10 research outputs found

    Learning from Winners: A Strategic Perspective of Improving Freelancers’ Bidding Competitiveness in Crowdsourcing

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    The rapid growth of crowdsourcing grants freelancers unprecedented opportunities to materialize their expertise by bidding in specific tasks. Despite lowering freelancers’ participation costs, the bidding mechanism meanwhile induces intense competition, rendering it difficult for freelancers to submit competitive bids. Although previous research has disentangled several bidding strategies, scant attention was paid to whether and how freelancers should learn to adjust their bidding strategies and improve bidding competitiveness during the journey of participating in multiple tasks. To fill in this gap, we adapt a set of bidding strategies from auction literature into the crowdsourcing context. Leveraging the lens of vicarious learning, we advance that freelancers’ learning from winners on bidding strategies will enhance their bidding competitiveness, which is moderated by task complexity. Our preliminary results suggest a significant relationship between strategic learning and bidding competitiveness, along with the moderating effect of task complexity. Expected contributions and future schemes are discussed finally

    Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction

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    Learning optimization models in the presence of unknown relations

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    In a sequential auction with multiple bidding agents, it is highly challenging to determine the ordering of the items to sell in order to maximize the revenue due to the fact that the autonomy and private information of the agents heavily influence the outcome of the auction. The main contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we demonstrate how to apply machine learning techniques to solve the optimal ordering problem in sequential auctions. We learn regression models from historical auctions, which are subsequently used to predict the expected value of orderings for new auctions. Given the learned models, we propose two types of optimization methods: a black-box best-first search approach, and a novel white-box approach that maps learned models to integer linear programs (ILP) which can then be solved by any ILP-solver. Although the studied auction design problem is hard, our proposed optimization methods obtain good orderings with high revenues. Our second main contribution is the insight that the internal structure of regression models can be efficiently evaluated inside an ILP solver for optimization purposes. To this end, we provide efficient encodings of regression trees and linear regression models as ILP constraints. This new way of using learned models for optimization is promising. As the experimental results show, it significantly outperforms the black-box best-first search in nearly all settings.Comment: 37 pages. Working pape

    Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: an experiment

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    This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them. In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the top-trading-cycle mechanism. There is a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, but it requires coordination across sectors. Our results show that coordination failure occurs more frequently when there is asymmetry between the two sectors compared with the one-sector benchmark, even without inter-sectoral complementarity. When mechanisms are run sequentially across the two sectors, such failure is substantially reduced, compared with when they are run simultaneously

    Essays On Hybrid Bundle Pricing

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    Increasingly, firms are offering hybrid bundles — products that combine both good(s) and service(s). Some hybrid bundles, such as TiVo that combines a DVR and recording management are more visible, while some, such as GE‘s Powerplant System that includes a nuclear power plant and maintenance/project management are more obscure. While pricing strategies for a goods bundle have been well-studied, services bundles have been underexplored. Hybrid bundles, which are fundamentally different from bundles of goods or services, have received even less attention. In this dissertation, three essays offer important insights into different aspects of hybrid bundle pricing and provide important managerial implications and guidelines. Essay I develops an analytic model of optimal pricing for hybrid bundles by a monopolist. My results show that an increase in quality variability of the service is generally associated with a higher optimal hybrid bundle price and a lower optimal price of the good, but lower overall bundle profit. They also reveal that the optimal price of the service (good) in a hybrid bundle is higher (lower) when the good has diminishing unit cost and the service has constant unit cost. Essay II examines the effects of quality variability, independence, and complementarity on willingness-to-pay for hybrid bundle components using conjoint analysis experiments. The results show that higher quality variability of a service is associated with a wider distribution of willingness-to-pay, that independence between the good and the service has positive direct- and cross-effects on willingness-to-pay, that complementarity between components has a greater positive effect on the willingness-to-pay for the service than for the good, and that independence and complementarity interact to increase willingness-to-pay. Essay III develops a general model for the pricing of hybrid bundles offered in a competitive setting. I estimate the model using empirical data of a hybrid bundle comprising carpet and installation. The results show that the price of the service plays a crucial role in the demands of both the good and service and that the service cross-price effect on the demand for the good can be substantially higher than the direct-price effect of the good on its own demand

