A Parameterised Hierarchy of Argumentation Semantics for Extended Logic Programming and its Application to the Well-founded Semantics

Argumentation has proved a useful tool in defining formal semantics for assumption-based reasoning by viewing a proof as a process in which proponents and opponents attack each others arguments by undercuts (attack to an argument's premise) and rebuts (attack to an argument's conclusion). In this paper, we formulate a variety of notions of attack for extended logic programs from combinations of undercuts and rebuts and define a general hierarchy of argumentation semantics parameterised by the notions of attack chosen by proponent and opponent. We prove the equivalence and subset relationships between the semantics and examine some essential properties concerning consistency and the coherence principle, which relates default negation and explicit negation. Most significantly, we place existing semantics put forward in the literature in our hierarchy and identify a particular argumentation semantics for which we prove equivalence to the paraconsistent well-founded semantics with explicit negation, WFSX$_p$. Finally, we present a general proof theory, based on dialogue trees, and show that it is sound and complete with respect to the argumentation semantics.Comment: To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programmin

Improved Answer-Set Programming Encodings for Abstract Argumentation

The design of efficient solutions for abstract argumentation problems is a crucial step towards advanced argumentation systems. One of the most prominent approaches in the literature is to use Answer-Set Programming (ASP) for this endeavor. In this paper, we present new encodings for three prominent argumentation semantics using the concept of conditional literals in disjunctions as provided by the ASP-system clingo. Our new encodings are not only more succinct than previous versions, but also outperform them on standard benchmarks.Comment: To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP), Proceedings of ICLP 201

Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

Reasoning with Partial Knowledge

We investigate how sociological argumentation differs from the classical first-order logic. We focus on theories about age dependence of organizational mortality. The overall pattern of argument does not comply with the classical monotonicity principle: adding premises does not overturn conclusions in an argument. The cause of nonmonotonicity is the need to derive conclusions from partial knowledge. We identify meta-principles that appear to guide the observed sociological argumentation patterns, and we formalize a semantics to represent them. This semantics yields a new kind of logical consequence relation. We demonstrate that this new logic can reproduce the results of informal sociological theorizing and lead to new insights. It allows us to unify existing theory fragments and paves the way towards a complete classical theory.logic of theory building;non-monotonicity;organizational mortality respectively;social science methodology

Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition

One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a theory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understood as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by according the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons we have for them. Certain kinds of rational failings are so because they are manifestly illogical – for example, maintaining overtly contradictory commitments, violating deductive closure by refusing to accept the logical consequences of one’s present commitments, or failing to track basing relations by not updating one’s commitments in view of new, defeating information. Yet, according to the internal and empirical critiques, logic and probability theory fail to supply a fit set of norms for human reasoning and argument. Particularly, theories of bounded rationality have put pressure on argumentation theory to lower the normative standards of rationality for reasoners and arguers on the grounds that we are bounded, finite, and fallible agents incapable of meeting idealized standards. This paper explores the idea that argumentation, as a set of practices, together with the procedures and technologies of argumentation theory, is able to extend cognition such that we are better able to meet these idealized logical standards, thereby extending our responsibilities to adhere to idealized rational norms

Computing Consensus: A Logic for Reasoning About Deliberative Processes Based on Argumentation

Argumentation theory can encode an agent’s assessment of the state of an exchange of points of view. We present a conservative model of multiple agents potentially disagreeing on the views presented during a process of deliberation. We model this process as iteratively adding points of view (arguments), or aspects of points of view. This gives rise to a modal logic, deliberative dynamic logic, which permits us to reason about the possible developments of the deliberative state. The logic we propose applies to all natural semantics of argumentation theory. Furthermore, under a very weak assumption that the consensus considered by a group of agents is faithful to their individual views, we show that model checking these models is feasible, as long as the argumentation frameworks, which may be infinite, does not have infinite branching.acceptedVersio

Persuasive argumentation as a cultural practice

In this article author traces relation between argumentation and cultural practice. The first part focuses on definition of argumentation in informal logic tradition. In particular, it discusses argument in terms of verbal and social activity involving the use of everyday language. Author claims that there is no argumentation beyond language. The second part explains persuasive argumentation as a form of cultural practice. The persuasive arguments found in “social practice” can be understood as a social activity, analysable within the context of a given cultural system. Author refers to an approach taking the argumentative expression as a certain type of communicative practice, directed towards respecting, recognising or accepting specific actions. The inclusion of persuasive argumentation in the “circuit of cultural activities” to be studied makes it possible to compare this type of argumentation with other social practices, and to posit a clear historical dimension in the study of argumentation. It also makes it possible to view persuasive argumentation as one of many cultural activities aimed at changing or perpetuating behaviours, attitudes, thinking, etc. The third part of the paper concerns the problem of humanistic interpretation of persuasive argumentation. Author attempts to develop this intuition, at the same time demonstrating the problems that arise from this approach. In conclusion, author tries to analyze argumentation in terms of culture theory and humanistic interpretation

Abstract Argumentation and Answer Set Programming: Two Faces of Nelson’s Logic

In this work, we show that both logic programming and abstract argumentation frameworks can be interpreted in terms of Nelson’s constructive logic N4. We do so by formalising, in this logic, two principles that we call noncontradictory inference and strengthened closed world assumption: the first states that no belief can be held based on contradictory evidence while the latter forces both unknown and contradictory evidence to be regarded as false. Using these principles, both logic programming and abstract argumentation frameworks are translated into constructive logic in a modular way and using the object language. Logic programming implication and abstract argumentation supports become, in the translation, a new implication connective following the noncontradictory inference principle. Attacks are then represented by combining this new implication with strong negation. Under consideration in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP)

Probabilistic Argumentation. An Equational Approach

There is a generic way to add any new feature to a system. It involves 1) identifying the basic units which build up the system and 2) introducing the new feature to each of these basic units. In the case where the system is argumentation and the feature is probabilistic we have the following. The basic units are: a. the nature of the arguments involved; b. the membership relation in the set S of arguments; c. the attack relation; and d. the choice of extensions. Generically to add a new aspect (probabilistic, or fuzzy, or temporal, etc) to an argumentation network can be done by adding this feature to each component a-d. This is a brute-force method and may yield a non-intuitive or meaningful result. A better way is to meaningfully translate the object system into another target system which does have the aspect required and then let the target system endow the aspect on the initial system. In our case we translate argumentation into classical propositional logic and get probabilistic argumentation from the translation. Of course what we get depends on how we translate. In fact, in this paper we introduce probabilistic semantics to abstract argumentation theory based on the equational approach to argumentation networks. We then compare our semantics with existing proposals in the literature including the approaches by M. Thimm and by A. Hunter. Our methodology in general is discussed in the conclusion