Competition Between Auctions

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.auctions, bidding, competition, auction formats, auction houses

An Experimental Analysis of Parallel Multiple Auctions

At online auction platforms we often observed that substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently with auctions ending at the same time. I introduce an experimental setup of three sellers and four buyers in an ascending second price auction environment where every seller runs one auction with a homogeneous good and the buyers are confronted with single unit demand. I find that sellers revenue is significantly lower than theory predicts due to the fact that some auctions did not receive bids whereas other auctions concentrated the bids of all bidders. Moreover, I observe a statistically higher revenue of sellers setting the minimum starting price. Furthermore, my study shows that the buyers submit bids which are significantly lower than the private valuation every buyer receives. Comparing the efficiency of the parallel multiple auction setup to a double auction control experiment, I find a significant lower efficiency in parallel multiple auctions due to the coordination failure of the buyers.simultaneous auctions, internet auctions, market design, electronic business

PARTICIPATION AND LEARNING IN AUCTIONS: BIDDING DECISIONS IN EGYPTIAN OILSEED AUCTIONS

Auctions are common mechanisms for identifying prices and suppliers of commodities and are particularly important in agricultural marketing. Information asymmetries among bidders may be ameliorated over time through some form of learning. In this study, we incorporate prior decisions to participate, information from previous auctions, and firm-specific attributes to explain both the decision to bid and the level of the bid. Our analysis uses data from Egyptian oilseed tenders, an important market both for oilseeds and tendering. Because of the unbalanced nature of the panel data, we are able to evaluate the effects of signals received from previous tenders. We find that firms learn from previous auctions and can gain an informational advantage through some form of representation (e.g., by having an agent and/or direct sales agent to the country). Our results provide strong evidence that learning-by-doing affects the decision to participate and that learning affects the bid value. We also find that firms use outcomes of previous auctions to update information in both their decisions to participate in a market as well as determining the bid level. Finally, we find that firms with representation have a higher probability of participating in auctions and some evidence that they submit higher bids (earning higher returns).auction, bidding, tenders, optimal bids, learning, Marketing,

Learning from Seller Experiements in Online Markets

The internet has dramatically reduced the cost of varying prices, dis- plays and information provided to consumers, facilitating both active and passive experimentation. We document the prevalence of targeted pricing and auction design variation on eBay, and identify hundreds of thousands of experiments con- ducted by sellers across a wide array of retail products. We show how this type of data can be used to address questions about consumer behavior and market outcomes, and provide illustrative results on price dispersion, the frequency of over-bidding, the choice of reserve prices, ?buy now?options and other auction design parameters, and on consumer sensitivity to shipping fees. We argue that leveraging the experiments of market participants takes advantage of the scale and heterogeneity of online markets and can be a powerful approach for testing and measurement.

Competition Between Auctions

Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions

Optimal Auctions in Oligopoly Spectrum Market with Concealed Cost

This paper presents a mathematical approach to the future dynamic spectrum market, where multiple secondary operators compete to gain radio resources. The secondary network operators (SNOs) face various concurrent auctions. We discuss techniques, which can be used to select auctions to optimize their objectives and increase the winning probability. To achieve these goals, a matching problem is formulated and solved, where secondary operators are paired with auctions, which can provide spectrum with the highest expected quality of service (QoS). A total outlay optimization is structured for auctions with concealed reserve prices, which are only revealed to the secondary operators for some price upon request. More specifically, we solve a nonlinear problem to determine the minimum set of auctions by using the brute force algorithm. We further introduce a surplus maximization and demonstrate an auction mechanism of spectrum allocation by modifying the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. The mathematical analyses highlight that the optimal choice is achievable through the proposed mathematical formulation