Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods

This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each agent is assumed to arrive and depart dynamically, and in the basic model require the resource for one unit of time. We seek mechanisms that are truthful in the sense that truthful revelation of arrival, departure and value information is a dominant strategy, and that are online in the sense that they make allocation decisions without knowledge of the future. First, we provide two characterizations for the class of truthful online allocation rules. The characterizations extend beyond the typical single-parameter settings, and formalize the role of restricted misreporting in reversing existing price-based characterizations. Second, we present an online auction for unit-length jobs that achieves total value that is 2-competitive with the maximum offline value. We prove that no truthful deterministic online mechanism can achieve a better competitive ratio. Third, we consider revenue competitiveness and prove that no deterministic truthful online auction has revenue that is constant-competitive with that of the offline Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism We provide a randomized online auction that achieves a competitive ratio of O(log h), where h is the ratio of maximum value to minimum value among the agents; this mechanism does not require prior knowledge of h. Finally, we generalize our model to settings with multiple re-usable goods and to agents with different job lengths.Engineering and Applied Science

Measures to promote renewable energy for electricity generation in Algeria

Algeria has enormous renewable energy potential. However, fossil fuels remain the main electricity generation source, and the country is the third largest CO2 emitter in Africa. Algeria is also particularly vulnerable to climate change. Therefore, a set of actions related to energy, forests, industry and waste sectors have been programmed, over the period 2015–2030, and the government action program has given priority to promote renewable energy. In this sense, Algeria is committed to significantly promote investment in renewable energy, during the period 2020–2030. Thus by 2030, renewable electricity production capacity will achieve 22,000 MW, representing 27% of total electricity generation. This paper analyzes the electricity generation measures implemented in Algeria to reach the required energy mix, the legislative framework, financial aid, the feed-in tariff system, the tax incentives, and the tender and auctions undertaken. The analyses reveal that, although the electricity price premium policy has not been revoked, the newly enacted tender scheme is designed to become the standard procedure for launching renewable energy projects in Algeria in the coming years

Lost in Transaction: Individual-Level Welfare Loss in Quickly-Circulating Durable Goods Markets with Planned Temporary Ownership

A new style of durable goods consumption through a large scale online redistribution marketplace (e.g. eBay and Yahoo! Auction), characterized by a relatively small degree of usage and a short-term ownership, is becoming increasingly popular these days. Yet, the welfare structures of such emerging markets have not been investigated. By using a unique dataset of quickly-circulating multi-use train ticket resale markets, and by investigating perfectly-substitutable goods, this short article models, estimates, and analyzes individual-level welfare loss in such rapidly-growing market sectors. Our analysis shows that individual-level welfare losses caused by search and resale costs are non-negligibly large, ranging from 3% to 15% of the new good price. We also find that such individual-level welfare losses, which could be considered as hidden charges, are largely heterogeneous across buyers with differing degrees of intended use. These losses are described as disadvantageous to users who demand light degrees of usage