The Category of Mereotopology and Its Ontological Consequences

We introduce the category of mereotopology Mtop as an alternative category to that of topology Top, stating ontological consequences throughout. We consider entities such as boundaries utilizing Brentano’s thesis and holes utilizing homotopy theory with a rigorous proof of Hausdorff Spaces satisfying [GEM]TC axioms. Lastly, we mention further areas of study in this category

Symbolic modeling of structural relationships in the Foundational Model of Anatomy

The need for a sharable resource that can provide deep anatomical knowledge and support inference for biomedical applications has recently been the driving force in the creation of biomedical ontologies. Previous attempts at the symbolic representation of anatomical relationships necessary for such ontologies have been largely limited to general partonomy and class subsumption. We propose an ontology of anatomical relationships beyond class assignments and generic part-whole relations and illustrate the inheritance of structural attributes in the Digital Anatomist Foundational Model of Anatomy. Our purpose is to generate a symbolic model that accommodates all structural relationships and physical properties required to comprehensively and explicitly describe the physical organization of the human body

Ontological foundations for structural conceptual models

In this thesis, we aim at contributing to the theory of conceptual modeling and ontology representation. Our main objective here is to provide ontological foundations for the most fundamental concepts in conceptual modeling. These foundations comprise a number of ontological theories, which are built on established work on philosophical ontology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of language and linguistics. Together these theories amount to a system of categories and formal relations known as a foundational ontolog

Mereological Essentialism and Mereological Inessentialism

Mereological essentialists argue that mereological summations cannot change their parts. Mereological inessentialists argue that mereological summations can change some or all of their parts. In this paper I articulate and defend a position called Moderate Mereological Inessentialism, according to which certain mereological summations can change some, but not all, of their parts. Persistent mereological summations occur when the functional parts of mereological summations persist through alterations to its spatial parts

Spatial location and its relevance for terminological inferences in bio-ontologies

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>An adequate and expressive ontological representation of biological organisms and their parts requires formal reasoning mechanisms for their relations of physical aggregation and containment.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>We demonstrate that the proposed formalism allows to deal consistently with "role propagation along non-taxonomic hierarchies", a problem which had repeatedly been identified as an intricate reasoning problem in biomedical ontologies.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The proposed approach seems to be suitable for the redesign of compositional hierarchies in (bio)medical terminology systems which are embedded into the framework of the OBO (Open Biological Ontologies) Relation Ontology and are using knowledge representation languages developed by the Semantic Web community.</p

What is global supervenience?

The relation of global supervenience is widely appealed to in philosophy. In slogan form, it is explained as follows: a class of properties A supervenes on a class of properties B if no two worlds differ in the distribution of A-properties without differing in the distribution of B-properties. It turns out, though, that there are several ways to cash out that slogan. Three different proposals have been discussed in the literature. In this paper, I argue that none of them is adequate. Furthermore, I present a puzzle that reveals a tension in our concept of global supervenience

The Metaphysics of Mental Representation

The representational theory of mind (RTM) explains the phenomenon of intentionality in terms of the existence and nature of mental representations. Despite the typical characterisation of mental representations in terms of their semantics, RTM is best understood as a metaphysical – more specifically formal ontological – theory whose primary defining feature is stipulating the existence of a class of mental particulars called representations. In this regard it is false, since mental representations do not exist. My argument is primarily methodological. Using an extended analysis of mereology and its variants as paradigmatic examples of a formal ontological theory, I argue for a 'synthetic’ approach to ontology which seeks to form a sound descriptive characterisation of the relevant phenomena from empirical data, to which philosophical analysis is applied to produce a rigorous theory. The value and necessity of this method is proved by example in our discussion of mereology which is shown to be defensible given certain assumptions, in particular perdurantism, but still inadequate as an account of parthood without considerable supplementation. We also see that there are viable alternatives which adopt a more synthetic approach and do not require the same assumptions. Having effectively demonstrated the value of a synthetic approach in ontology I critically examine the methodology employed by RTM and find it severely lacking. In the guise of ‘commonsense psychology’ RTM cavalierly imposes a theoretical framework without regard to empirical data, and this results in a severe distortion of the phenomenon of intentionality it purports to explain. RTM is methodologically unsound, and so its commitment to the existence of mental representations is utterly undermined. Furthermore the most attractive aspect of RTM – its semantics – can be separated from any commitment to mental representations existing. Even RTM’s strongest advocates lack motivation to believe that mental representations exist