67 research outputs found
It bends but would it break?:topological analysis of BGP infrastructures in Europe
The Internet is often thought to be a model of resilience, due to a decentralised, organically-grown architecture. This paper puts this perception into perspective through the results of a security analysis of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing infrastructure. BGP is a fundamental Internet protocol and its intrinsic fragilities have been highlighted extensively in the literature. A seldom studied aspect is how robust the BGP infrastructure actually is as a result of nearly three decades of perpetual growth. Although global black-outs seem unlikely, local security events raise growing concerns on the robustness of the backbone. In order to better protect this critical infrastructure, it is crucial to understand its topology in the context of the weaknesses of BGP and to identify possible security scenarios. Firstly, we establish a comprehensive threat model that classifies main attack vectors, including but non limited to BGP vulnerabilities. We then construct maps of the European BGP backbone based on publicly available routing data. We analyse the topology of the backbone and establish several disruption scenarios that highlight the possible consequences of different types of attacks, for different attack capabilities. We also discuss existing mitigation and recovery strategies, and we propose improvements to enhance the robustness and resilience of the backbone. To our knowledge, this study is the first to combine a comprehensive threat analysis of BGP infrastructures withadvanced network topology considerations. We find that the BGP infrastructure is at higher risk than already understood, due to topologies that remain vulnerable to certain targeted attacks as a result of organic deployment over the years. Significant parts of the system are still uncharted territory, which warrants further investigation in this direction
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Improving Computer Network Operations Through Automated Interpretation of State
Networked systems today are hyper-scaled entities that provide core functionality for distributed services and applications spanning personal, business, and government use. It is critical to maintain correct operation of these networks to avoid adverse business outcomes. The advent of programmable networks has provided much needed fine-grained network control, enabling providers and operators alike to build some innovative networking architectures and solutions. At the same time, they have given rise to new challenges in network management. These architectures, coupled with a multitude of devices, protocols, virtual overlays on top of physical data-plane etc. make network management a highly challenging task. Existing network management methodologies have not evolved at the same pace as the technologies and architectures. Current network management practices do not provide adequate solutions for highly dynamic, programmable environments. We have a long way to go in developing management methodologies that can meaningfully contribute to networks becoming self-healing entities. The goal of my research is to contribute to the design and development of networks towards transforming them into self-healing entities.
Network management includes a multitude of tasks, not limited to diagnosis and troubleshooting, but also performance engineering and tuning, security analysis etc. This research explores novel methods of utilizing network state to enhance networking capabilities. It is constructed around hypotheses based on careful analysis of practical deficiencies in the field. I try to generate real-world impact with my research by tackling problems that are prevalent in deployed networks, and that bear practical relevance to the current state of networking. The overarching goal of this body of work is to examine various approaches that could help enhance network management paradigms, providing administrators with a better understanding of the underlying state of the network, thus leading to more informed decision-making. The research looks into two distinct areas of network management, troubleshooting and routing, presenting novel approaches to accomplishing certain goals in each of these areas, demonstrating that they can indeed enhance the network management experience
Detecting IP prefix hijack events using BGP activity and AS connectivity analysis
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the main component of core Internet connectivity, suffers vulnerability issues related to the impersonation of the ownership of IP prefixes for Autonomous Systems (ASes). In this context, a number of studies have focused on securing the BGP through several techniques, such as monitoring-based, historical-based and statistical-based behavioural models. In spite of the significant research undertaken, the proposed solutions cannot detect the IP prefix hijack accurately or even differentiate it from other types of attacks that could threaten the performance of the BGP. This research proposes three novel detection methods aimed at tracking the behaviour of BGP edge routers and detecting IP prefix hijacks based on statistical analysis of variance, the attack signature approach and a classification-based technique.
The first detection method uses statistical analysis of variance to identify hijacking behaviour through the normal operation of routing information being exchanged among routers and their behaviour during the occurrence of IP prefix hijacking. However, this method failed to find any indication of IP prefix hijacking because of the difficulty of having raw BGP data hijacking-free.
