Approximating Multiobjective Optimization Problems: How exact can you be?

It is well known that, under very weak assumptions, multiobjective optimization problems admit $(1+\varepsilon,\dots,1+\varepsilon)$-approximation sets (also called $\varepsilon$-Pareto sets) of polynomial cardinality (in the size of the instance and in $\frac{1}{\varepsilon}$). While an approximation guarantee of $1+\varepsilon$ for any $\varepsilon>0$ is the best one can expect for singleobjective problems (apart from solving the problem to optimality), even better approximation guarantees than $(1+\varepsilon,\dots,1+\varepsilon)$ can be considered in the multiobjective case since the approximation might be exact in some of the objectives. Hence, in this paper, we consider partially exact approximation sets that require to approximate each feasible solution exactly, i.e., with an approximation guarantee of $1$, in some of the objectives while still obtaining a guarantee of $1+\varepsilon$ in all others. We characterize the types of polynomial-cardinality, partially exact approximation sets that are guaranteed to exist for general multiobjective optimization problems. Moreover, we study minimum-cardinality partially exact approximation sets concerning (weak) efficiency of the contained solutions and relate their cardinalities to the minimum cardinality of a $(1+\varepsilon,\dots,1+\varepsilon)$-approximation set

ND-Tree-based update: a Fast Algorithm for the Dynamic Non-Dominance Problem

In this paper we propose a new method called ND-Tree-based update (or shortly ND-Tree) for the dynamic non-dominance problem, i.e. the problem of online update of a Pareto archive composed of mutually non-dominated points. It uses a new ND-Tree data structure in which each node represents a subset of points contained in a hyperrectangle defined by its local approximate ideal and nadir points. By building subsets containing points located close in the objective space and using basic properties of the local ideal and nadir points we can efficiently avoid searching many branches in the tree. ND-Tree may be used in multiobjective evolutionary algorithms and other multiobjective metaheuristics to update an archive of potentially non-dominated points. We prove that the proposed algorithm has sub-linear time complexity under mild assumptions. We experimentally compare ND-Tree to the simple list, Quad-tree, and M-Front methods using artificial and realistic benchmarks with up to 10 objectives and show that with this new method substantial reduction of the number of point comparisons and computational time can be obtained. Furthermore, we apply the method to the non-dominated sorting problem showing that it is highly competitive to some recently proposed algorithms dedicated to this problem.Comment: 15 pages, 21 figures, 3 table

Algorithms for generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables

We consider generalized potential games, that constitute a fundamental subclass of generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We propose different methods to compute solutions of generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables, i.e., games in which some variables are continuous while the others are discrete. We investigate which types of equilibria of the game can be computed by minimizing a potential function over the common feasible set. In particular, for a wide class of generalized potential games, we characterize those equilibria that can be computed by minimizing potential functions as Pareto solutions of a particular multi-objective problem, and we show how different potential functions can be used to select equilibria. We propose a new Gauss–Southwell algorithm to compute approximate equilibria of any generalized potential game with mixed-integer variables. We show that this method converges in a finite number of steps and we also give an upper bound on this number of steps. Moreover, we make a thorough analysis on the behaviour of approximate equilibria with respect to exact ones. Finally, we make many numerical experiments to show the viability of the proposed approaches

Mechanism Design for Team Formation

Team formation is a core problem in AI. Remarkably, little prior work has addressed the problem of mechanism design for team formation, accounting for the need to elicit agents' preferences over potential teammates. Coalition formation in the related hedonic games has received much attention, but only from the perspective of coalition stability, with little emphasis on the mechanism design objectives of true preference elicitation, social welfare, and equity. We present the first formal mechanism design framework for team formation, building on recent combinatorial matching market design literature. We exhibit four mechanisms for this problem, two novel, two simple extensions of known mechanisms from other domains. Two of these (one new, one known) have desirable theoretical properties. However, we use extensive experiments to show our second novel mechanism, despite having no theoretical guarantees, empirically achieves good incentive compatibility, welfare, and fairness.Comment: 12 page