Private Real Estate Investment Analysis within a One-Shot Decision Framework

Land development is a typical one-shot decision for private investors due to the huge investment expense and the fear of substantial loss. In this paper, a private real estate investment problem is analyzed within a one-shot decision framework, which is used for a situation where a decision is made only once. The one-shot decision framework involves two steps. The first is to identify which state of nature should be focused for each alternative. The second is to evaluate alternatives by using the focused states of nature. In a one-shot decision framework, the behavior of different types of private investors, such as normal, active, passive and more easily satisfied ones, are examined. The analysis provides insights into personal real estate investment and important policy implications in the regulation of urban land development.Private real estate investment; Possibility theory; One-shot decision; Focus points

A Model of Noisy Introspection

This paper presents a theoretical model of noisy introspection designed to explain behavior in games played only once. The equilibrium determines layers of beliefs about others' beliefs about ..., etc., but allows for surprises by relaxing the equilibrium requirement that belief distributions coincide with decision distributions. The paper contains a convergence proof and reports estimated introspection and error parameters for data from 37 one-shot matrix games. The accuracy of the model is compared with that of two alternative approaches: the Nash equilibrium and the logit quantal response equilibrium.game theory, introspection, Nash equilibrium, experiments.

Social Distance and Reciprocity

Contrary to the predictions of non-cooperative game theory, trust and reciprocity are commonly reported in simple games. We conduct a one-shot investment game to examine how social distance affects behavior in two-person exchanges. Two aspects of social distance are examined: ex post revelation of complete information on the second playerâ??s choice set and ex post revelation of information regarding the second playerâ??s identity. The results indicate that reciprocity is not affected by knowledge of the choice set, but depends critically on the possible revelation of the decision makerâ??s identity. That is, the possibility that the second playerâ??s identity (picture) is revealed to his/her counterpart has a profound effect on the degree of reciprocity extended.

Do People Care about Loss Probabilities?

In a series of experiments, we provide evidence that people pay special attention to the probability of losing. We first analyze this behavior in the typically used one-shot choice tasks. We then extend our analysis to repeated decisions in choice tasks, as well as allocation and investment tasks. Additionally, we test both decision making under risk and under gradually removed uncertainty, as with decisions from experience. Our findings of explicit attention to loss probabilities contradict the predictions of normative and descriptive decision theories, such as Expected Utility Theory and (Cumulative) Prospect Theory. We suggest a value function with a jump rather than a kink at the reference point, which separates gains and losses

Risk measures on networks and expected utility

In reliability theory projects are usually evaluated in terms of their riskiness, and often decision under risk is intended as the one-shot-type binary choice of accepting or not accepting the risk. In this paper we elaborate on the concept of risk acceptance, and propose a theoretical framework based on network theory. In doing this, we deal with system reliability, where the interconnections among the random quantities involved in the decision process are explicitly taken into account. Furthermore, we explore the conditions to be satisfied for risk-acceptance criteria to be consistent with the axiomatization of standard expected utility theory within the network framework. In accordance with existing literature, we show that a risk evaluation criterion can be meaningful even if it is not consistent with the standard axiomatization of expected utility, once this is suitably reinterpreted in the light of networks. Finally, we provide some illustrative examples

Social decision making in autistic adolescents: the role of theory of mind, executive functioning and emotion regulation

Social decision making is often challenging for autistic individuals. Twenty autistic adolescents made decisions in the socially interactive context of a one-shot ultimatum game, and performance was compared to a large matched typical reference sample. Theory of mind, executive functioning and emotion regulation were measured via direct assessments, self- and parent report. Relative to the reference sample, autistic adolescents proposed fewer fair offers, and this was associated with poorer theory of mind. Autistic adolescents responded similarly to the reference sample when making decisions about offers proposed to them, however they did not appear to down regulate their negative emotion in response to unfair treatment in the same way. Atypical processes may underpin even apparently typical decisions made by autistic adolescents

Doing good vs. avoiding bad in prosocial choice: a refined test and extension of the morality preference hypothesis

Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions (such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Game experiments) is not driven by outcome-based social preferences – as classically assumed – but by a generalized morality preference for “doing the right thing”. Here we argue that the key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018) comprise prominent methodological confounds and open questions that bear on influential psychological theory. Specifically, their design confounds: (i) preferences for efficiency with self-interest; and (ii) preferences for action with preferences for morality. Furthermore, their design fails to dissociate the preference to do “good” from the preference to avoid doing “bad”. We thus designed and conducted a preregistered, refined and extended test of the morality preference hypothesis (N=801). Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that prosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for doing the morally right thing. Inconsistent with influential psychological theory, however, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was as potent as the preference to avoid doing “bad” in this case

Doing good vs. avoiding bad in prosocial choice: a refined test and extension of the morality preference hypothesis

Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions (such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Game experiments) is not driven by outcome-based social preferences – as classically assumed – but by a generalized morality preference for “doing the right thing”. Here we argue that the key experiments reported in Capraro and Rand (2018) comprise prominent methodological confounds and open questions that bear on influential psychological theory. Specifically, their design confounds: (i) preferences for efficiency with self-interest; and (ii) preferences for action with preferences for morality. Furthermore, their design fails to dissociate the preference to do “good” from the preference to avoid doing “bad”. We thus designed and conducted a preregistered, refined and extended test of the morality preference hypothesis (N=801). Consistent with this hypothesis, our findings indicate that prosociality in the anonymous, one-shot Dictator Game is driven by preferences for doing the morally right thing. Inconsistent with influential psychological theory, however, our results suggest the preference to do “good” was as potent as the preference to avoid doing “bad” in this case

Can Free Choice Be Known?

In this note we reconsider an argument, borrowed from causal decision theory, according to which rational and identical players should cooperate in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma. We argue that, regardless of how one views this type of reasoning, the example rpoints at a possible inconsistency in standard formulations of knowledge and decision. We suggest that when formalizing notions of "decision," "choice," and "rationality," care must be taken not to assume knowledge of one's own choice. Finally, the relationships to the classical problems of causal decision theory and of dterminism versus free will are briefly discussed.