2,200 research outputs found
EVEN ALLOCATIONS FOR GENERALISED RATIONING PROBLEMS
We study an extension of the standard rationing problem, consisting of the allocation of utility losses. We assume neither linearly transferable utilities nor risk averse agents. As a consequence, the utility possibility sets need not be convex or smooth. This problem is referred to as the generalised rationing problem. We introduce the notion of even allocations as a solution concept that extends the random arrival rule to this general scenario. Moreover, we show that, when the feasible set is convex, this solution can be characterised by a suitable reformulation of the axioms that define the Nash bargaining solution.Rationing Problems, Non-Transferable Utilities, Nash Bargaining Solution, Clarke Cones.
Mechanisms for Automated Negotiation in State Oriented Domains
This paper lays part of the groundwork for a domain theory of negotiation,
that is, a way of classifying interactions so that it is clear, given a domain,
which negotiation mechanisms and strategies are appropriate. We define State
Oriented Domains, a general category of interaction. Necessary and sufficient
conditions for cooperation are outlined. We use the notion of worth in an
altered definition of utility, thus enabling agreements in a wider class of
joint-goal reachable situations. An approach is offered for conflict
resolution, and it is shown that even in a conflict situation, partial
cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents (that is, agents in
fundamental conflict might still agree to cooperate up to a certain point). A
Unified Negotiation Protocol (UNP) is developed that can be used in all types
of encounters. It is shown that in certain borderline cooperative situations, a
partial cooperative agreement (i.e., one that does not achieve all agents'
goals) might be preferred by all agents, even though there exists a rational
agreement that would achieve all their goals. Finally, we analyze cases where
agents have incomplete information on the goals and worth of other agents.
First we consider the case where agents' goals are private information, and we
analyze what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase
their utility. Then, we consider the situation where the agents' goals (and
therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but the worth they attach to
their goals is private information. We introduce two mechanisms, one 'strict',
the other 'tolerant', and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency
of negotiation outcomes.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file
A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximize their joint welfare. The joint maxi- mization assumption is compared with di®erent sharing pro¯t schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value. The results show that the joint welfare max- imization assumption is similar with Nash Bargaining solution.game theory, coalition formation, joint welfare maximization, Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution, Consensus Value, international environmental agreements
Trajectory selection for the Mariner Jupiter/Saturn 1977 project
The use of decision analysis to facilitate a group decision-making problem in the selection of trajectories for the two spacecraft of the Mariner Jupiter/Saturn 1977 Project. A set of 32 candidate trajectory pairs was developed. Cardinal utility function values were assigned to the trajectory pairs, and the data and statistics derived from collective choice rules were used in selecting the science-preferred trajectory pair
Endogeneous Household Interaction
Most econometric models of intrahousehold behavior assume that household decision-making is efficient, i.e., utility realizations lie on the Pareto frontier. In this paper we investigate this claim by adding a number of participation constraints to the household allocation problem. Short-run constraints ensure that each spouse obtains a utility level at least equal to what they would realize under (inefficient) Nash equilibrium. Long-run constraints ensure that each spouse obtains a utility level equal to a least what they would realize by cheating on the efficient allocation and receiving Nash equilibrium payoffs in all successive periods. Given household characteristics and the (common) discount factor of the spouses, not all households may be able to attain payoffs on the Pareto frontier. We estimate these models using a Method of Simulated Moments estimator and data from one wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find that the model with long-run participation constraint fits the data best, and that 6 percent of sample households are not able to attain efficient outcomes. To meet the long-run participation constraint, over 90 percent of "efficient" households are required to modify the ex ante Pareto weight of 0.5 for each spouse assumed to apply to all households.household time allocation, grim trigger strategy, household production, method of simulated moments
Endogeneous Household Interaction
Most econometric models of intrahousehold behavior assume that household decisionmaking is efficient, i.e., utility realizations lie on the Pareto frontier. In this paper we investigate this claim by adding a number of participation constraints to the household allocation problem. Short-run constraints ensure that each spouse obtains a utility level at least equal to what they would realize under (inefficient) Nash equilibrium. Long-run constraints ensure that each spouse obtains a utility level equal to a least what they would realize by cheating on the efficient allocation and receiving Nash equilibrium payoffs in all successive periods. Given household characteristics and the (common) discount factor of the spouses, not all households may be able to attain payoffs on the Pareto frontier. We estimate these models using a Method of Simulated Moments estimator and data from one wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find that the model with long-run participation constraint fits the data best, and that 6 percent of sample households are not able to attain efficient outcomes. To meet the long-run participation constraint, over 90 percent of "efficient" households are required to modify the ex ante Pareto weight of 0.5 for each spouse assumed to apply to all households.Household Time Allocation, Grim Trigger Strategy, Household Production, Method of Simulated Moments
Nonlinear Interval Parameter Programming Combined with Cooperative Games: a Tool for Addressing Uncertainty in Water Allocation Using Water Diplomacy Framework
This paper shows the utility of a new interval cooperative game theory as an effective water diplomacy tool to resolve competing and conflicting needs of water users from different sectors including agriculture, domestic, industry and environment. Interval parameter programming is applied in combination with cooperative game theoretic concepts such as Shapley values and the Nucleolus to provide mutually beneficial solutions for water allocation problems under uncertainty. The allocation problem consists of two steps: water resources are initially allocated to water users based on the Nash bargaining model and the achieved nonlinear interval parameter model is solved by transforming it into a problem with a deterministic weighted objective function. Water amounts and net benefits are reallocated to achieve efficient water usage through net benefit transfers. The net benefit reallocation is done by the application of different cooperative game theoretical methods. Then, the optimization problem is solved by linear interval programming and by converting it into a problem with two deterministic objective functions. The suggested model is then applied to the Zarrinehrud sub-basin, within Urmia Lake basin in Northwestern Iran. Findings suggest that a reframing of the problem using cooperative strategies within the context of water diplomacy framework - creating flexibility in water allocation using mutual gains approach - provides better outcomes for all competing users of water
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