On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games

This paper provides a dual characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games (in particular, repeated games) as the discount factor tends to one. As a first corollary, the folk theorems of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille (2011) obtain. As a second corollary, in the context of repeated games, it follows that this limit set of payoffs is a polytope (a bounded polyhedron) when attention is restricted to equilibria in pure strategies. We provide a two-player game in which this limit set is not a polytope when mixed strategies are considered.Stochastic games, Repeated games, Folk theorem

A note on palindromic δ\delta-vectors for certain rational polytopes

Let P be a convex polytope containing the origin, whose dual is a lattice polytope. Hibi's Palindromic Theorem tells us that if P is also a lattice polytope then the Ehrhart $\delta$-vector of P is palindromic. Perhaps less well-known is that a similar result holds when P is rational. We present an elementary lattice-point proof of this fact.Comment: 4 page