General analytical framework for cooperative sensing and access trade-off optimization

In this paper, we investigate the joint cooperative spectrum sensing and access design problem for multi-channel cognitive radio networks. A general heterogeneous setting is considered where the probabilities that different channels are available, SNRs of the signals received at secondary users (SUs) due to transmissions from primary users (PUs) for different users and channels can be different. We assume a cooperative sensing strategy with a general a-out-of-b aggregation rule and design a synchronized MAC protocol so that SUs can exploit available channels. We analyze the sensing performance and the throughput achieved by the joint sensing and access design. Based on this analysis, we develop algorithms to find optimal parameters for the sensing and access protocols and to determine channel assignment for SUs to maximize the system throughput. Finally, numerical results are presented to verify the effectiveness of our design and demonstrate the relative performance of our proposed algorithms and the optimal ones.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1404.167

Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies

The efficient design of networks has been an important engineering task that involves challenging combinatorial optimization problems. Typically, a network designer has to select among several alternatives which links to establish so that the resulting network satisfies a given set of connectivity requirements and the cost of establishing the network links is as low as possible. The Minimum Spanning Tree problem, which is well-understood, is a nice example. In this paper, we consider the natural scenario in which the connectivity requirements are posed by selfish users who have agreed to share the cost of the network to be established according to a well-defined rule. The design proposed by the network designer should now be consistent not only with the connectivity requirements but also with the selfishness of the users. Essentially, the users are players in a so-called network design game and the network designer has to propose a design that is an equilibrium for this game. As it is usually the case when selfishness comes into play, such equilibria may be suboptimal. In this paper, we consider the following question: can the network designer enforce particular designs as equilibria or guarantee that efficient designs are consistent with users' selfishness by appropriately subsidizing some of the network links? In an attempt to understand this question, we formulate corresponding optimization problems and present positive and negative results.Comment: 30 pages, 7 figure

Low-Complexity Energy-Efficient Broadcasting in One-Dimensional Wireless Networks

In this paper, we investigate the transmission range assignment for N wireless nodes located on a line (a linear wireless network) for broadcasting data from one specific node to all the nodes in the network with minimum energy. Our goal is to find a solution that has low complexity and yet performs close to optimal. We propose an algorithm for finding the optimal assignment (which results in the minimum energy consumption) with complexity O(N^2). An approximation algorithm with complexity O(N) is also proposed. It is shown that, for networks with uniformly distributed nodes, the linear-time approximate solution obtained by this algorithm on average performs practically identical to the optimal assignment. Both the optimal and the suboptimal algorithms require the full knowledge of the network topology and are thus centralized. We also propose a distributed algorithm of negligible complexity, i.e., with complexity O(1), which only requires the knowledge of the adjacent neighbors at each wireless node. Our simulations demonstrate that the distributed solution on average performs almost as good as the optimal one for networks with uniformly distributed nodes.Comment: 17 page