The research also proposes another detection method that parses BGP advertisements (announcements) and checks whether IP prefixes are announced or advertised by more than one AS. If so, events are selected for further validation using Regional Internet Registry (RIR) databases to determine whether the ASes announcing the prefixes are owned by the same organisation or different organisations. Advertisements for the same IP prefix made by ASes owned by different organisations are subsequently identified as hijacking events. The proposed algorithm of the detection method was validated using the 2008 YouTube Pakistan hijack event; the analysis demonstrates that the algorithm qualitatively increases the accuracy of detecting IP prefix hijacks. The algorithm is very accurate as long as the RIRs (Regional Internet Registries) are updated concurrently with hijacking detection. The detection method and can be integrated and work with BGP routers separately.
Another detection method is proposed to detect IP prefix hijacking using a combination of signature-based (parsing-based) and classification-based techniques. The parsing technique is used as a pre-processing phase before the classification-based method. Some features are extracted based on the connectivity behaviour of the suspicious ASes given by the parsing technique. In other words, this detection method tracks the behaviour of the suspicious ASes and follows up with an analysis of their interaction with directly and indirectly connected neighbours based on a set of features extracted from the ASPATH information about the suspicious ASes. Before sending the extracted feature values to the best five classifiers that can work with the specifications of an implemented classification dataset, the detection method computes the similarity between benign and malicious behaviours to determine to what extent the classifiers can distinguish suspicious behaviour from benign behaviour and then detect the hijacking. Evaluation tests of the proposed algorithm demonstrated that the detection method was able to detect the hijacks with 96% accuracy and can be integrated and work with BGP routers separately.Saudi Cultural Burea
Securing the Internet at the Exchange Points
Tese de mestrado, Engenharia Informática (Arquitectura, Sistemas e Redes de Computadores), 2022, Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de CiênciasBGP, the border gateway protocol, is the inter-domain routing protocol that glues the
Internet. Despite its importance, it has well-known security problems. Frequently, the
BGP infrastructure is the target of prefix hijacking and path manipulation attacks. These
attacks disrupt the normal functioning of the Internet by either redirecting the traffic,
potentially allowing eavesdropping, or even preventing it from reaching its destination
altogether, affecting availability.
These problems result from the lack of a fundamental security mechanism: the ability
to validate the information in routing announcements. Specifically, it does not authenticate the prefix origin nor the validity of the announced routes. This means that an intermediate network that intercepts a BGP announcement can maliciously announce an IP
prefix that it does not own as theirs, or insert a bogus path to a prefix with the goal to
intercept traffic.
Several solutions have been proposed in the past, but they all have limitations, of
which the most severe is arguably the requirement to perform drastic changes on the
existing BGP infrastructure (i.e., requiring the replacement of existing equipment). In
addition, most solutions require their widespread adoption to be effective. Finally, they
typically require secure communication channels between the participant routers, which
entails computationally-intensive cryptographic verification capabilities that are normally
unavailable in this type of equipment.
With these challenges in mind, this thesis proposes to investigate the possibility to
improve BGP security by leveraging the software-defined networking (SDN) technology
that is increasingly common at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). These interconnection
facilities are single locations that typically connect hundreds to thousands of networks,
working as Internet “middlemen” ideally placed to implement inter-network mechanisms,
such as security, without requiring changes to the network operators’ infrastructure. Our
key idea is to include a secure channel between IXPs that, by running in the SDN server
that controls these modern infrastructures, avoids the cryptographic requirements in the
routers. In our solution, the secure channel for communication implements a distributed
ledger (a blockchain), for decentralized trust and its other inherent guarantees. The rationale is that by increasing trust and avoiding expensive infrastructure updates, we hope to
create incentives for operators to adhere to these new IXP-enhanced security services
Optimization of BGP Convergence and Prefix Security in IP/MPLS Networks
Multi-Protocol Label Switching-based networks are the backbone of the operation of the Internet, that communicates through the use of the Border Gateway Protocol which connects distinct networks, referred to as Autonomous Systems, together. As the technology matures, so does the challenges caused by the extreme growth rate of the Internet. The amount of BGP prefixes required to facilitate such an increase in connectivity introduces multiple new critical issues, such as with the scalability and the security of the aforementioned Border Gateway Protocol.
Illustration of an implementation of an IP/MPLS core transmission network is formed through the introduction of the four main pillars of an Autonomous System: Multi-Protocol Label Switching, Border Gateway Protocol, Open Shortest Path First and the Resource Reservation Protocol. The symbiosis of these technologies is used to introduce the practicalities of operating an IP/MPLS-based ISP network with traffic engineering and fault-resilience at heart.
