Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax-and-Round

Many algorithms that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. The resulting mechanisms are often natural and simple to understand. But how good are these algorithms as mechanisms? Truthful reporting of valuations is typically not a dominant strategy (certainly not with a pay-your-bid, first-price rule, but it is likely not a good strategy even with a critical value, or second-price style rule either). Our goal is to show that a wide class of approximation algorithms yields this way mechanisms with low Price of Anarchy. The seminal result of Lucier and Borodin [SODA 2010] shows that combining a greedy algorithm that is an $\alpha$-approximation algorithm with a pay-your-bid payment rule yields a mechanism whose Price of Anarchy is $O(\alpha)$. In this paper we significantly extend the class of algorithms for which such a result is available by showing that this close connection between approximation ratio on the one hand and Price of Anarchy on the other also holds for the design principle of relaxation and rounding provided that the relaxation is smooth and the rounding is oblivious. We demonstrate the far-reaching consequences of our result by showing its implications for sparse packing integer programs, such as multi-unit auctions and generalized matching, for the maximum traveling salesman problem, for combinatorial auctions, and for single source unsplittable flow problems. In all these problems our approach leads to novel simple, near-optimal mechanisms whose Price of Anarchy either matches or beats the performance guarantees of known mechanisms.Comment: Extended abstract appeared in Proc. of 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'15

Balancing Relevance and Diversity in Online Bipartite Matching via Submodularity

In bipartite matching problems, vertices on one side of a bipartite graph are paired with those on the other. In its online variant, one side of the graph is available offline, while the vertices on the other side arrive online. When a vertex arrives, an irrevocable and immediate decision should be made by the algorithm; either match it to an available vertex or drop it. Examples of such problems include matching workers to firms, advertisers to keywords, organs to patients, and so on. Much of the literature focuses on maximizing the total relevance---modeled via total weight---of the matching. However, in many real-world problems, it is also important to consider contributions of diversity: hiring a diverse pool of candidates, displaying a relevant but diverse set of ads, and so on. In this paper, we propose the Online Submodular Bipartite Matching (\osbm) problem, where the goal is to maximize a submodular function $f$ over the set of matched edges. This objective is general enough to capture the notion of both diversity (\emph{e.g.,} a weighted coverage function) and relevance (\emph{e.g.,} the traditional linear function)---as well as many other natural objective functions occurring in practice (\emph{e.g.,} limited total budget in advertising settings). We propose novel algorithms that have provable guarantees and are essentially optimal when restricted to various special cases. We also run experiments on real-world and synthetic datasets to validate our algorithms.Comment: To appear in AAAI 201

Streaming Algorithms for Submodular Function Maximization

We consider the problem of maximizing a nonnegative submodular set function $f:2^{\mathcal{N}} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ subject to a $p$-matchoid constraint in the single-pass streaming setting. Previous work in this context has considered streaming algorithms for modular functions and monotone submodular functions. The main result is for submodular functions that are {\em non-monotone}. We describe deterministic and randomized algorithms that obtain a $\Omega(\frac{1}{p})$-approximation using $O(k \log k)$-space, where $k$ is an upper bound on the cardinality of the desired set. The model assumes value oracle access to $f$ and membership oracles for the matroids defining the $p$-matchoid constraint.Comment: 29 pages, 7 figures, extended abstract to appear in ICALP 201

A Bridge between Liquid and Social Welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders

We study incentive compatible mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions where the bidders have submodular (or XOS) valuations and are budget-constrained. Our objective is to maximize the \emph{liquid welfare}, a notion of efficiency for budget-constrained bidders introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme (2014). We show that some of the known truthful mechanisms that best-approximate the social welfare for Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders through demand query oracles can be adapted, so that they retain truthfulness and achieve asymptotically the same approximation guarantees for the liquid welfare. More specifically, for the problem of optimizing the liquid welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders, we obtain a universally truthful randomized $O(\log m)$-approximate mechanism, where $m$ is the number of items, by adapting the mechanism of Krysta and V\"ocking (2012). Additionally, motivated by large market assumptions often used in mechanism design, we introduce a notion of competitive markets and show that in such markets, liquid welfare can be approximated within a constant factor by a randomized universally truthful mechanism. Finally, in the Bayesian setting, we obtain a truthful $O(1)$-approximate mechanism for the case where bidder valuations are generated as independent samples from a known distribution, by adapting the results of Feldman, Gravin and Lucier (2014).Comment: AAAI-1