A Unified Approach to Korean Causal Connective -nikka

This paper explores the semantic-pragmatic functions of the Korean causal connective –nikka. It has been widely observed that because-clauses are ambiguous depending on the level of causation: propositional, epistemic, and speech-act level causations. (e.g. Sweetser 1990) Many researchers argue that Korean also has three level causations and the two Korean causal connectives, -nikka and –ese ‘because’, are used in different levels of causation: while the usage of –ese is restricted to a propositional level causation, -nikka can be used in epistemic or speech-act level causations, as well as propositional level causations. I argue, departing from previous analyses, that the three different levels of causation do not exist in Korean. Alternatively, I propose that a nikka-clause always targets a propositional argument. Under this point of view, it is assumed that a nikka-clause takes a mood marked phrase: [ϕ-nikka [Mood(φ)]. On the basis of this structure, I argue that the various function of the nikka-clause results from the different types of mood in the main clause

Two types of speaker's ignorance over the epistemic space in Korean

The main goal of this paper is to propose a novel paradigm of the split epistemic ignorance, based on two morphologically related particles in Korean: inka in wh-indefinites vs. nka in modalized questions. Previous literature assumes the interrogative-indefinite affinity as a reflex of a semantic relationship between interrogative markers and indefinites by introducing a set of propositional alternatives (Alternative Semantics: Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Alonso-Ovalle 2006, a.o.). However, we challenge these claims by showing that inka and nka are distinct lexical items which are distributed in different clause types, hence, a new split for the ignorance system is called for. We propose a semantics under which inka and nka variants are relativized to the epistemic state of the speaker, M(i) (Giannakidou 1995 et seq.). In particular, we show that: (i) the common denominator of nka and inka is the fact that they both express the speaker's epistemic indeterminacy; but (ii) the crucial difference arises from a strict dichotomy between the types of alternatives that nka and inka introduce, i.e., the propositional alternatives for nka vs. the individual alternatives for inka

Who controls who (or what)

Language can be used to bridge the gap between expert knowledge and ability to act. I argue that this function is grammaticalized in imperatives (and in some languages, larger paradigms of directives), and that this becomes evident in restrictions on the (co-)reference of their subjects. I develop an account of the conventional semantics of imperatives and directives in general that associates the prohibited constellations with conflicting discourse requirements

Deriving ignorance in questions: evidence from Sinhala

The epistemic component of a question has always been a crucial aspect in the analysis of the meaning of a question. However, while the meaning of questions has mostly been analyzed in terms of indirect questions embedded under the factive know, the ignorance component associated with a direct question has received very little attention in the literature. This paper highlights the significance of the ignorance component of a matrix question in the analysis of its meaning and proposes to account for it in terms of a presupposition in association with the indefinite component within a question. It develops and tests the hypothesis with some crucial data from Sinhala, an Indo-Aryan language spoken in Sri Lanka

Logical Form in the Second Language: An Investigation into Quantification in Interlanguage

In coping with variability in morphological production in L2 acquisition, which represents a challenge for the parameter (re-)setting theories, Lardiere (2008) proposed the feature reassembly hypothesis in which sequential difficulty in L2 acquisition of morpho-syntactic features is captured by the processes of (re-)assembly and mapping of features onto their morphological realizations. Slabakova (2009, 2013) incorporated Lardiere’s proposal in establishing a scale of difficulty in learning semantic properties (e.g. definiteness) which is based on whether reassembly is needed and whether the universal meaning is obtained by overt morphology or context (See also Ramchand & Svenonius, 2008). In considering the truth-conditional aspect of meaning, the feature-based framework is not powerful enough to account for the variability of interpretations that L2 learners come to learn. Take as an example the acquisition of English comparatives by Japanese L2 learners. We discuss the L2 acquisition of a special type of syntaxsemantics mismatch in which in which a certain meaningprimitive (i.e., comparative and tense) is expressed using different truth conditions in the native and target language

The interdependence of modality and Theory of Mind

Modality is traditionally defined as the expression of possibility or necessity. In English, modality is expressed by the modal auxiliaries such as can, would, should, or might; adjectives and adverbs such as possible, necessary, maybe, and absolutely; or phrasal verbs such as going to or have to. Theory of Mind (ToM) is broadly defined as the ability to attribute thoughts and beliefs to other people. ToM is usually expressed using propositional attitude verbs such as think as in Mary thinks that it will rain. Hegarty (2006, 2010) proposes that propositional attitude verbs are covertly modalized and can be analyzed using the same apparatus as modals. If this theory is correct, then attitude ascriptions that are used to express ToM should be acquired by children after the child has a command of modality. Previous research shows that modality emerges in children as young as two years of age (Choi, 1999), but that children do not reach adult proficiency until around twelve years of age (Coates, 1987). Similarly, ToM begins to emerge when children can pass the standard false belief task near their fourth birthday (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), but children lack the necessary interpretation of the thoughts and beliefs of other people until they are approximately twelve years old (Lalonde & Chandler, 2002). This study evaluates the acquisition of both modality and ToM in eighty-six first, third, and fifth graders, using elicitation tasks for modality and question-answer tasks to test for higher-order ToM. The data was then analyzed indicating the approximate age of the acquisition of different types of modality such as epistemic (both strong and weak), alethic, priority, and dynamic. These results were then compared to those of the ToM tasks which indicate the age at which first, second, third, and fourth order ToM are acquired. The data suggests that modality and ToM are interdependent. Based on the results, a strong sense of modality emerges before the appropriate use of expressions of the second-order ToM, and third and fourth order ToM are mastered before the more difficult expressions of modality

Q-particles in embedded declaratives, mood, and clausal complementation

Q-particles are functional items that are used to form alternative-related constructions. This paper investigates a hitherto understudied use of the Japanese Q-particle ka in which it occurs immediately below the declarative complementizer and imposes constraints on the doxastic state of the attitude holder. I show that this use of ka is licensed only under a limited range of attitude predicates, and once licensed, it encodes the presupposition that  the attitude holder is 'uncertain' regarding the truth value of the proposition denoted by the embedded sentence

Toward a typology of constative speech acts:actions beyond evidentiality, epistemic modality, and factuality

The present study joins the long-running debate about the semantic– pragmatic distinction of the three domains of epistemic modality, evidentiality, and factuality. In particular, this work aims at providing both a theoretical and operational framework to investigate what type of speech act is at stake when a speaker/writer alternatively decides to mark a proposition as an epistemic modal, an evidential, or a factual construction. In fact, three basic types of illocutionary force will be shown to determine the modal marking of a constative speech act: evaluational (EvF(p)), presentative (PrF(p)), and assertive (AsF(p)) force. This classification is based on a set of tests that can effectively address either grammaticalized constructions or pragmatic strategies, independent from the specificity of the item under enquiry. This approach is first used to disen- tangle the controversial meaning of MUST-type predicates and then further theorized as a speech-act based framework of epistemic disambiguation

Vanilla Rules: the "No Ice Cream" Construction

This paper is about what we call Deontically-flavored Nominal Constructions (DNCs) in English, such as "No ice cream" or "Dogs on leash only". DNCs are often perceived as commands and have been argued to be a type of non-canonical imperative, much like root infinitives in German or Russian. We argue instead that DNCs at their core are declaratives that cite a rule but can be used performatively in the right context. We propose that DNCs contain an elided deontic modal, i.e., allowed, whose presence explains their distributional restrictions and interpretational properties. Among other things, we speculate on the licensing conditions of DNCs (the presence of 'only' or the negative determiner 'no'), suggesting that these are tied to the properties of discourses in which rules can be used naturally