"Please hold for your connection": Determining points of interconnection for open access broadband

One of the early decisions facing a regulator in the context of an open access Next Generation Access networks (NGA) is the location of the points of interconnection to that NGA. This decision is one which needs to take into account the scope of the natural monopoly associated with an NGA and the extent to which there is the potential for competitive supply of transmission services (or backhaul) from access seeker points of presence to the NGA. The Australian NGA is called the National Broadband Network (NBN). This paper starts with the research question, where are the optimum sites for points of interconnection to the Australian NBN?. The paper commences by describing the architecture of the Australian NBN and considering some of the issues which arise from the fact that it is designed to be ubiquitous. The paper considers the issues that need to be considered in determining the extent to which there is a natural monopoly in transmission services as well as the effects on outcomes that arise from the existing deployment of infrastructure associated with the delivery of digital subscriber line broadband services based on unbundled local loops and line sharing services. The paper then moves to consider the requirements for consideration in the Australian regulatory context. This is summarised by the phrase long-term interests of end-users and the paper considers the interpretation of this phrase in the context of decisions on the number and location of points of interconnection. There is a review of the nature and extent to which operators in Australia contributed to the deliberations of the Australian regulator in determining the location of points of interconnection. In turn the paper then describes the actual approach taken in respect of the Australian NBN and the rationale behind those decisions. The final part of the paper describes the decision that was taken along with the rationale. It also examines the subsequent positions taken by stakeholders in respect of the points of interconnection to the Australian NBN. --Next generation access network,national broadband network,natural monopoly,transmission,point of interconnection,GPON

Optical interconnection networks based on microring resonators

Optical microring resonators can be integrated on a chip to perform switching operations directly in the optical domain. Thus they become a building block to create switching elements in on-chip optical interconnection networks, which promise to overcome some of the limitations of current electronic networks. However, the peculiar asymmetric power losses of microring resonators impose new constraints on the design and control of on-chip optical networks. In this work, we study the design of multistage interconnection networks optimized for a particular metric that we name the degradation index, which characterizes the asymmetric behavior of microrings. We also propose a routing control algorithm to maximize the overall throughput, considering the maximum allowed degradation index as a constrain

NGA, IP-Interconnection and their Impact on Business Models and Competition

Developments towards Next Generation Networks (NGN) have a strong impact on the design of the markets for electronic communications in general, but specifically on intercarrier relations with respect to interconnection and access. Due to the fact that competition in the European telecommunications environment has brought about alternative providers and their business models it is an interesting area to investigate how these business models will develop in an NGN environment and which (additional) business models may emerge in the future. To that end, the current paper looks at the development of different business models in the PSTN world and likely developments in the NGN world. This leads to conclusions with respect to requirements of the future regulatory framework of next generation networks in order to maintain the achievements of competition in the telecommunications area.NGN, business models, migration, competition, regulatory framework

NGA, IP-Interconnection and their Impact on Business Models and Competition

Developments towards Next Generation Networks (NGN) have a strong impact on the design of the markets for electronic communications in general, but specifically on intercarrier relations with respect to interconnection and access. Due to the fact that competition in the European telecommunications environment has brought about alternative providers and their business models it is an interesting area to investigate how these business models will develop in an NGN environment and which (additional) business models may emerge in the future. To that end, the current paper looks at the development of different business models in the PSTN world and likely developments in the NGN world. This leads to conclusions with respect to requirements of the future regulatory framework of next generation networks in order to maintain the achievements of competition in the telecommunications area.NGN, business models, migration, competition, regulatory framework.

Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The U.S.-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing

