5,098 research outputs found
Social Welfare in One-sided Matching Markets without Money
We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to
efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private
preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation
mechanisms that do not involve any monetary payments. We consider two natural
measures of social welfare: the ordinal welfare factor which measures the
number of agents that are at least as happy as in some unknown, arbitrary
benchmark allocation, and the linear welfare factor which assumes an agent's
utility linearly decreases down his preference lists, and measures the total
utility to that achieved by an optimal allocation. We analyze two matching
mechanisms which have been extensively studied by economists. The first
mechanism is the random serial dictatorship (RSD) where agents are ordered in
accordance with a randomly chosen permutation, and are successively allocated
their best choice among the unallocated items. The second mechanism is the
probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8], which
computes a fractional allocation that can be expressed as a convex combination
of integral allocations. The welfare factor of a mechanism is the infimum over
all instances. For RSD, we show that the ordinal welfare factor is
asymptotically 1/2, while the linear welfare factor lies in the interval [.526,
2/3]. For PS, we show that the ordinal welfare factor is also 1/2 while the
linear welfare factor is roughly 2/3. To our knowledge, these results are the
first non-trivial performance guarantees for these natural mechanisms
Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of Money
Recently, Frazier et al. proposed a natural model for crowdsourced
exploration of different a priori unknown options: a principal is interested in
the long-term welfare of a population of agents who arrive one by one in a
multi-armed bandit setting. However, each agent is myopic, so in order to
incentivize him to explore options with better long-term prospects, the
principal must offer the agent money. Frazier et al. showed that a simple class
of policies called time-expanded are optimal in the worst case, and
characterized their budget-reward tradeoff.
The previous work assumed that all agents are equally and uniformly
susceptible to financial incentives. In reality, agents may have different
utility for money. We therefore extend the model of Frazier et al. to allow
agents that have heterogeneous and non-linear utilities for money. The
principal is informed of the agent's tradeoff via a signal that could be more
or less informative.
Our main result is to show that a convex program can be used to derive a
signal-dependent time-expanded policy which achieves the best possible
Lagrangian reward in the worst case. The worst-case guarantee is matched by
so-called "Diamonds in the Rough" instances; the proof that the guarantees
match is based on showing that two different convex programs have the same
optimal solution for these specific instances. These results also extend to the
budgeted case as in Frazier et al. We also show that the optimal policy is
monotone with respect to information, i.e., the approximation ratio of the
optimal policy improves as the signals become more informative.Comment: WINE 201
Car Travel Time Variability on Links of a Radial Route in London: Methodology, Surveys and Data Processing
This working paper is one of a series of three describing
research on travel time variability of car drivers using a north
London corridor. The objectives of the work described in this
report were to determine the amount of variability experienced
within short time periods and between time periods, and to
explain these variations in terms of simultaneously-recorded
traffic factors.
This report describes the methodology used, the surveys carried
out and the data processing procedures. Data were collected on
twelve contiguous links on the A41 between 0730 and 1030 on
weekdays in spring and again in summer. Link travel-time
distributions for cars were obtained by registration-plate
matching using hand-held electronic data loggers. The methods
of treatment of spurious matches and outliers, resulting
respectively from chance matching of partial registration numbers
and from stopping or diverting vehicles, are described. The
reasons for selecting particular explanatory traffic variables
are presented, together with a description of the methods of data
collection.
The results of these surveys and their analysis are contained in
ITS Working Paper 279. The methodology, data collection
procedure and analysis of journey time variability experienced
by a panel of car commuters using the same corridor are contained
in ITS Working Paper 277
Relaxing the Irrevocability Requirement for Online Graph Algorithms
Online graph problems are considered in models where the irrevocability
requirement is relaxed. Motivated by practical examples where, for example,
there is a cost associated with building a facility and no extra cost
associated with doing it later, we consider the Late Accept model, where a
request can be accepted at a later point, but any acceptance is irrevocable.
Similarly, we also consider a Late Reject model, where an accepted request can
later be rejected, but any rejection is irrevocable (this is sometimes called
preemption). Finally, we consider the Late Accept/Reject model, where late
accepts and rejects are both allowed, but any late reject is irrevocable. For
Independent Set, the Late Accept/Reject model is necessary to obtain a constant
competitive ratio, but for Vertex Cover the Late Accept model is sufficient and
for Minimum Spanning Forest the Late Reject model is sufficient. The Matching
problem has a competitive ratio of 2, but in the Late Accept/Reject model, its
competitive ratio is 3/2
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