Perceptual Pluralism

Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perception delivers a multiplicity of representational formats, some proprietary and some shared with cognition. The argument for perceptual pluralism marshals a wide array of empirical evidence in favor of iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations in perception as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) perceptual object representations

The brain dynamics of architectural affordances during transition.

Action is a medium of collecting sensory information about the environment, which in turn is shaped by architectural affordances. Affordances characterize the fit between the physical structure of the body and capacities for movement and interaction with the environment, thus relying on sensorimotor processes associated with exploring the surroundings. Central to sensorimotor brain dynamics, the attentional mechanisms directing the gating function of sensory signals share neuronal resources with motor-related processes necessary to inferring the external causes of sensory signals. Such a predictive coding approach suggests that sensorimotor dynamics are sensitive to architectural affordances that support or suppress specific kinds of actions for an individual. However, how architectural affordances relate to the attentional mechanisms underlying the gating function for sensory signals remains unknown. Here we demonstrate that event-related desynchronization of alpha-band oscillations in parieto-occipital and medio-temporal regions covary with the architectural affordances. Source-level time-frequency analysis of data recorded in a motor-priming Mobile Brain/Body Imaging experiment revealed strong event-related desynchronization of the alpha band to originate from the posterior cingulate complex, the parahippocampal region as well as the occipital cortex. Our results firstly contribute to the understanding of how the brain resolves architectural affordances relevant to behaviour. Second, our results indicate that the alpha-band originating from the occipital cortex and parahippocampal region covaries with the architectural affordances before participants interact with the environment, whereas during the interaction, the posterior cingulate cortex and motor areas dynamically reflect the affordable behaviour. We conclude that the sensorimotor dynamics reflect behaviour-relevant features in the designed environment