    Multichannel Multi Market Media Service Business Model Evaluation and Benchmark

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    This research was conducted as a part of Next Media’s Multichannel Multimarket Media Services research programme. The project’s members are publishing companies and research institutions in Finland, including AAC Global, SanomaPro, Aalto University, Laurea, and the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. This study examines business models for the e-learning industry both in Finland and in international markets. Three complementary research pieces are presented in this report, and each is documented independently. • A study of different bundling opinions in the e-learning industry with public sector clients (decision-makers at public (state) schools) • A benchmarking study of AMA (American Management Association) as a content provider of education and training solutions. • A study of different business model options available to international e-learning companies, or companies striving to become internationa

    Bidder support in iterative, multiple-unit combinatorial auctions

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    This thesis is about supporting the bidders' decision making in iterative combinatorial auctions. A combinatorial auction refers to an auction with multiple (heterogeneous) items, in which bidders can submit bids on packages. Combinatorial auctions are challenging decision making environments for bidders, which hinders the adoption of combinatorial mechanisms into practice. Bidding is especially challenging in sealed-bid auctions. Bidders do not know the contents of other bidders' bids and hence cannot place bids that would team up with existing bids to become winners. The objective of this study is to develop and test support tools for bidders in semi-sealed-bid, iterative combinatorial auctions. The tools are designed for reverse auctions, but can easily be applied to a forward setting. The Quantity Support Mechanism (QSM) is a support tool, which provides the bidders with a list of bid suggestions. The bid suggestions are such that if submitted, they would become provisional winners. The QSM benefits both bidders and the buyer, because it chooses suggestions that are most profitable for the bidders while decreasing the total cost to the buyer. The QSM is based on a mixed integer programming problem. The QSM was tested in two simulation studies. The results of the studies indicated that the QSM works well - it is much better to use the QSM than no support - but that it does not necessarily guide the auctions to the efficient allocation. The QSM was also integrated into an online auctions system, and tested with human subjects. The results of the laboratory experiment showed that the performance of the QSM is dependent on the bidders' behavior and the kind of bids they place in the auction. The user interface of the auction was good. I also observed bidders' strategies, and could identify different bidder types corresponding to those reported in earlier studies. The experiment also showed the importance of experience in complex bidding environments. The simulation studies and the laboratory experiment showed that the QSM is too dependent on the existing bids in the bid stream, which causes the auctions to end in inefficient allocations. In order to overcome this problem we designed another support tool, the Group Support Mechanism (GSM). The main logic in the GSM is similar to the QSM. The main difference is that instead of solving for one bid that complements existing bids to become a winner, the GSM can suggest several bids for different bidders. Together this set of bids would then become provisionally winning. The preliminary tests show significant improvement in the efficiency of the auction outcomes when the GSM was used instead of the QSM. Future research includes the further development of the GSM and its testing with simulations and human subjects. Also, bidder behavior, bidder strategies and the effect of learning and experience in combinatorial auctions should be further studied. This is important because bidders' behavior in the auctions affects the auction design and the requirements for the user interface

    Optimal Bundling Strategies in Multiobject Auctions of Complements or Substitutes

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    We consider a problem at the interface of auctions and bundling. Our revenue-maximizing seller seeking to auction one unit each of two complements or substitutes in the best-of-three formats: the auction of the bundle, separate auctions of the individual items, and a combinatorial auction. We draw on an analytical model to address the following questions: (i) Which of the auctioning strategies is optimal under the second-price, sealed-bid format? (ii) What is the optimal strategy for the bidders? (iii) When the objects are asymmetrically valued (e.g., Super Bowl ticket versus souvenir), what is the optimal auctioning sequence under the pure components strategy? Our results suggest that separate auctions of the two objects are superior to the auction of the bundle for most substitutes and even moderate complements when there are at least four bidders. The auction of the pure bundle is better suited for strong complements or with too few bidders. When the combinatorial auction is an available option, it weakly dominates the auction of the pure bundle but has domains of inferiority relative to the separate auctions. When the objects are asymmetric in value, it is optimal to auction the higher-valued object first.auctions, bidding, bundling, game theory, price discrimination, pricing

