42,326 research outputs found
Optimal auctions with ambiguity
A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989.) When the bidders face more ambiguity than the seller we show that (i) given any auction, the seller can always (weakly) increase revenue by switching to an auction providing full insurance to all types of bidders, (ii) if the seller is ambiguity neutral and any prior that is close enough to the seller's prior is included in the bidders' set of priors then the optimal auction is a full insurance auction, and (iii) in general neither the first nor the second price auction is optimal (even with suitably chosen reserve prices). When the seller is ambiguity averse and the bidders are ambiguity neutral an auction that fully insures the seller is in the set of optimal mechanisms.Auctions, mechanism design, ambiguity, uncertainty
An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions
Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse e-marketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.Combinatorial Auction, Market Design Methodology, Market Architecture Design, Auction Rule Design, Winner Determination Design, Agent-Based System
Single and Multi-Dimensional Optimal Auctions - A Network Approach
This paper highlights connections between the discrete and continuous approaches to optimal auction design with single and multi-dimensional types. We provide an interpretaion of an optimal auction design problem in terms of a linear program that is an instance of a parametric shortest path problem on a lattice. We also solve some cases explicitly in the discrete framework.Auctions, Networks, Linear Programming
Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
Designing revenue optimal auctions for selling an item to symmetric
bidders is a fundamental problem in mechanism design. Myerson (1981) shows that
the second price auction with an appropriate reserve price is optimal when
bidders' values are drawn i.i.d. from a known regular distribution. A
cornerstone in the prior-independent revenue maximization literature is a
result by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) showing that the second price auction
without a reserve achieves of the optimal revenue in the worst case.
We construct a randomized mechanism that strictly outperforms the second
price auction in this setting. Our mechanism inflates the second highest bid
with a probability that varies with . For two bidders we improve the
performance guarantee from to of the optimal revenue. We also
resolve a question in the design of revenue optimal mechanisms that have access
to a single sample from an unknown distribution. We show that a randomized
mechanism strictly outperforms all deterministic mechanisms in terms of worst
case guarantee
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