Concept empiricism: vehicle, meaning and intentionality

In the following Magisterarbeit I am going to develop a Concept Empiricist model of conceptual thought, which is in its technical core primarily inspired and motivated by Larry Barsalou‘ s Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory (PSST) (1999, 2008a). But it is not a theory of concepts in the genuine sense only, but it also expands naturally on related topics like the ontology of mind and the problem of intentionality. This is not arbitrarily chosen, but a natural consequence of any contemporary Concept Empiricist theory, for those theories are in kind direct outgrowths of an embodied approach to cognition which yields these consequences – the natural extension to related topics – as will be shown. The roadmap for the Magisterarbeit is going to look like this: First I will delineate the embodied cognition framework. Within embodied cognition there is a plethora of differing attempts at explaining the diverse phenomena of higher and lower cognition which differ in the meanwhile tremendously from each other. Therefore it will be very useful to set clear boundaries between the differing approaches, which range from strong neural embodiment on the one side to a very promiscuous extended mind hypothesis on the other side, in order to make a clear case for Concept Empiricism. It will be also very helpful to set my favoured version of grounded cognition off against classical attempts at the phenomena which are to be explained. Following that I am going to present Larry Barsalou‘s Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory in more detail. I will do that to an extent which allows for an appropriate discussion of concept related phenomena, but which is not too lengthy. I will spare the reader with unnecessary psychological or neurobiological details as long as it is not really necessary for explaining or clarifying the phenomena with which I deal here. Having done this I will discuss at great length conceptual meaning. In doing so I will present a presentational theory of meaning which is anti-realist, internalist and imaginistic. In advertising for this theory I will recur to conceptual methods, intuition as well as to the empirical record. Next and related to this I will develop a resemblance based theory of intentionality which differs also widely from the already established theories of intentionality so far given. Indeed it possess a feature which makes it very distinct and this is, besides its reliance on pattern mapping, the statistical grounding of resemblance which allows a cognitive theory of resemblance which is definite and therefore not open to the counterarguments generally mashalled against related theories, which stress the importance of resemblance. A very distinctive feature of this theory of intentionality is additionally that intentionality is seen as a capacity which emerges naturally form the mental mechanism involved. As we will see, this is a distinctive advantage of it in comparison to other proposal in the field. A discussion of the ontology of mental states follows which is however primarily a discussion of mechanistic explanations and Bechtel‘s and McCauley‘s Heuristic Identity Theory (HIT). Those theories from philosophy of science and philosophy of cognitive science do not only deliver models for the ontology of mental states, but also epistemic criteria for evaluating a theory as superior or inferior. Especially the idea of productive continuity plays a role of pivotal importance in my Magisterarbeit. It might be a bit unfortunate that that an important consideration is discussed nearly at the end of the Magisterarbeit, since I refer to it very often, however, I considered it as equally unfortunate to delay the discussion of meaning and intentionality, which is already protruded by the overview chapter and the more technical parts, even more. Therefore I plead the reader to refer to later parts of the Magisterarbeit when it is necessary in order to understand earlier parts. In the course of writing I have gotten second thoughts regarding the adequacy of an ontology of mental states altogether, especially from the background of the theory of meaning and intentionality delivered here. Therefore I tried to accommodate for ontological concepts by means of a tentative phenomenological interpretation of them. Similar ideas influenced my deliberations regarding meaning too. I hope that this transition towards Phenomenology runs smoothly and that the high level of coherence which is my primary concern and something which I always strive for first is preserved. Further, I have dedicated a main chapter of the Magisterarbeit for possible and actual critics of the ideas brought forth by me. Besides the more classic standard objections there you can find a recent critique of the authors on which I refer most often. Naturally I try to refute any single criticism brought forth and I hope that the reader will approve my objection to the objections. I will round off the Magisterarbeit with some concluding remarks and prospects for future research.In der hier vorliegenden Magisterhausarbeit entwickele ich eine Theorie von Begriffen und somit auch von Bedeutung und Intentionalität, die in dem Embodied and Embedded Mind Paradigma verankert ist. Dabei beziehe ich mich maßgeblich auf die Begriffstheorie von Lawrence Barsalou, die sogenannte Perceptual Symbol Systems Theorie. Neben einer allgemeinen Darstellung des Paradigmas, stelle ich zu Beginn der Arbeit die Perceptual Symbol Systems Theorie von Barsalou dar, sowie weitere begriffliche Werkzeuge, die es möglich machen, eine im Körper gegründete Begriffstheorie zu entwickeln: Simulation, Emulation und Neuronale Ausbeutung (neural exploitation). Dieser Teil ist primär darstellend. Der daraufhin folgenden Abschnitte der Magisterarbeit entwickeln primär eine Konzeption von Begriffsempirismus, so wie ich ihn mir vorstelle. Dabei diskutiere ich ausführlich das Phänomen "Bedeutung" und komme dabei zum Schluss, dass es sich bei Bedeutung um etwas handelt, das radikal verschieden von dem ist, wie es speziell die analytische Tradition in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie gezeichnet hat. Bedeutung ist demnach primär ein sensomotorisches Phänomen, dass für Handlungen evolvierte und dass auf quasi-imaginistischen Mechanismen ruht. Bedeutung ist primär weniger repräsentational als vielmehr phänomenal präsentational und internalistisch. Ich entwickele diese Theorie von Bedeutung vor dem Hintergrund von philosophischen Argumenten wie dem symbol grounding Argument oder dem chinese room argument als auch vor dem Hintergrund neuropsychologischer Theorien wie z.B. der mental imagery Theorie von Kosslyn oder der Begriffstheorie von Barsalou. Neben dem positiven Teil der Theorieentwicklung, diskutiere ich auch eine Vielzahl von Einwänden, die gegen klassische Theorien vorgebracht wurden, die teilweise größere Ähnlichkeit zu der hier entwickelten Theorie haben. Im Anschluss daran, versuche ich, eine Theorie von Intentionalität auszuarbeiten, die es ermöglicht, dass Intentionalität als quasi emergentes Phänomen entsteht und nicht, wie es üblich ist, durch umständliche und problematische ad hoc Erklärungen eingebracht wird. Dabei gehe ich davon aus, dass die biologischen Mechanismen, die auch Bedeutung erklären, größtenteils dazu beitragen, Intentionalität zu erklären, wobei Intentionalität eine konkrete Relation zwischen einem Ding in der Welt, einem Perzept und einem Begriff ist. Die stark objektivistische und metaphysisch realistische Tendenz klassischer Referenz und Intentionalitätstheorien wird dabei zurückgewiesen. Für die Kritik an klassischen Theorien arbeite ich 12 Punkte heraus, die es erlauben, schwere Zweifel hinsichtlich eben jener klassischen Theorien zu haben. Ich schließe die Intentionalitätsdiskussion mit einer Betrachtung des Pseudophänomens intentional-intensionaler Kontexte ab und schlage ein Modell vor, dass dieses Phänomen zurückweist. Daraufhin behandele ich ontologische Probleme hinsichtlich meiner Position. Ich gebe dabei praktisch zwei Lösungsvorschläge ab. Der eine ist maßgeblich durch das Mechanistische Paradigma und die Heuristische Identitätstheorie aus der Wissenschaftstheorie motiviert und setzt Phänomene und Mechanismen in ein enges Verhältnis. Der andere weist ontologische Fragestellungen zurück und bezieht sich dabei vor allem auf die phänomenologische Tradition. Den letzten großen Teil der Magisterhausarbeit macht eine Zurückweisung von konkreter Kritik am Begriffsempirismus aus. Dabei diskutiere ich neben der klassischen Kritik von Fodor und Pylsyshyn, die relativ generell ist, hauptsächlich Edouard Macherys Kritik, die sich konkret gegen Barsalou und Prinz richtet. Die Magisterhausarbeit schließt mit einem Resümee, das vor allem die Probleme, die sich aus meiner Position ergeben, darstellt und schildert, was zukünftig in den Fokus philosophischer Diskussion rücken sollte

