8,506 research outputs found
Algorithms for Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation in the Real World
Coalition formation typically involves the coming together of multiple,
heterogeneous, agents to achieve both their individual and collective goals. In
this paper, we focus on a special case of coalition formation known as
Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (GCCF) whereby a network connecting the
agents constrains the formation of coalitions. We focus on this type of problem
given that in many real-world applications, agents may be connected by a
communication network or only trust certain peers in their social network. We
propose a novel representation of this problem based on the concept of edge
contraction, which allows us to model the search space induced by the GCCF
problem as a rooted tree. Then, we propose an anytime solution algorithm
(CFSS), which is particularly efficient when applied to a general class of
characteristic functions called functions. Moreover, we show how CFSS can
be efficiently parallelised to solve GCCF using a non-redundant partition of
the search space. We benchmark CFSS on both synthetic and realistic scenarios,
using a real-world dataset consisting of the energy consumption of a large
number of households in the UK. Our results show that, in the best case, the
serial version of CFSS is 4 orders of magnitude faster than the state of the
art, while the parallel version is 9.44 times faster than the serial version on
a 12-core machine. Moreover, CFSS is the first approach to provide anytime
approximate solutions with quality guarantees for very large systems of agents
(i.e., with more than 2700 agents).Comment: Accepted for publication, cite as "in press
Cooperative Games with Bounded Dependency Degree
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among
self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how
the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players.
Unfortunately, computational problems associated with many of these solution
concepts tend to be intractable---NP-hard or worse. In this paper, we
incorporate complexity measures recently proposed by Feige and Izsak (2013),
called dependency degree and supermodular degree, into the complexity analysis
of cooperative games. We show that many computational problems for cooperative
games become tractable for games whose dependency degree or supermodular degree
are bounded. In particular, we prove that simple games admit efficient
algorithms for various solution concepts when the supermodular degree is small;
further, we show that computing the Shapley value is always in FPT with respect
to the dependency degree. Finally, we note that, while determining the
dependency among players is computationally hard, there are efficient
algorithms for special classes of games.Comment: 10 pages, full version of accepted AAAI-18 pape
Coalition structure generation in cooperative games with compact representations
This paper presents a new way of formalizing the coalition structure generation problem (CSG) so that we can apply constraint optimization techniques to it. Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. CSG involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions to maximize social surplus. Traditionally, the input of the CSG problem is a black-box function called a characteristic function, which takes a coalition as input and returns the value of the coalition. As a result, applying constraint optimization techniques to this problem has been infeasible. However, characteristic functions that appear in practice often can be represented concisely by a set of rules, rather than treating the function as a black box. Then we can solve the CSG problem more efficiently by directly applying constraint optimization techniques to this compact representation. We present new formalizations of the CSG problem by utilizing recently developed compact representation schemes for characteristic functions. We first characterize the complexity of CSG under these representation schemes. In this context, the complexity is driven more by the number of rules than by the number of agents. As an initial step toward developing efficient constraint optimization algorithms for solving the CSG problem, we also develop mixed integer programming formulations and show that an off-the-shelf optimization package can perform reasonably well
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among
self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of
agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or
can do things more efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a
solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in
the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new
coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game
theory. However, the computational questions around this constraint have
received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software
agents (that represent real-world parties), these questions become increasingly
explicit.
In this paper we define a concise general representation for games in
characteristic form that relies on superadditivity, and show that it allows for
efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core. We then show that
determining whether the core is nonempty is -complete both with
and without transferable utility. We demonstrate that what makes the problem
hard in both cases is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of
outcomes possible for the grand coalition), by showing that if these are given,
the problem becomes tractable in both cases. However, we then demonstrate that
for a hybrid version of the problem, where utility transfer is possible only
within the grand coalition, the problem remains -complete even
when the collaborative possibilities are given
Sharing rides with friends: a coalition formation algorithm for ridesharing
We consider the Social Ridesharing (SR) problem, where a set of commuters, connected through a social network, arrange one-time rides at short notice. In particular, we focus on the associated optimisation problem of forming cars to minimise the travel cost of the overall system modelling such problem as a graph constrained coalition formation (GCCF) problem, where the set of feasible coalitions is restricted by a graph (i.e., the social network). Moreover, we significantly extend the state of the art algorithm for GCCF, i.e., the CFSS algorithm, to solve our GCCF model of the SR problem. Our empirical evaluation uses a real dataset for both spatial (GeoLife) and social data (Twitter), to validate the applicability of our approach in a realistic application scenario. Empirical results show that our approach computes optimal solutions for systems of medium scale (up to 100 agents) providing significant cost reductions (up to -36.22%). Moreover, we can provide approximate solutions for very large systems (i.e., up to 2000 agents) and good quality guarantees (i.e., with an approximation ratio of 1.41 in the worst case) within minutes (i.e., 100 seconds
Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy
management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the
network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This
poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process
of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to
participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving
different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process
needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can
ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an
overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a
feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various
games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification
to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy
research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key
features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the
paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models
that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important
finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac
Social Data Offloading in D2D-Enhanced Cellular Networks by Network Formation Games
Recently, cellular networks are severely overloaded by social-based services,
such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, in which thousands of clients subscribe
a common content provider (e.g., a popular singer) and download his/her content
updates all the time. Offloading such traffic through complementary networks,
such as a delay tolerant network formed by device-to-device (D2D)
communications between mobile subscribers, is a promising solution to reduce
the cellular burdens. In the existing solutions, mobile users are assumed to be
volunteers who selfishlessly deliver the content to every other user in
proximity while moving. However, practical users are selfish and they will
evaluate their individual payoffs in the D2D sharing process, which may highly
influence the network performance compared to the case of selfishless users. In
this paper, we take user selfishness into consideration and propose a network
formation game to capture the dynamic characteristics of selfish behaviors. In
the proposed game, we provide the utility function of each user and specify the
conditions under which the subscribers are guaranteed to converge to a stable
network. Then, we propose a practical network formation algorithm in which the
users can decide their D2D sharing strategies based on their historical
records. Simulation results show that user selfishness can highly degrade the
efficiency of data offloading, compared with ideal volunteer users. Also, the
decrease caused by user selfishness can be highly affected by the cost ratio
between the cellular transmission and D2D transmission, the access delays, and
mobility patterns
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