Improved Online Algorithms for Knapsack and GAP in the Random Order Model

The knapsack problem is one of the classical problems in combinatorial optimization: Given a set of items, each specified by its size and profit, the goal is to find a maximum profit packing into a knapsack of bounded capacity. In the online setting, items are revealed one by one and the decision, if the current item is packed or discarded forever, must be done immediately and irrevocably upon arrival. We study the online variant in the random order model where the input sequence is a uniform random permutation of the item set. We develop a randomized (1/6.65)-competitive algorithm for this problem, outperforming the current best algorithm of competitive ratio 1/8.06 [Kesselheim et al. SIAM J. Comp. 47(5)]. Our algorithm is based on two new insights: We introduce a novel algorithmic approach that employs two given algorithms, optimized for restricted item classes, sequentially on the input sequence. In addition, we study and exploit the relationship of the knapsack problem to the 2-secretary problem. The generalized assignment problem (GAP) includes, besides the knapsack problem, several important problems related to scheduling and matching. We show that in the same online setting, applying the proposed sequential approach yields a (1/6.99)-competitive randomized algorithm for GAP. Again, our proposed algorithm outperforms the current best result of competitive ratio 1/8.06 [Kesselheim et al. SIAM J. Comp. 47(5)]

House Markets with Matroid and Knapsack Constraints

Classical online bipartite matching problem and its generalizations are central algorithmic optimization problems. The second related line of research is in the area of algorithmic mechanism design, referring to the broad class of house allocation or assignment problems. We introduce a single framework that unifies and generalizes these two streams of models. Our generalizations allow for arbitrary matroid constraints or knapsack constraints at every object in the allocation problem. We design and analyze approximation algorithms and truthful mechanisms for this framework. Our algorithms have best possible approximation guarantees for most of the special instantiations of this framework, and are strong generalizations of the previous known results

Mechanism Design with Predicted Task Revenue for Bike Sharing Systems

Bike sharing systems have been widely deployed around the world in recent years. A core problem in such systems is to reposition the bikes so that the distribution of bike supply is reshaped to better match the dynamic bike demand. When the bike-sharing company or platform is able to predict the revenue of each reposition task based on historic data, an additional constraint is to cap the payment for each task below its predicted revenue. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism called {\em TruPreTar} to incentivize users to park bicycles at locations desired by the platform toward rebalancing supply and demand. TruPreTar possesses four important economic and computational properties such as truthfulness and budget feasibility. Furthermore, we prove that even when the payment budget is tight, the total revenue still exceeds or equals the budget. Otherwise, TruPreTar achieves 2-approximation as compared to the optimal (revenue-maximizing) solution, which is close to the lower bound of at least $\sqrt{2}$ that we also prove. Using an industrial dataset obtained from a large bike-sharing company, our experiments show that TruPreTar is effective in rebalancing bike supply and demand and, as a result, generates high revenue that outperforms several benchmark mechanisms.Comment: Accepted by AAAI 2020; This is the full version that contains all the proof

Budget Feasible Mechanisms

We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our knowledge, in the past. We focus on the case of procurement auctions in which sellers have private costs, and the auctioneer aims to maximize a utility function on subsets of items, under the constraint that the sum of the payments provided by the mechanism does not exceed a given budget. Standard mechanism design ideas such as the VCG mechanism and its variants are not applicable here. We show that, for general functions, the budget constraint can render mechanisms arbitrarily bad in terms of the utility of the buyer. However, our main result shows that for the important class of submodular functions, a bounded approximation ratio is achievable. Better approximation results are obtained for subclasses of the submodular functions. We explore the space of budget feasible mechanisms in other domains and give a characterization under more restricted conditions

Online Knapsack Problem under Expected Capacity Constraint

Online knapsack problem is considered, where items arrive in a sequential fashion that have two attributes; value and weight. Each arriving item has to be accepted or rejected on its arrival irrevocably. The objective is to maximize the sum of the value of the accepted items such that the sum of their weights is below a budget/capacity. Conventionally a hard budget/capacity constraint is considered, for which variety of results are available. In modern applications, e.g., in wireless networks, data centres, cloud computing, etc., enforcing the capacity constraint in expectation is sufficient. With this motivation, we consider the knapsack problem with an expected capacity constraint. For the special case of knapsack problem, called the secretary problem, where the weight of each item is unity, we propose an algorithm whose probability of selecting any one of the optimal items is equal to $1-1/e$ and provide a matching lower bound. For the general knapsack problem, we propose an algorithm whose competitive ratio is shown to be $1/4e$ that is significantly better than the best known competitive ratio of $1/10e$ for the knapsack problem with the hard capacity constraint.Comment: To appear in IEEE INFOCOM 2018, April 2018, Honolulu H

Improved Online Algorithm for Fractional Knapsack in the Random Order Model

The fractional knapsack problem is one of the classical problems in combinatorial optimization, which is well understood in the offline setting. However, the corresponding online setting has been handled only briefly in the theoretical computer science literature so far, although it appears in several applications. Even the previously best known guarantee for the competitive ratio was worse than the best known for the integral problem in the popular random order model. We show that there is an algorithm for the online fractional knapsack problem that admits a competitive ratio of 4.39. Our result significantly improves over the previously best known competitive ratio of 9.37 and surpasses the current best 6.65-competitive algorithm for the integral case. Moreover, our algorithm is deterministic in contrast to the randomized algorithms achieving the results mentioned above