The Mechanics of Embodiment: A Dialogue on Embodiment and Computational Modeling

Embodied theories are increasingly challenging traditional views of cognition by arguing that conceptual representations that constitute our knowledge are grounded in sensory and motor experiences, and processed at this sensorimotor level, rather than being represented and processed abstractly in an amodal conceptual system. Given the established empirical foundation, and the relatively underspecified theories to date, many researchers are extremely interested in embodied cognition but are clamouring for more mechanistic implementations. What is needed at this stage is a push toward explicit computational models that implement sensory-motor grounding as intrinsic to cognitive processes. In this article, six authors from varying backgrounds and approaches address issues concerning the construction of embodied computational models, and illustrate what they view as the critical current and next steps toward mechanistic theories of embodiment. The first part has the form of a dialogue between two fictional characters: Ernest, the �experimenter�, and Mary, the �computational modeller�. The dialogue consists of an interactive sequence of questions, requests for clarification, challenges, and (tentative) answers, and touches the most important aspects of grounded theories that should inform computational modeling and, conversely, the impact that computational modeling could have on embodied theories. The second part of the article discusses the most important open challenges for embodied computational modelling

Separation and Engagement: From Duplex Vision to the Achievement of Self-Consciousness

The world we observe and the world we act in are one and the same world, and crucially so. Dualisms are rife in cognitive science, and superficially, this paper may seem to be an exercise in splitting things in two. Neither brain structures nor cognitive aptitudes nor even modes of awareness will appear safe. Yet the core insights of this paper are guided by the above maxim of metaphysical monism, and serve to reinforce it. They will concern not differences and oppositions, but rather cooperation and complicity. To employ a prime metaphor elaborated by Brian Smith (1996), this is one story of the single dance we perform in our world, and how the two main skills we bring to bear therein – and to dig deeper, how their neural foundations – result in our important achievements as thinking creatures. Though it may traffic in popular dualisms, this is a tale of negotiation and mutual enrichment. Monisms and dualities notwithstanding, there is also a three-step hierarchy that the following argument will scale. I will begin in the trenches of neuroscience and the psychology of visual perception. This will motivate a discussion of two skills available to perceiving creatures, skills that I will subsequently claim to be central to a rather sophisticated form of self-consciousness. The main charge of this paper may be conceptualised as the task of showing that these three domains, of visual perception, of vital ways of interacting with the world, and of self-consciousness, are importantly interconnected. In what follows, I will build the case for two broad realms of embodied, embedded cognitive capability, referred to as separation and engagement in honour of Smith’s (1996) usage, being directly enabled by the functions characterising ventral stream and dorsal stream visual processing, respectively. Separation and engagement are our twin abilities to represent what is at a spatial or temporal distance from our local and present surroundings on the one hand, and to interact with our immediate, available environments, on the other. I will commence by exploring the perceptual performances made possible by the ventral and dorsal streams of the visual system. Based on empirical findings and theoretical analysis, I will draw out the relationship between ventral processing and a modest form of separation, and indeed, between dorsal processing, ecological perception, and engagement. This strictly segregated dialectic will soon begin to seem artificial. It will therefore be synthesised by way of arguments for the necessity of dorsally mediated processing for full-fledged separation, and the metaphysically indispensable position of the functions of ventral processing in engagement as we know it. Finally, I will attempt to show that full-fledged separation is what catalyses the transition from being an aware subject to being an object of self-awareness. Yet full-fledged separation cannot exist in the absence of an engaged, active life and the neural processing that supports it. Therefore, my claim will be that a sophisticated kind of self-consciousness can be traced back to the functions of the two visual streams via the interlaced achievements of separation and engagement. Prior to my closing remarks, I will advance some clarifications of this thesis and field objections as to its implications for the nature of cognition