, а також проаналізувати вплив трансформаційних процесів на встановлення цін на електроенергію, на прикладі ринку електричної енергії України, що перебуває у стадії реформування. Результати дослідження отримані із застосуванням методів порівняння, ретроспективного і аналізу, методів узагальнення і систематизації, а також методів кореляційного і регресійного аналізу. Проведений аналіз предмета дослідження дозволяє зробити висновок, що дерегулювання і реструктуризація енергетичних компаній були визначені в якості переходу до конкурентних відносин і дозволили вирішити значні проблеми в різних сферах господарювання. Отже, реформа структурних складових енергоринку має здійснюватися комплексно, для уникнення фрагментарних диспропорцій і впливу цінових спотворень для функціонування учасників ринку електроенергії

Deindustrialisation. Lessons from the StructuralOutcomes of Post-Communist Transition

Theoretical and empirical studies show that deindustrialisation, broadly observed in developed countries, is an inherent part of the economic development pattern. However, post-communist countries, while being only middle-income economies, have also experienced deindustrialisation. Building on the model developed by Rowthorn and Wells (1987) we explain this phenomenon and show that there is a strong negative relationship between the magnitude of deindustrialisation and the efficiency and consistency of market reforms. We also demonstrate that reforms of the agricultural sector play a significant role in placing a transition country on a development path that guarantees convergence to EU employment structures.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39847/3/wp463.pd

The Political Economy of Privatization

International organizations promote privatization as precondition for economic development. But is there really too little privatization? This political economy model asks for the incentives of governments to privatize or restructure a state-owned firm. Different government types are compared to identify the political and institutional determinants of privatization. Under privatization, governments commit not to influence the profit-maximizing employment choice by private investors. With respect to the social optimum, both voter-oriented and egoistic governments can have inefficiently high incentives to privatize. When this is the case, outside pressure to privatize is detrimental. An improving institutional environment reduces these inefficiencies.political incentives ; privatization ; restructuring ; employment

Regional Economic Policy: Structured Approach and Tools (The Oretical Formulation

The subject matter of the article is the development of a doctrine of coordinated regional development and the study of the structural quality of development of regional systems based on the theoretical analysis of institutional factors (parameters) that determine the technological efficiency of the regional economy. The purpose is to show possibilities of technological changes and the shift of economic growth in a particular regional system, with strict limits for accelerated development, with emphasis on industrial regions. For this purpose, we generated a number of structural models, analyzed the impact of technological factors on parameters of growth of the regional economy and determined conditions for development of industrial regions. We applied correlative and regression analysis to establish a statistically significant correlation between relevant parameters, used econometric models to show the possibility to estimate parameters of growth through control parameters, including technological factor. The structural aspect of regional economic growth is measured by dividing investments into two classes: old and new technologies. It is possible to increase the technological efficiency of the regional economy by improving results with regard to used (old) technologies and applying new technologies. This approach fundamentally refines the priority queue algorithm for regional development, provides a choice of a strategy of regional technological development. When resources are directed only to the latest technologies, the disproportion in development of the regional economic system can dramatically increase, and parameters related to diversion of resources and creation of a new resource will determine the growth rate of the region. The behavior of investment in old technologies has a major impact on the rate of regional economic growth in Russia, while investments in new technologies are minor and did not have an equivalent impact on the economic growth rate compared with old technologies. Institutional corrections that define parameters of resource diversion from old technologies and creation of a new resource for development, will determine the quality of new economic growth