Since 1997, the U.S. government has attempted to use the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on telecommunications services as a vehicle for 'exporting' American principles of telecommunications regulation to other nations. The United States took the position in 1997 that the WTO telecommunications agreement requires its signatory nations to follow the practices of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on telecommunications regulatory policy. Subsequently, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has sought to influence, under the implicit threat of trade sanctions, Japan's domestic regulatory policy on the pricing of mandatory competitor access to the unbundled elements of the local network belonging to the operating companies of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT). In this Article, we examine the substantive difficulties of engrafting the FCC's interconnection policy onto the telecommunications marketplace of another nation. For more than five years, many American experts on telecommunications policy have disagreed whether American consumers have benefited from the very FCC policies that the USTR would have Japanese regulators emulate. The USTR's initiative appears to ignore that the transition to costoriented rates for interconnection and retail telecommunications services has been a difficult and unfinished process in the United States; that the cost models used by the FCC to set interconnection prices have significant deficiencies; that actual interconnection prices both within and outside the United States diverge considerably from the estimates of the FCC's cost models; that variations across countries in the prices of inputs have a significant effect on the costs of interconnection; and that, with respect to depreciation in particular, regulators treat this cost differently'and, from an economic perspective, more reasonably'in Japan than in the United States. Such substantive economic considerations suggest why the FCC's policy in this area has generated continuous litigation, including two Supreme Court cases, since 1996 and consequently is too unresolved at this point in the American experience for the United States to force on its trading partners. Next, we ask whether the USTR has the detailed knowledge required to negotiate trade agreements on interconnection pricing. We question the propriety of using the USTR to influence the domestic regulatory policy of another country on a topic as complex as the efficient pricing of mandatory access to unbundled network elements. The USTR's power to formulate trade policy on this subject resides in officials who are unlikely to possess the economic expertise and resources necessary to evaluate the consumer-welfare implications of the policies that they would have Japan and other nations adopt. For these reasons, the USTR cannot credibly make the interconnection pricing policies of another nation a legitimate concern of U.S. trade policy.

Is America Exporting Misguided Telecommunications Policy? The U.S.-Japan Telecom Trade Negotiations and Beyond

Global telecommunications markets have traditionally been closed to foreign trade and investment. Recent World Trade Organization negotiations resulted in a Basic Telecommunications agreement that sought to construct a multilateral framework to reverse that trend and begin opening telecom markets worldwide. Regrettably, this new WTO framework is quite ambiguous and open to pro-regulatory interpretations by member states. In fact, during recent bilateral trade negotiations with Japan, U.S. government officials adopted the position that the new framework allowed them to demand that the Japanese government adopt very specific regulatory provisions regarding telecom network interconnection and pricing policies. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative argued that Japanese officials should require their domestic telecom providers to share their networks with rivals at a generously discounted price to encourage greater resale competition. Those interconnection and line-sharing rules were borrowed directly from the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996, a piece of legislation that remains the subject of intense debate within the United States. Good evidence now exists that those rules generally retard net-work investment and innovation by encouraging infrastructure sharing over facilities-based investment. Consequently, the USTR has generated resentment on the part of Japan and other trading partners as it has attempted to force them to adopt heavy-handed telecommunications mandates that have very little to do with legitimate free-trade policy. The USTR must discontinue efforts to impose American telecommunications regulations on other countries as part of free-trade negotiations and should instead focus on reforming or eliminating the most serious barriers to foreign direct investment both here and abroad

Regulation of NGN: Structural Separation, Access Regulation, or No Regulation at All?

Since the introduction of Next Generation Networks (NGNs) by telecommunication network operators, national regulators have begun to adapt their access regulation regimes to the new technological conditions. The regulatory reactions gravitate towards three distinct regulatory trajectories: unregulated competition, access regulation, and structural separation. We first analyze the extent of market power in access Networks in NGNs from a technological perspective. Second, we use case studies to identify patterns between technological and market conditions and regulators' reactions in selected countries. We find that market power in the access network is likely to prevail. Regulatory reactions differ with the extent of infrastructure competition and the regulators position in the trade-off between promoting investment and protecting competition.Next Generation Network, deregulation, access regulation, structural separation

Regulation of NGN: Structural Separation, Access Regulation, or No Regulation at All?

Since the introduction of Next Generation Networks (NGNs) by telecommunication network operators, national regulators have begun to adapt their access regulation regimes to the new technological conditions. The regulatory reactions gravitate towards three distinct regulatory trajectories: unregulated competition, access regulation, and structural separation. We first analyze the extent of market power in access Networks in NGNs from a technological perspective. Second, we use case studies to identify patterns between technological and market conditions and regulators' reactions in selected countries. We find that market power in the access network is likely to prevail. Regulatory reactions differ with the extent of infrastructure competition and the regulators position in the trade-off between promoting investment and protecting competitionNext Generation Network, deregulation, access regulation, structural separation.

Telecommunications reform in Uganda

The paper documents the case of Uganda's telecommunications reform. Uganda is one of only two countries in Africa that decided to privatize telecommunications in a competitive framework by selling a second national operator license. The authors find that Uganda did not sacrifice significant sales proceeds by choosing competition, but instead gained tremendously in both the speed and scale of investment from its early focus on competition.Knowledge Economy,ICT Policy and Strategies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,ICT Policy and Strategies,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Education for the Knowledge Economy