3,647 research outputs found

    Optimizing Your Online-Advertisement Asynchronously

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    We consider the problem of designing optimal online-ad investment strategies for a single advertiser, who invests at multiple sponsored search sites simultaneously, with the objective of maximizing his average revenue subject to the advertising budget constraint. A greedy online investment scheme is developed to achieve an average revenue that can be pushed to within O(ϵ)O(\epsilon) of the optimal, for any ϵ>0\epsilon>0, with a tradeoff that the temporal budget violation is O(1/ϵ)O(1/\epsilon). Different from many existing algorithms, our scheme allows the advertiser to \emph{asynchronously} update his investments on each search engine site, hence applies to systems where the timescales of action update intervals are heterogeneous for different sites. We also quantify the impact of inaccurate estimation of the system dynamics and show that the algorithm is robust against imperfect system knowledge

    The Value-of-Information in Matching with Queues

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    We consider the problem of \emph{optimal matching with queues} in dynamic systems and investigate the value-of-information. In such systems, the operators match tasks and resources stored in queues, with the objective of maximizing the system utility of the matching reward profile, minus the average matching cost. This problem appears in many practical systems and the main challenges are the no-underflow constraints, and the lack of matching-reward information and system dynamics statistics. We develop two online matching algorithms: Learning-aided Reward optimAl Matching (LRAM\mathtt{LRAM}) and Dual-LRAM\mathtt{LRAM} (DRAM\mathtt{DRAM}) to effectively resolve both challenges. Both algorithms are equipped with a learning module for estimating the matching-reward information, while DRAM\mathtt{DRAM} incorporates an additional module for learning the system dynamics. We show that both algorithms achieve an O(ϵ+δr)O(\epsilon+\delta_r) close-to-optimal utility performance for any ϵ>0\epsilon>0, while DRAM\mathtt{DRAM} achieves a faster convergence speed and a better delay compared to LRAM\mathtt{LRAM}, i.e., O(δz/ϵ+log(1/ϵ)2))O(\delta_{z}/\epsilon + \log(1/\epsilon)^2)) delay and O(δz/ϵ)O(\delta_z/\epsilon) convergence under DRAM\mathtt{DRAM} compared to O(1/ϵ)O(1/\epsilon) delay and convergence under LRAM\mathtt{LRAM} (δr\delta_r and δz\delta_z are maximum estimation errors for reward and system dynamics). Our results reveal that information of different system components can play very different roles in algorithm performance and provide a systematic way for designing joint learning-control algorithms for dynamic systems

    Market-based Recommendation: Agents that Compete for Consumer Attention

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    The amount of attention space available for recommending suppliers to consumers on e-commerce sites is typically limited. We present a competitive distributed recommendation mechanism based on adaptive software agents for efficiently allocating the 'consumer attention space', or banners. In the example of an electronic shopping mall, the task is delegated to the individual shops, each of which evaluates the information that is available about the consumer and his or her interests (e.g. keywords, product queries, and available parts of a profile). Shops make a monetary bid in an auction where a limited amount of 'consumer attention space' for the arriving consumer is sold. Each shop is represented by a software agent that bids for each consumer. This allows shops to rapidly adapt their bidding strategy to focus on consumers interested in their offerings. For various basic and simple models for on-line consumers, shops, and profiles, we demonstrate the feasibility of our system by evolutionary simulations as in the field of agent-based computational economics (ACE). We also develop adaptive software agents that learn bidding strategies, based on neural networks and strategy exploration heuristics. Furthermore, we address the commercial and technological advantages of this distributed market-based approach. The mechanism we describe is not limited to the example of the electronic shopping mall, but can easily be extended to other domains
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