The first research objective of this thesis is to determine whether the deployment of a new BGP feature, which is referred to as BGP Prefix Independent Convergence (PIC), within AS16086 would be a worthwhile endeavour. This BGP extension aims to reduce the convergence delay of BGP Prefixes inside of an IP/MPLS Core Transmission Network, thus improving the networks resilience against faults.
Simultaneously, the second research objective was to research the available mechanisms considering the protection of BGP Prefixes, such as with the implementation of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure and the Artemis BGP Monitor for proactive and reactive security of BGP prefixes within AS16086.
The future prospective deployment of BGPsec is discussed to form an outlook to the future of IP/MPLS network design. As the trust-based nature of BGP as a protocol has become a distinct vulnerability, thus necessitating the use of various technologies to secure the communications between the Autonomous Systems that form the network to end all networks, the Internet
Interdomain Route Leak Mitigation: A Pragmatic Approach
The Internet has grown to support many vital functions, but it is not administered by any central authority. Rather, the many smaller networks that make up the Internet - called Autonomous Systems (ASes) - independently manage their own distinct host address space and routing policy. Routers at the borders between ASes exchange information about how to reach remote IP prefixes with neighboring networks over the control plane with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). This inter-AS communication connects hosts across AS boundaries to build the illusion of one large, unified global network - the Internet. Unfortunately, BGP is a dated protocol that allows ASes to inject virtually any routing information into the control plane. The Internet’s decentralized administrative structure means that ASes lack visibility of the relationships and policies of other networks, and have little means of vetting the information they receive. Routes are global, connecting hosts around the world, but AS operators can only see routes exchanged between their own network and directly connected neighbor networks. This mismatch between global route scope and local network operator visibility gives rise to adverse routing events like route leaks, which occur when an AS advertises a route that should have been kept within its own network by mistake. In this work, we explore our thesis: that malicious and unintentional route leaks threaten Internet availability, but pragmatic solutions can mitigate their impact. Leaks effectively reroute traffic meant for the leak destination along the leak path. This diversion of flows onto unexpected paths can cause broad disruption for hosts attempting to reach the leak destination, as well as obstruct the normal traffic on the leak path. These events are usually due to misconfiguration and not malicious activity, but we show in our initial work that vrouting-capable adversaries can weaponize route leaks and fraudulent path advertisements to enhance data plane attacks on Internet infrastructure and services. Existing solutions like Internet Routing Registry (IRR) filtering have not succeeded in solving the route leak problem, as globally disruptive route leaks still periodically interrupt the normal functioning of the Internet. We examine one relatively new solution - Peerlocking or defensive AS PATH filtering - where ASes exchange toplogical information to secure their networks. Our measurements reveal that Peerlock is already deployed in defense of the largest ASes, but has found little purchase elsewhere. We conclude by introducing a novel leak defense system, Corelock, designed to provide Peerlock-like protection without the scalability concerns that have limited Peerlock’s scope. Corelock builds meaningful route leak filters from globally distributed route collectors and can be deployed without cooperation from other network
Systems for characterizing Internet routing
2018 Spring.Includes bibliographical references.Today the Internet plays a critical role in our lives; we rely on it for communication, business, and more recently, smart home operations. Users expect high performance and availability of the Internet. To meet such high demands, all Internet components including routing must operate at peak efficiency. However, events that hamper the routing system over the Internet are very common, causing millions of dollars of financial loss, traffic exposed to attacks, or even loss of national connectivity. Moreover, there is sparse real-time detection and reporting of such events for the public. A key challenge in addressing such issues is lack of methodology to study, evaluate and characterize Internet connectivity. While many networks operating autonomously have made the Internet robust, the complexity in understanding how users interconnect, interact and retrieve content has also increased. Characterizing how data is routed, measuring dependency on external networks, and fast outage detection has become very necessary using public measurement infrastructures and data sources. From a regulatory standpoint, there is an immediate need for systems to detect and report routing events where a content provider's routing policies may run afoul of state policies. In this dissertation, we design, build and evaluate systems that leverage existing infrastructure and report routing events in near-real time. In particular, we focus on geographic routing anomalies i.e., detours, routing failure i.e., outages, and measuring structural changes in routing policies
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