93 research outputs found
Emerging Security Threats in Modern Digital Computing Systems: A Power Management Perspective
Design of computing systems — from pocket-sized smart phones to massive cloud based data-centers — have one common daunting challenge : minimizing the power consumption. In this effort, power management sector is undergoing a rapid and profound transformation to promote clean and energy proportional computing. At the hardware end of system design, there is proliferation of specialized, feature rich and complex power management hardware components. Similarly, in the software design layer complex power management suites are growing rapidly. Concurrent to this development, there has been an upsurge in the integration of third-party components to counter the pressures of shorter time-to-market. These trends collectively raise serious concerns about trust and security of power management solutions.
In recent times, problems such as overheating, performance degradation and poor battery life, have dogged the mobile devices market, including the infamous recall of Samsung Note 7. Power outage in the data-center of a major airline left innumerable passengers stranded, with thousands of canceled flights costing over 100 million dollars. This research examines whether such events of unintentional reliability failure, can be replicated using targeted attacks by exploiting the security loopholes in the complex power management infrastructure of a computing system.
At its core, this research answers an imminent research question: How can system designers ensure secure and reliable operation of third-party power management units? Specifically, this work investigates possible attack vectors, and novel non-invasive detection and defense mechanisms to safeguard system against malicious power attacks. By a joint exploration of the threat model and techniques to seamlessly detect and protect against power attacks, this project can have a lasting impact, by enabling the design of secure and cost-effective next generation hardware platforms
Towards trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware
Historically, hardware was thought to be inherently secure and trusted due to its
obscurity and the isolated nature of its design and manufacturing. In the last two
decades, however, hardware trust and security have emerged as pressing issues.
Modern day hardware is surrounded by threats manifested mainly in undesired
modifications by untrusted parties in its supply chain, unauthorized and pirated
selling, injected faults, and system and microarchitectural level attacks. These threats,
if realized, are expected to push hardware to abnormal and unexpected behaviour
causing real-life damage and significantly undermining our trust in the electronic and
computing systems we use in our daily lives and in safety critical applications. A
large number of detective and preventive countermeasures have been proposed in
literature. It is a fact, however, that our knowledge of potential consequences to
real-life threats to hardware trust is lacking given the limited number of real-life
reports and the plethora of ways in which hardware trust could be undermined. With
this in mind, run-time monitoring of hardware combined with active mitigation of
attacks, referred to as trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware, is proposed
as the last line of defence. This last line of defence allows us to face the issue of live
hardware mistrust rather than turning a blind eye to it or being helpless once it occurs.
This thesis proposes three different frameworks towards trustworthy computing
on untrustworthy hardware. The presented frameworks are adaptable to different
applications, independent of the design of the monitored elements, based on
autonomous security elements, and are computationally lightweight. The first
framework is concerned with explicit violations and breaches of trust at run-time,
with an untrustworthy on-chip communication interconnect presented as a potential
offender. The framework is based on the guiding principles of component guarding,
data tagging, and event verification. The second framework targets hardware elements
with inherently variable and unpredictable operational latency and proposes a
machine-learning based characterization of these latencies to infer undesired latency
extensions or denial of service attacks. The framework is implemented on a DDR3
DRAM after showing its vulnerability to obscured latency extension attacks. The
third framework studies the possibility of the deployment of untrustworthy hardware
elements in the analog front end, and the consequent integrity issues that might arise
at the analog-digital boundary of system on chips. The framework uses machine
learning methods and the unique temporal and arithmetic features of signals at this
boundary to monitor their integrity and assess their trust level
Security of Systems on Chip
The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.In recent years, technology has started to evolve to become more power efficient, powerful in terms of processors and smaller in size. This evolution of electronics has led microprocessors and other components to be merged to form a circuit called System-on-Chip. If we are to make a vast and cursory comparison between SoC and microcontrollers, microprocessors, and CPUs; we would come to the conclusion of SoCs being a single chip, doing all the things the other components can do yet without needing any external parts. So SoCs are computers just by themselves. Furthermore, SoCs have more memory than microcontrollers in general. Being a computer just by themselves allows them also to become servers. Nowadays, an SoC may be regarded also as a Server-on-Chi
A Survey of hardware protection of design data for integrated circuits and intellectual properties
International audienceThis paper reviews the current situation regarding design protection in the microelectronics industry. Over the past ten years, the designers of integrated circuits and intellectual properties have faced increasing threats including counterfeiting, reverse-engineering and theft. This is now a critical issue for the microelectronics industry, mainly for fabless designers and intellectual properties designers. Coupled with increasing pressure to decrease the cost and increase the performance of integrated circuits, the design of a secure, efficient, lightweight protection scheme for design data is a serious challenge for the hardware security community. However, several published works propose different ways to protect design data including functional locking, hardware obfuscation, and IC/IP identification. This paper presents a survey of academic research on the protection of design data. It concludes with the need to design an efficient protection scheme based on several properties
Runtime Detection of a Bandwidth Denial Attack from a Rogue Network-on-Chip
Chips with high computational power are the crux of today’s pervasive complex digital systems. Microprocessor circuits are evolving towards many core designs with the integration of hundreds of processing cores, memory elements and other devices on a single chip to sustain high performance computing while maintaining low design costs. Two decisive paradigm shifts in the semiconductor industry have made this evolution possible: (a) architectural and (b) organizational.
