A measure of rationality and welfare

There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates from the classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two important questions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best for extracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare analysis. In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundational analysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis of individual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealed preference data. We call such measure minimal index.Rationality; Individual Welfare; Revealed Preference.

Uncertain Demand, Consumer Loss Aversion, and Flat-Rate Tariffs

The so called flat-rate bias is a well documented phenomenon caused by consumers' desire to be insured against fluctuations in their billing amounts. This paper shows that expectation-based loss aversion provides a formal explanation for this bias. We solve for the optimal two-part tariff when contracting with loss-averse consumers who are uncertain about their demand. The optimal tariff is a flat rate if marginal cost of production is low compared to a consumer's degree of loss aversion and if there is enough variation in the consumer's demand. Moreover, if consumers differ with respect to the degree of loss aversion, firms' optimal menu of tariffs typically comprises a flat-rate contract

Living with risk

Living with risk can lead to anticipatory feelings such as anxiety or hopefulness. Such feelings can a¤ect the choice between lotteries that will be played out in the future - choice may be motivated not only by the (static) risks involved but also by the desire to reduce anxiety or to promote savoring. This paper provides a model of preference in a three-period setting that is axiomatic and includes a role for anticipatory feelings. It is shown that the model of preference can accommodate intuitive patterns of demand for information such as information seeking when a favorable outcome is very likely and information aversion when it is more likely that the outcome will be unfavorable. Behavioral meaning is given to statements such as "individual 1 is anxious" and "2 is more anxious than 1". Finally, the model is di¤erentiated sharply from the classic model due to Kreps and Porteus.risk, anxiety, savoring, anticipatory feelings, demand for commitment, demand for information, temporal resolution of risk, temptation

Uncertain Demand, Consumer Loss Aversion, and Flat-Rate Tariffs

The so called flat-rate bias is a well documented phenomenon caused by consumers' desire to be insured against fluctuations in their billing amounts. This paper shows that expectation-based loss aversion provides a formal explanation for this bias. We solve for the optimal two-part tariff when contracting with loss-averse consumers who are uncertain about their demand. The optimal tariff is a flat rate if marginal cost of production is low compared to a consumer's degree of loss aversion and if there is enough variation in the consumer's demand. Moreover, if consumers differ with respect to the degree of loss aversion, firms' optimal menu of tariffs typically comprises a flat-rate contract.Consumer Loss Aversion; Flat-Rate Tariffs; Nonlinear Pricing; Uncertain Demand

Choice by lexicographic semiorders

In Tversky's (1969) model of a lexicographic semiorder, preference is generated by the sequential application of numerical criteria, by declaring an alternative x better than an alternative y if the first criterion that distinguishes between x and y ranks x higher than y by an amount exceeding a fixed threshold. We generalize this idea to a fully-fledged model of boundedly rational choice. We explore the connection with sequential rationalizability of choice (Apesteguia and Ballester 2009, Manzini and Mariotti 2007), and we provide axiomatic characterizations of both models in terms of observable choice data.Lexicographic semiorders, bounded rationality, revealed preference, choice

An optimal-control based integrated model of supply chain

Problems of supply chain scheduling are challenged by high complexity, combination of continuous and discrete processes, integrated production and transportation operations as well as dynamics and resulting requirements for adaptability and stability analysis. A possibility to address the above-named issues opens modern control theory and optimal program control in particular. Based on a combination of fundamental results of modern optimal program control theory and operations research, an original approach to supply chain scheduling is developed in order to answer the challenges of complexity, dynamics, uncertainty, and adaptivity. Supply chain schedule generation is represented as an optimal program control problem in combination with mathematical programming and interpreted as a dynamic process of operations control within an adaptive framework. The calculation procedure is based on applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle and the resulting essential reduction of problem dimensionality that is under solution at each instant of time. With the developed model, important categories of supply chain analysis such as stability and adaptability can be taken into consideration. Besides, the dimensionality of operations research-based problems can be relieved with the help of distributing model elements between an operations research (static aspects) and a control (dynamic aspects) model. In addition, operations control and flow control models are integrated and applicable for both discrete and continuous processes.supply chain, model of supply chain scheduling, optimal program control theory, Pontryagin’s maximum principle, operations research model,

Satisficing behavior with a secondary criterion

Using the techniques of revealed preference analysis, we study a two-stage model of choice behavior. In the first stage, the decision maker maximizes a menu-dependent binary relation encoding preferences that are imperfectly perceived. In the second, a menu-independent binary relation is maximized over the subset of alternatives that survive the first stage. This structure can support various interpretations, including those of salience effects, positive action, and surface characteristics. We characterize the model behaviorally both in ordinal form and in terms of the corresponding numerical representations

“Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Dual Sourcing Option

We study a manufacturer's strategic use of a dual-sourcing option when facing suppliers who possess private information about their likelihood of experiencing a supply disruption. The manufacturer can diversify its supply by ordering from both suppliers, but we find that the cost of doing so is inflated under asymmetric information due to the suppliers' incentives to misrepresent their reliabilities. If the manufacturer instead sole-sources, competition between the suppliers curbs their informational rents. Therefore, asymmetric information pushes the manufacturer away from diversification and towards sole-sourcing. Surprisingly, the additional cost that asymmetric information imposes on diversification may cause the manufacturer to cease diversifying in reaction to uniformly eroding supply base reliability, while it would do just the opposite under symmetric information. Despite these trends away from diversification, the value of the dual-sourcing option should not be underestimated for manufacturers who are unsure of their suppliers' reliabilities - the dual-sourcing option is actually more valuable under asymmetric information than under symmetric information if the manufacturer's cost of replacing a unit lost due to a disruption is moderate. We also analyze the eect of codependence between supply disruptions, and find that a reduction in supplier codependence increases the manufacturer's value of information. Therefore, strategic actions to reduce codependence between supply disruptions should not be seen as a substitute for learning about the suppliers' reliabilities.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61153/1/1116_Damian.pd

Chain of Production as a Monetary Propagation Mechanism

This paper studies a general equilibrium model with multiple stages of production and sticky prices. Working through the input-output relations among industries at different stages and the timing of firms' pricing decisions, the model generates persistent fluctuations in both the inflation rate and aggregate output following a monetary shock. The persistence is larger, the greater the number of production stages. With a sufficient number of stages, the real persistence is arbitrarily large.Chain of Production; Persistence; Monetary Policy