32 research outputs found
Resource requirements and speed versus geometry of unconditionally secure physical key exchanges
The imperative need for unconditional secure key exchange is expounded by the
increasing connectivity of networks and by the increasing number and level of
sophistication of cyberattacks. Two concepts that are information theoretically
secure are quantum key distribution (QKD) and Kirchoff-law-Johnson-noise
(KLJN). However, these concepts require a dedicated connection between hosts in
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks which can be impractical and or cost prohibitive. A
practical and cost effective method is to have each host share their respective
cable(s) with other hosts such that two remote hosts can realize a secure key
exchange without the need of an additional cable or key exchanger. In this
article we analyze the cost complexities of cable, key exchangers, and time
required in the star network. We mentioned the reliability of the star network
and compare it with other network geometries. We also conceived a protocol and
equation for the number of secure bit exchange periods needed in a star
network. We then outline other network geometries and trade-off possibilities
that seem interesting to explore.Comment: 13 pages, 7 figures, MDPI Entrop
Enhanced secure key exchange systems based on the Johnson-noise scheme
We introduce seven new versions of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise
(KLJN) classical physical secure key exchange scheme and a new transient
protocol for practically-perfect security. While these practical improvements
offer progressively enhanced security and/or speed for the non-ideal
conditions, the fundamental physical laws providing the security remain the
same.
In the "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) scheme, Alice and Bob utilize the fact that
they exactly know not only their own resistor value but also the stochastic
time function of their own noise, which they generate before feeding it into
the loop.
In the "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) system, Alice and Bob have publicly known
identical sets of different resistors with a proper, publicly known truth table
about the bit-interpretation of their combination. In the "keyed" KLJN (KKLJN)
system, by using secure communication with a formerly shared key, Alice and Bob
share a proper time-dependent truth table for the bit-interpretation of the
resistor situation for each secure bit exchange step during generating the next
key.
The remaining four KLJN schemes are the combinations of the above protocols
to synergically enhance the security properties. These are: the
"intelligent-multiple" (iMKLJN), the "intelligent-keyed" (iKKLJN), the
"keyed-multiple" (KMKLJN) and the "intelligent-keyed-multiple" (iKMKLJN) KLJN
key exchange systems.
Finally, we introduce a new transient-protocol offering practically-perfect
security without privacy amplification, which is not needed at practical
applications but it is shown for the sake of ongoing discussions.Comment: This version is accepted for publicatio
On KLJN-based secure key distribution in vehicular communication networks
In a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett., 13 (2014) 1450020] we introduced a
vehicular communication system with unconditionally secure key exchange based
on the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme. In this
paper, we address the secure KLJN key donation to vehicles. This KLJN key
donation solution is performed lane-by-lane by using roadside key provider
equipment embedded in the pavement. A method to compute the lifetime of the
KLJN key is also given. This key lifetime depends on the car density and gives
an upper limit of the lifetime of the KLJN key for vehicular communication
networks.Comment: Accepted for publicatio
Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical
secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics
to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and
circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the
current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system,
respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the
instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy
amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information
leak and successfully preserve the system's unconditional security