At the heart of the architectural innovation is a scalable high speed data communication structure, the network-on-chip (NoC). NoC is an interconnect network for the glueless integration of on-chip components in the modern complex communication centric designs. In the recent days, NoC has replaced the traditional bus based architecture owing to its structured and modular design, scalability and low design cost. The organizational revolution has resulted in a globalized and collaborative supply chain with pervasive use of third party intellectual properties to reduce the time-to-market and overall design costs.
Despite the advantages of these paradigm shifts, modern system-on-chips pose a plethora of security vulnerabilities. This work explores a threat model arising from a malicious NoC IP embedded with a hardware trojan affecting the resource availability of on-chip components. A rigorous simulation infrastructure is established to evaluate the feasibility and potency of such an attack. Further, a non-invasive runtime monitoring technique is proposed and thoroughly investigated to ensure the trustworthiness of a third party NoC IP with low overheads
Design of programmable hardware security modules for enhancing blockchain based security framework
Globalization of the chip design and manufacturing industry has imposed significant threats to the hardware security of integrated circuits (ICs). It has made ICs more susceptible to various hardware attacks. Blockchain provides a trustworthy and distributed platform to store immutable records related to the evidence of intellectual property (IP) creation, authentication of provenance, and confidential data storage. However, blockchain encounters major security challenges due to its decentralized nature of ledgers that contain sensitive data. The research objective is to design a dedicated programmable hardware security modules scheme to safeguard and maintain sensitive information contained in the blockchain networks in the context of the IC supply chain. Thus, the blockchain framework could rely on the proposed hardware security modules and separate the entire cryptographic operations within the system as stand-alone hardware units. This work put forth a novel approach that could be considered and utilized to enhance blockchain security in real-time. The critical cryptographic components in blockchain secure hash algorithm-256 (SHA-256) and the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm are designed as separate entities to enhance the security of the blockchain framework. Physical unclonable functions are adopted to perform authentication of transactions in the blockchain. Relative comparison of designed modules with existing works clearly depicts the upper hand of the former in terms of performance parameters
Quantifiable Assurance: From IPs to Platforms
Hardware vulnerabilities are generally considered more difficult to fix than
software ones because they are persistent after fabrication. Thus, it is
crucial to assess the security and fix the vulnerabilities at earlier design
phases, such as Register Transfer Level (RTL) and gate level. The focus of the
existing security assessment techniques is mainly twofold. First, they check
the security of Intellectual Property (IP) blocks separately. Second, they aim
to assess the security against individual threats considering the threats are
orthogonal. We argue that IP-level security assessment is not sufficient.
Eventually, the IPs are placed in a platform, such as a system-on-chip (SoC),
where each IP is surrounded by other IPs connected through glue logic and
shared/private buses. Hence, we must develop a methodology to assess the
platform-level security by considering both the IP-level security and the
impact of the additional parameters introduced during platform integration.
Another important factor to consider is that the threats are not always
orthogonal. Improving security against one threat may affect the security
against other threats. Hence, to build a secure platform, we must first answer
the following questions: What additional parameters are introduced during the
platform integration? How do we define and characterize the impact of these
parameters on security? How do the mitigation techniques of one threat impact
others? This paper aims to answer these important questions and proposes
techniques for quantifiable assurance by quantitatively estimating and
measuring the security of a platform at the pre-silicon stages. We also touch
upon the term security optimization and present the challenges for future
research directions
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