A Description Logic Framework for Commonsense Conceptual Combination Integrating Typicality, Probabilities and Cognitive Heuristics

We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of concept combination of prototypical concepts. The proposed logic relies on the logic of typicality ALC TR, whose semantics is based on the notion of rational closure, as well as on the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics, and is equipped with a cognitive heuristic used by humans for concept composition. We first extend the logic of typicality ALC TR by typicality inclusions whose intuitive meaning is that "there is probability p about the fact that typical Cs are Ds". As in the distributed semantics, we define different scenarios containing only some typicality inclusions, each one having a suitable probability. We then focus on those scenarios whose probabilities belong to a given and fixed range, and we exploit such scenarios in order to ascribe typical properties to a concept C obtained as the combination of two prototypical concepts. We also show that reasoning in the proposed Description Logic is EXPTIME-complete as for the underlying ALC.Comment: 39 pages, 3 figure

Precise Propagation of Upper and Lower Probability Bounds in System P

In this paper we consider the inference rules of System P in the framework of coherent imprecise probabilistic assessments. Exploiting our algorithms, we propagate the lower and upper probability bounds associated with the conditional assertions of a given knowledge base, automatically obtaining the precise probability bounds for the derived conclusions of the inference rules. This allows a more flexible and realistic use of System P in default reasoning and provides an exact illustration of the degradation of the inference rules when interpreted in probabilistic terms. We also examine the disjunctive Weak Rational Monotony of System P+ proposed by Adams in his extended probability logic.Comment: 8 pages -8th Intl. Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning NMR'2000, April 9-11, Breckenridge, Colorad

Nonmonotonic Probabilistic Logics between Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Logic under Coherence

Recently, it has been shown that probabilistic entailment under coherence is weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment. Moreover, probabilistic entailment under coherence is a generalization of default entailment in System P. In this paper, we continue this line of research by presenting probabilistic generalizations of more sophisticated notions of classical default entailment that lie between model-theoretic probabilistic entailment and probabilistic entailment under coherence. That is, the new formalisms properly generalize their counterparts in classical default reasoning, they are weaker than model-theoretic probabilistic entailment, and they are stronger than probabilistic entailment under coherence. The new formalisms are useful especially for handling probabilistic inconsistencies related to conditioning on zero events. They can also be applied for probabilistic belief revision. More generally, in the same spirit as a similar previous paper, this paper sheds light on exciting new formalisms for probabilistic reasoning beyond the well-known standard ones.Comment: 10 pages; in Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR-2002), Special Session on Uncertainty Frameworks in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, pages 265-274, Toulouse, France, April 200

Some views on information fusion and logic based approaches in decision making under uncertainty

Decision making under uncertainty is a key issue in information fusion and logic based reasoning approaches. The aim of this paper is to show noteworthy theoretical and applicational issues in the area of decision making under uncertainty that have been already done and raise new open research related to these topics pointing out promising and challenging research gaps that should be addressed in the coming future in order to improve the resolution of decision making problems under uncertainty

Quasi Conjunction, Quasi Disjunction, T-norms and T-conorms: Probabilistic Aspects

We make a probabilistic analysis related to some inference rules which play an important role in nonmonotonic reasoning. In a coherence-based setting, we study the extensions of a probability assessment defined on $n$ conditional events to their quasi conjunction, and by exploiting duality, to their quasi disjunction. The lower and upper bounds coincide with some well known t-norms and t-conorms: minimum, product, Lukasiewicz, and Hamacher t-norms and their dual t-conorms. On this basis we obtain Quasi And and Quasi Or rules. These are rules for which any finite family of conditional events p-entails the associated quasi conjunction and quasi disjunction. We examine some cases of logical dependencies, and we study the relations among coherence, inclusion for conditional events, and p-entailment. We also consider the Or rule, where quasi conjunction and quasi disjunction of premises coincide with the conclusion. We analyze further aspects of quasi conjunction and quasi disjunction, by computing probabilistic bounds on premises from bounds on conclusions. Finally, we consider biconditional events, and we introduce the notion of an $n$-conditional event. Then we give a probabilistic interpretation for a generalized Loop rule. In an appendix we provide explicit expressions for the Hamacher t-norm and t-conorm in the unitary hypercube

How much of commonsense and legal reasoning is formalizable? A review of conceptual obstacles

Fifty years of effort in artificial intelligence (AI) and the formalization of legal reasoning have produced both successes and failures. Considerable success in organizing and displaying evidence and its interrelationships has been accompanied by failure to achieve the original ambition of AI as applied to law: fully automated legal decision-making. The obstacles to formalizing legal reasoning have proved to be the same ones that make the formalization of commonsense reasoning so difficult, and are most evident where legal reasoning has to meld with the vast web of ordinary human knowledge of the world. Underlying many of the problems is the mismatch between the discreteness of symbol manipulation and the continuous nature of imprecise natural language, of degrees of similarity and analogy, and of probabilities

Bounded Rationality and Heuristics in Humans and in Artificial Cognitive Systems

In this paper I will present an analysis of the impact that the notion of “bounded rationality”, introduced by Herbert Simon in his book “Administrative Behavior”, produced in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). In particular, by focusing on the field of Automated Decision Making (ADM), I will show how the introduction of the cognitive dimension into the study of choice of a rational (natural) agent, indirectly determined - in the AI field - the development of a line of research aiming at the realisation of artificial systems whose decisions are based on the adoption of powerful shortcut strategies (known as heuristics) based on “satisficing” - i.e. non optimal - solutions to problem solving. I will show how the “heuristic approach” to problem solving allowed, in AI, to face problems of combinatorial complexity in real-life situations and still represents an important strategy for the design and implementation of intelligent systems