    Disseny d'un model d'avaluació de resultats de l'activitat de màrqueting per a empreses competint al mercat català i amb relació contractual amb els seus clients

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    L’objectiu de la tesi doctoral és el de desenvolupar un model que permeti valorar de forma objectiva les actuacions en matèria de màrqueting portades a terme per una organització. Aquest model està constituït per un conjunt de variables descriptives i quantitatives, anomenades variables de control, juntament amb una metodologia de càlcul i un sistema d’indicadors integrat que facilita la traçabilitat de les inversions de màrqueting i explicita la relació causa-efecte entre aquestes i el valor generat per a l’organització. El model s’utilitza per a valorar dades reals d’organitzacions que operin al mercat català i que compleixin la condició de basar la relació amb els seus clients en un model contractual (com veurem més endavant, és inviable aplicar un model comú per a tot tipus d’empresa). L’objectiu, doncs, és la valoració de l’acompliment dels seus objectius en relació als seus actius de mercat (marca i valor de client) i la creació d’un model específic, no generalitzable, per a aquest tipus d’empreses. Un segon objectiu d’aquest treball és l’anàlisi de les principals publicacions especialitzades referents des d’un punt de vista global i local, proposant en primer lloc una terminologia clara en relació a l’activitat de màrqueting, l’acompliment dels seus objectius i la conceptualització d’actius de mercat, i analitzant, en segon, l’impacte d’aquests àmbits i la seva evolució en els últims quinze anys. Alguns estudis previs (Llonch et al., 2002; Ambler i Xiucun, 2003; entre d’altres) es centren a comparar empreses per sectors, funcionalitats i països. És probable, com apunta Llonch et al. (2002) al fer això, que casuístiques atribuïbles a diferències geogràfiques i nacionals es tractin erròniament com a empresarials. A tal efecte, aquest estudi elimina la variabilitat per país i sector (parcialment, aquest darrer), proposant un model acotat, tal com recomanen Ambler et al., (2001), Llonch et al (2002), entre d’altres, que pugui servir de referència en la metodologia i en la validesa conceptual, i no tant en els resultats del model en un context més genèric. Pauwels (2009) demostra la relació entre la creació d’un model predefinit de variables i la millora del càlcul de l’eficiència en la despesa en màrqueting, pel que la creació d’aquest model integrat té l’objectiu d’esdevenir una eina de Gestió del Rendiment Corporatiu (GRC, en endavant1) (Bauer, 2004) aplicada a la gestió de màrqueting i els seus actius. Aquesta particularització del GRC rep el nom de Gestió del Rendiment de Màrqueting (GRM, en endavant2) (Ambler, 2000) i el seu objectiu és el d’augmentar la usabilitat i faciliti la generació d’informació per a la presa de decisions de la línia directiva de les organitzacions. L’abast de la tesi és el de crear el model des d’una perspectiva d’avaluació de l’activitat de màrqueting per part de la línia directiva, i no pas el desenvolupament informàtic d’una eina de suport a la presa de decisions ja que això, com apunten diversos autors (Dover, 2004; Schiff, 2008) i es tractarà amb més profunditat en el capítol 5, implicaria un nivell de personalització per cada empresa que no és objectiu d’aquesta tesi.The thes is aims to develop a practical model to asses m arketing perform ance within an organization. The model is basically structured around control metrics both from a qualitative and quantitatve approach, together with an integrated system of key performance indicators that enables marketing accountability through different organisational divisions, thus stating a solid cause/effect relationship between marketing activities and the value created for the organisation. The aformentioned model is used to assess marketing activites for catalan com panies with a contract-based customer relationship. Final assessment includes also a dynamic valuation of the company's market as sets . A second objective of the thes is is to review the current state of the art of marketing assessment literature from specialized journals both from a global and a local pers pective, defining a comprehensive list of related terms about marketing performance measurement, market-asset description and valuation and an accurate analysis about its evolution throughout the last 15 years.Postprint (published version
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